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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this study was to gain an understanding of the nature of the role of the 
Public Protector in promoting democratic governance. The Office of the Public 
Protector is one of the institutions that constitutes the Chapter 9 institutions (State 
Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy) of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa of 1996. This study is intended to strengthen academic discourse for 
the continued support of the Office of the Public Protector as an independent 
functionary to advance accountability. The enquiry is premised on the concept of 
democratic good governance, which aims to hold the government accountable for its 
actions and/or omissions. The apathy of the South African public, who has generally 
remained silent amidst the scathing attacks directed at the Public Protector, 
prompted this study to carefully pose the following dual primary research question: 
What is the role and challenges of the Public Protector as an independent Chapter 9 
institution, and do the remedial actions of the Public Protector contribute to the 
implementation of good governance in the South African constitutional democracy? 
The methodology entailed a desktop analysis of literature and official documents to 
conceptualise the area of investigation. The data-collection sources for the desktop 
analysis also included global authoritative books, articles, court findings, and 
regulatory, policy, and strategy documents. The generated information was 
scrutinised through a process of intellectual analysis, categorisation, classification, 
integration, reflection, comparison, and synthesis. The approach was qualitative and 
included specific dimensions of unobtrusive research techniques to eliminate bias 
and to promote conceptual and contextual analyses.  
The emphasis of this thesis is the functioning, problems, challenges, pressures, and 
the power of the remedial recommendations and actions of the Office of the Public 
Protector in South Africa within its constituent structures and statutory parameters. 
The Public Protector functions cooperatively with all other institutions whose 
mandate it is to promote good governance, which includes the legislature, 
independent judiciary, and the other Chapter 9 institutions. Oversight institutions 
have a collective responsibility to ensure the promotion of good governance and to 
enhance democracy in South Africa. As a result of the interdependence of all levels 
of government, any discussion of constitutional mandates will inevitably touch on 
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certain matters that will affect not only the other government levels in general but the 
total legislative and policy effort in particular.  
This study found that the Public Protector has remedial power and that it is not for 
the president or any other organ of government to decide what form of remedial 
action would be more appropriate to right the wrongs of state or executive 
malfeasance and malpractice. It is clear that there has been almost full compliance 
with the Public Protector’s remedial actions in cases where those recommendations 
were contested in the courts. By holding the government accountable through the 
remedial actions of the Public Protector, it is ensured that his or her role is consonant 
with the purpose of political accountability, which is to hold the government and other 
organs of state accountable for their actions and omissions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Accountability; constitutional democracy; good governance; Public 
Protector; Ombudsman. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
RESEARCH RATIONALE AND SCIENTIFIC ORIENTATION  
OF THE STUDY 
1.1    Introduction 
This study focuses on the role of the Public Protector to promote democratic 
governance in South Africa. The Office of the Public Protector is one of the 
institutions that constitutes the State Institutions Supporting Constitutional 
Democracy (also known as Chapter 9 institutions because these institutions are 
legislated in Chapter 9 of the Constitution) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996 (hereafter referred to as “the Constitution”). This 
study is intended to strengthen the academic discourse for the continued support of 
the Office of the Public Protector as an independent institution to conduct its 
constitutional mandate of advancing good governance. This chapter introduces the 
research and focuses on the background and rationale of the research, as well as 
the problem statement to provide context for the research problem. The primary 
research question, secondary research questions and research objectives are 
provided.   
The scientific and methodological paradigm is provided to serve as the basis for the 
qualitative approach followed in this study. This chapter explains the research design 
and contextualises the methodological research paradigm, including the types of 
research, the purpose of the research, the deductive versus the inductive approach, 
the relationship between theory and knowledge, and the unit of analysis. 
Subsequently, the chapter discusses the research techniques suitable for the 
research approach adopted in the thesis in terms of unobtrusive methods, including 
conceptual, content, comparative, and documentary analyses. The chapter then 
discusses the process of compiling a literature review and explains the validity and 
reliability of the research findings. The chapter also highlights the data-collection 
sources in terms of the sources that were used to obtain information for this 
research. The terms frequently utilised in the study are defined, and the rationale 
behind the ethical considerations is highlighted. Finally, the chapter provides a brief 
outline to demarcate the chapters of the thesis.  
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1.2    Background, research rationale and problem statement    
In terms of this research, the thesis is premised on the concept of democratic good 
governance, which aims to hold the government accountable for its actions and/or 
omissions. Nel (2015:89) points out that “governance rests upon the foundations of 
democratic and legitimate institutional structures, and links the style of governmental 
interaction with society to a normative assessment of the outcomes of that 
interaction”.  
South Africa is a constitutional democracy, where the party that wins the majority of 
seats in parliament can exercise its majority powers through propelling policies. This 
state of affairs, however, permits or engenders a greater possibility that oversight 
functions may suffer or be minimalised, as the leadership may be self-serving. Such 
circumstances do not augur well for independent oversight functionaries to carry out 
their mandate free from parliamentary control or manipulation.  
Fukuyama (2015a) points out that while the state creates and uses power, the Rule 
of Law and democratic accountability serve as prerequisites intended to limit the 
abuse of power. Levy and Fukuyama (2010:17) contend that “both democratic 
accountability and the Rule of Law serve as checks on a leadership that might seek 
to pervert the functioning of the bureaucracy for narrow political ends”. Hence, 
Fukuyama (2015a) argues that the essence of “the Rule of Law is that the most 
powerful must be under the Rule of Law instead of pursuing the rule by law, which 
leaves them not subjected to the law”. “Democratic accountability through free and 
fair multiparty elections obliges rulers to be accountable not only to the elite but all 
citizens” (Fukuyama 2015a). Levy and Fukuyama (2010:6) state that “democracy 
can involve a number of different mechanisms for holding governments 
accountable”.    
Warner (2015) asserts that “the people and the government in a democracy have 
reinforcing roles that find expression in a ‘social contract’ emphasising the 
responsibilities that each of the parties shoulder”. In the same way, Fukuyama 
(2015b) affirms that “the government is there to provide public goods without 
personally enriching the select few”. Fukuyama (2015b) further warns that “the state 
should not be regarded as a feeding ground used to support the rulers and their 
close associates”. Warner (2015) highlights that the people have a responsibility to 
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make governance work. Fukuyama (2015b) posits that “while the state creates and 
uses power, institutions such as the Rule of Law and democratic accountability must 
be in place to limit power”. Fukuyama (2015b) further argues that “the most powerful 
must also be subject to the Rule of Law and that the rulers must not just be 
accountable to the elite but to all citizens alike”. It is not enough for the rulers to 
make claims that they are procedurally accountable while ignoring the most 
important aspect known as substantive accountability (Fukuyama 2014). Substantive 
accountability is central in determining whether governance is targeted at ensuring 
that the government does what the citizens want.  
Governments in democratic countries owe their existence to the legitimacy accorded 
to them by the electorate. According to Pienaar (2000:52),  
“governments in all countries are expected to be the guardians of the 
people and of the interests of the people over whom they govern. It is a 
truism, however, that governments which are managed or operated by 
humans are as fallible as the humans who constitute them”.   
For this reason, it is incumbent on the government-of-the-day to provide 
accountability in all matters pertaining to carrying out its mandate. Pienaar (2000:53) 
contends that “the main or principal form of external control in a democracy is that 
exercised by the legislature on the executive”. Besides the legislature, the judiciary 
and other internal mechanisms, including internal review of administrative actions 
and fiscal superintendence, are in place to provide oversight over the executive 
(Pienaar 2000:52).  
Pienaar (2000:52) acknowledges that these “traditional safeguards, while continuing 
to play an important role as a bulwark against administrative excesses, are not 
always working at maximum efficiency”. Owing to the inadequacy of the prevailing 
institutions, the search for more effective remedies for maladministration led to the 
establishment of the Office of the Public Protector in South Africa (Pienaar 2000:52). 
Against this background, Thornhill (2011:80) highlights that “public accountability is 
no longer viewed from a financial perspective, but is deemed to be an inherent 
requirement in any political, administrative and managerial action in the public 
sector”. 
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The shortcomings experienced with failure to hold the executive to account on the 
part of traditional safeguards led to the realisation that “there was no effective 
provision for remedies for maladministration, particularly when an individual or a 
small group was affected” (Pienaar 2000:52). Mothupi (2002:3) emphasises that 
governments, especially those established on democratic principles, need 
institutions such as the Public Protector in order to uphold constitutional democracy. 
The framing of the constitution was deemed fit to be supplemented by the oversight 
function provided by traditional safeguards. Pienaar (2000:53) argues that “due to 
the inadequate nature of legislative oversight, other external controls such as the 
Constitutional Court, Public Protector, and the Human Rights Commission, among 
the others, acquire particular relevance”. Levy and Fukuyama (2010:5-6) assert that 
while the state creates and uses power, accountability institutions limit power by 
reducing the state’s discretionary use of power.  
Mothupi (2002:3) maintains that the “Constitution made an innovative and significant 
contribution to the creation of a coherent framework of institutions designed to 
entrench constitutional democracy”. To complement the foregoing assertion, Klugh 
(1995) highlights that “while there is little international experience as to the 
functioning of such a wide range of institutions, this development may well prove to 
be one of the most important contributions from the South African experience”.  
South Africa has initiated legislation, policies, and procedures, with the purpose of 
creating a preliminary foundation for developing and striving for good democratic 
governance. This is against the background of studies that point to good governance 
having positive effects for growth and development. There are, however, challenges 
concerning implementing these policies in order to promote good governance. The 
challenges are reflected in the lack of unanimity in the exercise of oversight over the 
executive by oversight functionaries such as parliament and the Office of the Public 
Protector.  
The Constitution mandates the establishment of a system of governance that 
necessitates Chapter 9 institutions, parliament (the legislature), government (the 
executive), and the judiciary (courts). This study examines how one of the Chapter 9 
institutions, namely the Public Protector, contributes to good governance. According 
to Public Protector South Africa (2008a:13), Chapter 9 institutions are organs of 
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state, yet they do not form part of government. Hence, the principles of cooperative 
government do not apply to the Public Protector.  
The concept of a Public Protector is rooted in the concept of an Ombudsman as 
conceived in Sweden (see Section 3.3.1). Irrespective of the title utilised by a 
country, the goal is to afford citizens a mechanism to have their concerns heard. This 
is against the background of perceptions of growing abuse of power by elected 
political office bearers and public officials. Rowat (1968:127) states that “the decision 
to appoint an Ombudsman was presumably taken because it had become apparent 
that the means available to the citizen for ventilating his grievances against officials 
and gaining redress for administrative injuries were inadequate”. For elaboration on 
the involvement of the Public Protector with regard to remedying maladministration in 
South Africa’s public sector, see Chapter Five. 
The framers of the South African Constitution paved the way for the establishment of 
a democratic state based on the separation of powers with the government 
implementing policy adopted by parliament, and the judiciary interpreting legislation 
where disputes occurred. Parliament is mandated to exercise oversight over the 
government and the public service. To complement this, the Constitution made 
provision for the establishment of Chapter 9 institutions, with powers to investigate 
and provide remedial action on matters that affect the general public. Chapter 9 
institutions are accountable to and report only to parliament in the exercise of this 
constitutional mandate. The ability of all institutions in South Africa to work and 
function in harmony with one another towards the achievement of development is the 
ultimate goal advocated by the proponents of good democratic governance.   
Regarding South Africa’s constitutional democracy, the Public Protector, together 
with other state institutions that support democracy, has been specifically constituted 
to neutralise or reduce the negative implications of majority party rule and the 
potential for authoritarianism. This arises from the democratic processes adopted by 
South Africa, wherein the party with the majority votes in parliament is empowered to 
choose the president from among its members, normally the party’s leader. 
Subsequently, the president selects the members of cabinet based on their 
presidential prerogative. The distinction between parliament and government thus 
becomes blurred, to the extent that the abuse of power becomes a distinct 
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possibility, which appears not to have been anticipated in the creation of the 
Constitution. 
This situation arose in South Africa when the parliament did not deem the remedial 
actions that the Public Protector proposed in terms of her findings in the State of 
Capture report fit to be implemented. This case is analysed in detail in Chapter Five 
of the thesis. The Public Protector is an institution that operates within the broader 
framework of state systems. Schwind, Das and Wager (1999:74) assert that some 
systems are autonomous and self-sufficient, to the extent of being independent of 
their environment or circumstances, and these are termed closed systems. 
Conversely, open systems are dependent on their situation or milieu; their processes 
are contingent on, or conditional to external factors.  
Good governance is based on the foundations of functioning organisational systems, 
which, when employed correctly, are conducive to facilitating the effective delivery of 
public services. Van der Waldt and Auriacombe (2012:57) contend that “it is 
important to understand organisations as structures with systems, processes, 
procedures, design, order, control, etc.; as well as people who must function within 
these structures to operationalise organisational objectives”. The Public Protector, as 
an institution, is considered, and was selected as, the organisational unit of analysis 
for the purpose of this study.  
With regard to good governance, the systems in place have a profound impact on 
the quality of governance that a country enjoys. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
(2014:3), through the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), defines 
governance as “the provision of the political, social and economic goods that a 
citizen has the right to expect from his or her state, and that the state has the 
responsibility to deliver to its citizens”. In the words of Helen Clark, “good 
governance refers to governing systems which are capable, responsive, inclusive, 
and transparent” (in United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2011). From 
the African Development Bank’s (AfDB 2008:15) perspective, “governance is a 
process referring to the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
nation, and its relations with other nations”. The World Bank (2007:1) refers to good 
governance as “essentially the combination of transparent and accountable 
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institutions, strong skill and competence, and a fundamental willingness to do the 
right thing”.  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB 1995:3) defines governance as the “manner in 
which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development”. On the same note, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD 2010:64), although not using the term 
widely, deals with governance and accountability in terms of good corporate 
governance. Similarly, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB 2010:xxv) also 
does not widely use the term “good governance” but highlights several issues 
commonly associated with good governance.  
For the European Commission (2001:10), “governance means rules, processes and 
behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level, 
particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and 
coherence”. For the International Monetary Fund (IMF 1997:3), “good governance is 
important for countries at all stages of development, and the approach followed is 
that of concentrating on those aspects of good governance that are closely related to 
surveillance over macroeconomic policies”. Finally, the Organisation for Economic  
Co-operation and Development (OECD 1998), in its work on public governance, 
focuses in particular on the “principal elements of good governance, namely 
accountability, transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, responsiveness, forward 
vision and the Rule of Law”.  
Fukuyama (2013:3) highlights that “governance is government’s ability to make and 
enforce rules and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is 
democratic or not”. As such, associating democracy with good governance is a 
theory that is true in some cases but not necessarily universally true (Andrews, 
Fukuyama and Grindle 2013). Globally, the aspiration to govern public and private 
institutions in a manner by which the populace is best served and catered for 
constitutes one of the most coveted and crucial ideals, with South Africa being no 
exception. Understanding and agreeing on what constitutes good governance is, 
however, a dilemma that poses challenges to a number of people. The challenge is 
compounded by the fact that the authorities in democratic countries are under 
serious scrutiny with respect to compliance and adherence to principles that 
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underpin democratic governance. It is essential to take into account that good 
governance should not be equated with democracy; this would imply that only 
institutions in democratic dispensations are exclusively able to deliver services 
(Fukuyama 2013:3). 
The UNDP (1997:6) affirms that good governance enables the development of 
effective mechanisms and processes that are necessary for institutions to function 
normally in the course of their operations. The UNDP (1997) further delineates some 
of the essential characteristics of good governance, including participation, 
transparency, responsiveness, Rule of Law, consensus orientation, equity, 
effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, and strategic vision. A strategically 
defined amalgamation of some or all of these elements contributes towards the 
successful operation of an entity. Good governance is perceived by the United 
Nations (UN) as continually associated with the delivery of public services in 
conjunction with the promotion of the general welfare and the security of a nation’s 
population. 
Working towards achieving good governance, especially in the context of the 
developing world, is a serious challenge. Sinha (2004:111) contends that “when one 
talks of good governance, one really has an ideal in mind that is difficult to specify in 
great detail and accuracy”. This denotes that good governance is difficult to define 
and to delineate. Grindle (2007:2) affirms that “in moving from the definition of 
governance to the definition of good governance, the normative view of what ‘ought 
to be’ are much more prominent”. Similarly, “good governance is a value-laden multi-
dimensional concept and, because of its epistemic relativism, can mean different 
things to different people depending on the context in which it is used” (Maserumule 
2011:8). Bovaird (2005:217) analogously observes that “good governance is a 
contested concept, both in theory and practice”. Continuing with the issue of 
providing a characterisation and description of good governance, Akokpari (2005:19) 
concurs that the concept of good governance “has become an evocative term whose 
precise meaning has remained fluid and nebulous”.  
Rowat (1968:132) highlights that the interest in an Ombudsman institution derives 
from the fact that this functionary is seen as an authority independent of 
government who is responsible to parliament for the exercise of his or her 
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mandate. The Ombudsman is also an authority to which citizens can appeal 
against administrative decisions that are made arbitrarily. The Office on Institutions 
Supporting Democracy (OISD 2015:24) asserts that the appeal of the Ombudsman 
lies in this functionary’s mandate in forming part of parliamentary control, namely 
the authority of parliament to monitor and review the public administration. In 
situations where the legislator is seen as conniving with the executive instead of 
exercising oversight, the Public Protector’s role is of paramount importance. 
The concept of the Public Protector is better understood as an independent 
institution, which, together with other Chapter 9 institutions, is subject only to the 
Constitution. The Office of the Public Protector serves as one of the horizontal 
accountability institutions. Therefore, the South African Public Protector enjoys 
constitutional protection and carries a constitutional mandate. The Office of the 
Public Protector serves as a mechanism through which citizens can articulate their 
grievances with expectations that these will be resolved, at least by an apolitical 
functionary acting in the best interest of promoting administrative fairness and 
good governance.    
The Public Protector is entrusted with the authority to intervene between the 
bureaucracy and the citizens, especially with regard to perceived incidents of 
maladministration. This functionary is not entitled to discriminate against public 
officials who are wrongfully accused by members of the public without due 
processes to verify the facts around the accusations. Hence, one of the guiding 
principles that the Public Protector must observe is administrative fairness. In a 
situation characterised by widespread perceptions of corruption and 
maladministration, it is imperative that the Public Protector remedies the situation 
as a matter of urgency to avoid derailing the country from its course of pursuing 
good governance, which, if overlooked, might lead to state failure.  
The Office of the Public Protector serves as an institution that emphasises 
adherence to the Rule of Law to the extent of restraining government power. In all 
respects, the Public Protector provides access to every citizen to have their voices 
heard, which the legislator is often unable to do. For this reason, the Public Protector 
is not in competition with the legislator but rather serves to complement the oversight 
function performed by the legislator. The framers of the Constitution envisioned an 
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institution or institutions independent of the legislature positioned to provide 
additional oversight. 
An overview of the need to operationalise good governance is shown in Figure 1.1, 
with all the role players making a contribution to ensuring that good governance is 
pursued.   
Figure 1.1: Stakeholders in good governance 
 
 
Source: Author’s own construction 
From Figure 1.1 it can be deduced that the citizens are the main reason for the 
existence of state institutions in a country. Parliament, the courts, and the Public 
Protector each has a role to play in exercising oversight over the government. 
Citizens report incidents of maladministration or corruption to the Public Protector 
and in some instances to the courts. The findings of the courts and the Public 
Protector are then presented to parliament for consideration, which in turn must be 
legislated for government implementation beneficial to the citizens.  
Globally, good governance is an ideal to which every state aspires. As noted 
previously, the international community has periodically advocated good governance 
to be embraced by all countries. South Africa is not exempt from aspiring to attain 
Parliament 
Public  Protector 
and other 
Chapter 9 
institutions 
Govern-
ment 
Courts 
Citizens 
11 
good governance. The way in which South Africa’s organs of state are structured to 
ensure that there is separation of powers was also meant to enhance good 
governance (Department: Government Communication and Information System 
2013:201). The inclusion of phenomena such as accountability, openness, and 
responsiveness in the Constitution with which the government and all its 
establishments must comply is an indication of an inclination towards good 
governance. 
Governance, as one of the contemporary paradigms emanating from the public 
administration discourse, owes its existence to key global challenges that confront 
nation states. Nel (2013:35-36) asserts that  
“global, nation states were unable to address key social issues within 
traditional public [administration and] management paradigms, 
because of the increasing complexity of policy issues and solutions, 
accompanied by dramatic increases in expectations as a result of 
successful development outcomes and the huge accompanying cost 
increases in service delivery and facilities of the desired quality for 
increasing citizenship”.  
Cloete (2003:11) concurs that “the emergence of the governance paradigm in the 
field of Public Administration was necessitated by the weaknesses in the liberal, free-
market based NPM [New Public Management] approach”. In the same way, 
Maserumule (2011:374) posits that “the scope of governance transcends the intra-
organisational focus of the NPM and its market orientation”. Nel (2015:88) argues 
that “not only does public governance aim to address key issues in contemporary 
society, it also aims to scrutinise the practice of government”. 
Indeed, Heinrich, Hill and Lynn (2004:3-4) propound that  
“governance shifts the unit of analysis from programs and agencies to 
tools of action; and the focus of administration from hierarchy to 
network, from public versus private to public plus private, from 
command and control to negotiation and persuasion, from 
management skills to enablement skills”.  
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Whatever the challenges in defining governance, Lynn et al. (2000:235) contend that 
governance refers to “the means for achieving direction, control, and coordination of 
wholly or partially autonomous individuals or organisations on behalf of interests to 
which they jointly contribute”. As in the case of NPM, governance did not supplant 
the established frameworks but added a new dimension to the operations of the 
public sector with more focus on improved public service delivery outputs and 
outcomes (Nel 2013:36).  
As a result, governance emphasises collective responsibility in the delivery of public 
services by bringing together all stakeholders in this joint operation, hence promoting 
cooperative governance. Nel (2015:89) asserts that “the outcomes of good 
governance include best management practices, relating to both the processes and 
consequences of the style of interaction between government and society”. In 
addition, Cheema and Rondinelli (2003:8) suggest that  
“today, there is a far greater need for the state to enhance capacity as a 
necessary condition to apply the benefits of globalisation and to play a critical 
role in alleviating poverty, protecting the environment, promoting human 
equity, gender and security rights and ensuring the improving of governance”.  
Governance is therefore more a frontal attack on the various global challenges 
exacerbated by unstable economic conditions and political uncertainty experienced 
predominantly by the developing world. For this reason, Cheema and Rondinelli 
(2003:9) posit that “good governance is an essential condition to achieve 
developmental goals”.  
Khan (2009:7) states that “compared to the NPM, governance emphasises a link 
between the civil society organisations and the state”. Similarly, “the outcomes of 
good governance build upon the principles of NPM and aim to promote best 
practices in civil society, and the public and the private sectors, in order to improve 
the quality of life, business and the environment” (Nel 2015:89). In addition “good 
governance aims to ensure a cooperative and participatory relationship within, and 
between, civil society, the public and private sectors, and to guide the interaction 
between and within these factions” (Nel 2015:89).  
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Good governance is an “ideal” associated with a government’s ability to deliver 
public goods and services to citizens in a manner that shows commitment to the 
people’s general and material welfare. The word “good” is an adjective that 
differentiates that which is desirable from the undesirable. Hence, there is talk of bad 
governance, poor governance, as well as the much-hailed good governance. For the 
purpose of this study, the two concepts, governance and good governance, are 
employed interchangeably. Notwithstanding its ideal nature, good governance is 
attainable. A government’s ability to govern on the basis of good governance bodes 
well for entrenching the groundwork of nation building and state formation, as well as 
determining whether the country will be rich or poor (Fukuyama 2015b). Audiopedia 
(2014) provides the following descriptions of good governance: 
 An indeterminate term used in international development literature to describe 
how public institutions conduct public affairs to manage public resources; 
 The process of decision-making and the process of how decisions are 
implemented; 
 A model to compare ineffective economies or political bodies with viable 
economies and political bodies; and 
 A concept that centres on the responsibility of governments and governing 
bodies to meet the needs of the masses as opposed to the needs of select 
groups in society. 
Similarly, Warner (2015) contends that “governance, and by implication good 
governance, is about outcomes – not people – and governance issues are often 
confused with partisan issue”. Furthermore, “governance is about public officials 
taking stewardship of the public goods and public tax revenue and delivering to the 
people what the people need”. In essence, good governance should engender in the 
people the responsibility to hold government to account. Continuing, Audiopedia 
(2014) highlights the point that “concepts such as democratisation, civil society, 
decentralisation, peaceful conflict management and accountability are often used 
when defining good governance”. At the same time, the emphasis on good 
governance must be equated with the promotion of good democratic governance 
(Audiopedia 2014). 
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Maserumule (2011:264) contends that “without governance, good governance would 
not have been part of the conceptual scheme in the parlance of the contemporary 
development discourse which shapes thoughts and perceptions in the description of 
the paradigm focusing on state formation or re-invention”. Maserumule (2011:264) 
states that governance does not owe its conceptual existence to good governance; 
conversely, the conception of governance without good governance is logically 
possible. Maserumule (2011:264) further points out that “good” is an adjective that 
qualifies the noun “governance”. Some scholars use the concepts “governance” and 
“good governance” interchangeably as synonyms (Sinha 2004; Edigheji 2003; 
Mhone 2003; Leftwich 1993). In contrast, others contend that these concepts are not 
the same (Olowu 2003; Cloete 2003). Olowu (2003:4-5) explains that it is relatively 
easy to define governance rather than good governance.  
Despite policies and efforts intended to steer South Africa’s public sector towards 
operating on the basis of good governance, there are still gaps in coordinating 
government activities comprehensively in a systemic manner. There seem to be 
incidents that point to lack of consensus and will to ensure that good governance is 
on track. Attaining consensus as to what must be done by all stakeholders to strive 
towards good governance remains a serious challenge. Some attempts by the Public 
Protector and other Chapter 9 institutions to enhance good governance have been 
undermined and frustrated by some sectors of the community.  
Although the functions and duties of the Public Protector are clearly delineated and 
defined in the Constitution, there are barriers to the oversight functions that this 
functionary performs. Similarly, it must be assessed how the Public Protector can 
best be empowered to function unanimously in striving for good governance, which 
is the objective of this thesis.  
Literature on governance and good governance – including four of the six World 
Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators purporting to measure aspects of 
state capacity (government effectiveness, regulatory quality, stability and absence of 
violence, and control of corruption) – has not conclusively proven that good 
governance is easy to achieve even on a universal scale (Fukuyama 2013:1). 
Similarly, the IIAG addresses issues of governance on the African continent (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation 2014:3). The IIAG has practical relevance to this study because 
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of the nature of governance problems and challenges that afflict the African 
continent. As noted previously, other multilateral institutions have also made a 
profound contribution to the discourse on governance and good governance. The 
implementation of these indicators has seen some countries improving and others 
struggling to achieve the desired results. One certainty is that countries are not 
willing to openly acknowledge that they are trapped in bad or poor governance. It 
can therefore, be assumed that good governance is a basis and a foundation for 
development in a democracy.  
This study emphasises the importance of a concerted effort in the pursuit of good 
governance in terms of supporting institutions such as the Office of the Public 
Protector in its mission. A situation of having a majority parliament that is self-serving 
and not willing to exercise impartial oversight must be avoided. “The mandate of the 
Office of the Public Protector is to strengthen constitutional democracy by 
investigating and redressing improper and prejudicial conduct, maladministration and 
abuse of power in state affairs” (Corruption Watch 2018). It would be a serious threat 
to South Africa’s democratic system if independent functionaries – for instance the 
Public Protector and other state institutions, which are empowered to monitor the 
activities of public sector institutions – are not supported and funded. In order to 
ensure a thriving, sustainable, and representative form of government, focused on 
effective and efficient service delivery, it is crucial that the Public Protector should be 
able to impartially exercise his or her duties without fear of reprisal, in conjunction 
with exposing issues of corruption and incidents of expropriation. This situation was 
highlighted in South Africa when the State of Capture report was released by the 
Office of the Public Protector in 2016. The remedial actions proposed by the Public 
Protector were contested and the Gauteng High Court ruled that the Public 
Protector’s actions against former president Jacob Zuma were “wise, necessary, 
rational and appropriate” (Tandwa 2017) (see Chapter Five). 
The operations and functioning of the Public Protector are premised on the need to 
ensure that the business of governing is conducted on a basis of transparency. 
Pienaar (2000:61) highlights that “the Public Protector is uniquely placed to report on 
what Transparency International has termed ‘integrity slippage’ often associated with 
further forms of misconduct and corruption”. This stems from the fact that 
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“Transparency International is an international organisation exclusively devoted to 
curbing corruption” (Transparency International 1997 in Kusek and Rist 2004:6). 
“Corruption undermines good governance, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads 
to the misallocation of resources, harms the private sector and private sector 
development, and particularly hurts the poor” (Transparency International 2002). 
Pienaar (2000:58) posits that “in terms of corruption, the Public Protector has a wide 
mandate to investigate corruption in the broad sense of any conduct that reflects 
slippage from ideal norms and standards”.   
The Constitution mandates parliament and the state institutions that support 
constitutional democracy to exercise their powers and functions in the best interest 
of the country. This is in essence what good governance entails. In any democratic 
dispensation there is a fundamental requirement for educating the public towards 
utilising and supporting the state institutions that endorse and uphold a 
constitutionally representative government with the objective of enhancing and 
facilitating effective service delivery. Furthermore, it is a noble ideal to have all 
organs of state working in a unified manner as advocated by a systems approach 
towards attaining good governance, given that South Africa is a system within the 
global system, with many sub-systems aiming towards a common objective. 
As an institution that operates within a well-defined government system, the Office of 
the Public Protector is dependent on its environment and, in turn, produces 
outcomes that impact thereon. Where possible, there should be measures and 
processes to protect the Public Protector and to expose unscrupulous and selfish 
politicians who may attempt to exert unfair influence, take advantage, and/or feel that 
they are beyond reproach and above the law. The Office of the Public Protector is 
tasked with the responsibility of putting public interests first and, primarily, to fulfil its 
mandate towards improved and progressive service delivery. This denotes that the 
Public Protector should constantly remain separated from party politics and 
continually exercise absolute impartiality in all circumstances. 
The Public Protector is well positioned to make a sound contribution towards 
enhancing democratic good governance. Having examined some similar institutions 
from the international perspective with regard to promoting and enhancing good 
governance, the Office of the Public Protector has good prospects of strengthening 
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South Africa’s constitutional democracy. This emanates from the fact that the Public 
Protector is neither a political party agent nor a representative, hence this functionary 
is expected to carry out the mandate of the office without fear, favour, or prejudice. A 
strong, independent, and apolitical Public Protector is vital for a healthy democracy 
premised on good governance. 
In a country or situation where the executive and the legislature are intricately 
intertwined, accountability tends to suffer. It is for this reason that this study 
examines how the Public Protector, within the framework of the broader government 
system, could best assist in contributing towards good governance. 
The review of the literature suggests that a uniform approach in conducting 
operations in the public sector could have beneficial outcomes. The South African 
Constitution clearly spells out how the state and government systems are constituted 
in terms of cooperative governance. The Department: Government Communication 
and Information System (2013:201) ascertains that “government is committed to the 
building of a free, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, united and successful South 
Africa”. The aspiration to attain good governance requires constant monitoring and 
evaluation of where the country is at all times relative to the good governance 
indicators espoused in its statutory framework. 
Various reports of the Public Protector and other Chapter 9 institutions have in most 
cases pointed to non-compliance as an impediment to effective policy 
implementation. This has served to undermine the imperative to provide service 
delivery, as outlined in the Constitution.   
The apathy of the South African public, who generally remained silent amidst the 
scathing attacks directed at the Public Protector, has prompted this study to carefully 
pose the following dual primary research question: What is the role and challenges 
of the Public Protector as an independent Chapter 9 institution, and do the remedial 
actions of the Public Protector contribute to the implementation of good governance 
in the South African constitutional democracy? 
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1.3    Secondary research questions 
To complement the primary guiding research question, the following secondary 
questions were formulated: 
 Which concepts are most appropriate and adequate to address good 
governance challenges in South Africa? 
 What does the concept “democracy” entail? 
 What do the concepts “governance” and “good governance” entail? 
 What do the measures of good governance entail? 
 What are the nature and essence of the variables and concepts that 
influence good governance? 
 What do the concepts “legitimacy” and “credibility” entail? 
 What does the concept “development” entail? 
 What do accountability and transparency entail? 
 What does decentralisation entail? 
 What does centralisation entail? 
 What does leadership entail?   
 How did P(p)ublic A(a)dministration develop? 
 What does the Public Management paradigm entail? 
 What does the NPM paradigm entail? 
 What does Post-NPM entail? 
 What does New Public Governance / New Political Governance (NPG) entail? 
 What does Network Theory entail? 
 What does the concept “Ombudsman” entail? 
 What do the international perspectives of public oversight institutions 
entail? 
 How is the modus operandi of the Public Protector constituted 
internationally (Ombudsman) to promote good governance? 
 What do the role and functions of an Ombudsman entail globally? 
 How did the Ombudsman develop in Scandinavia, Europe, the United 
Kingdom (UK), Canada, the United States of America (USA), New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Africa? 
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 What does the statutory framework that governs the Public Protector 
entail? 
 What are the regulatory and policy variables that influence South Africa’s 
Public Protector? 
 What are the external structural variables that influence South Africa’s Public 
Protector? 
 Which multilateral international institutions are involved in promoting 
oversight of good governance?  
 How did the Office of the Public Protector develop in South Africa? 
 What is the mandate of the Public Protector as an independent 
institution that operates in a democratic state system? 
 What do the role and activities of the Public Protector entail? 
 What are the powers of the Public Protector? 
 What do the responsibilities of Public Protector entail?  
 What are the functions of the Public Protector?  
 How can selected reports of the Public Protector be contextualised to 
provide a representative example in general of state abuse? 
 How did the case of the State of Capture report create a dilemma in 
terms of the validity of the recommended judicial inquiry? 
 How did the case of the State of Capture report contextualise the nature 
and scope of the power to appoint a commission of inquiry to 
investigate state abuse?  
 Are the Public Protector’s remedial actions enforceable in terms of the 
prescriptions that were made in the State of Capture report?  
1.4   Research objectives 
In addressing the research questions that guide this study, the following research 
objectives were formulated for the purposes of this study: 
 Clarify the conceptual, contextual, and theoretical variables that influence 
democratic good governance in the public sector. 
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 Discuss the origins of the theoretical variables that underpin good governance 
in South Africa, and how these paradigms are used to advance the practical 
application of good governance. 
 Provide an exploration of the conceptual knowledge of the main paradigms 
that influence the theoretical and philosophical public administration 
frameworks that govern public sector activities. 
 Highlight how a public oversight functionary is constituted internationally, and 
to determine the operations of the Office of the Ombudsman as a “watchdog” 
institution in selected countries. 
 Contextualise the statutory, regulatory, and policy frameworks that influence 
South Africa’s Public Protector.  
 Determine multilateral, structural, and external variables that oversee good 
governance.  
 Determine and contextualise the scope, role, and functions of the Public 
Protector in promoting good governance. 
 Contextualise the mandate of the Public Protector as an independent 
institution that operates in a democratic state system by way of case 
examples. 
 Determine whether the recommendations made by the Public Protector have 
remedial power in terms of their enforcement.   
 Determine the variables that influence the credibility of the Office of the Public 
Protector. 
1.5    Research design and methodology 
This section explains the scientific approach followed in this study by examining what 
the methodology of this thesis entailed, as well as other research methods closely 
related to the research methodology. As a point of departure, it is deemed essential 
to draw a distinction between research design and research methodology. These two 
concepts are often used interchangeably. Mouton (2005:55-56) maintains that 
“research design is a plan outlining how one intends to conduct scientific inquiry into 
a particular phenomenon, entity, process or event identified as the object of study or 
unit of analysis”.  
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Babbie and Mouton (2005:75) assert that “research design is mainly concerned with 
the type of study being planned, its point of departure as research problem or 
question, and its focus on the logic” of the research process and the results it aims to 
achieve. The primary function of a research design is to enable the researcher to 
anticipate what the appropriate research decisions should be so as to maximise the 
validity of the eventual results (Mouton 1996:107). McNabb (2002:6-8) contends that 
the logic of research is the activity of reasoning, based on scientific data required to 
answer research questions.  
Conversely, “research methodology focuses on the research process and the kind of 
tools and procedures to be used” (Mouton 2005:56). Similarly, Brynard and 
Hanekom (1997:27) assert that research methodology is “a basic procedure and the 
steps in solving an unresolved problem”. Compared with the research design, 
research methodology is also concerned with the collection and analysis of data by 
using the most objective procedure (Mouton 2005:56).  
In the same manner, Leedy and Ormrod (2014:7) posit that,  
“whereas a research tool is a specific mechanism or strategy the 
researcher uses to collect, manipulate, or interpret data; the research 
methodology is the general approach the researcher takes in carrying 
out the research project, and to some extent, this approach dictates the 
particular tools the researcher selects”.  
Greyling (2014:14) posits that “methodology considers and explains the logic and 
philosophy behind the use of certain methods for research instead of others”. 
Therefore, the choice of a research methodology is the result of a conscious and 
carefully calculated decision. Schwandt (2007:193) asserts that “methodology is a 
theory of how inquiry should proceed”. In the same vein, Auriacombe and Van der 
Waldt (2016) suggest that “a theory is the scientific manner in which certain 
phenomena are explained, analysed and predicted in reality”. Hence, Schwandt 
(2007:193) propounds that “methodology includes the assumptions and values that 
serve as a rationale for the research and the standards or criteria the researcher 
uses for interpreting data and reaching conclusions”. 
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Auriacombe and Van der Waldt (2016:45) state that “different studies use different 
methodologies and the methods appropriate for the task at hand that should be 
used”. To concur, Mouton (1996:36-40) contends that “the researcher not only 
selects the method and techniques but also the methodological paradigm; 
quantitative, qualitative or even a combination of both”. Grover and Glazier 
(1986:234) describe a paradigm as “a framework of basic assumptions with which 
perceptions are evaluated and relationships and values are delineated and applied 
to a discipline or profession”. Correspondingly, Greyling (2014:16) argues that “there 
is a direct relationship between the research question(s) and the theoretical and 
methodological frameworks of a study”. To provide more clarity on methodology, 
Auriacombe (2016a:44) explains that,  
“while a research method refers to the means required to execute a 
certain stage of the research process, such as compiling a literature 
study, data collection techniques refer to the variety of tools that can be 
used when data is collected, such as interviews, questionnaires and 
observation”.  
It is therefore warranted to note, that research methods and data-collection 
techniques are inextricably linked in conducting research and producing scientifically 
grounded outcomes. Consequently, “these methods and techniques are distinctively 
linked to quantitative or qualitative approaches” (Auriacombe 2016a:44). 
1.5.1     Methodological research paradigm 
Quantitative and qualitative approaches are the two most widely employed research 
paradigms across all disciplines. Schurink (2009:788) contends that qualitative and 
quantitative researchers use different epistemological assumptions that stem from 
different theoretical contexts to understand human behaviour. Auriacombe 
(2016a:45) succinctly asserts that a quantitative approach predominantly seeks 
explanations, while measuring what it assumes to be a static reality in the hope of 
developing generalisations. 
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On the contrary, a qualitative approach aims at in-depth description by way of 
exploring what is assumed to be a dynamic reality (Auriacombe 2016a:45). 
Alternatively, Mouton (2005:49) states that the, 
“quantitative paradigm in social research refers to the quantification of 
constructs; the central role of variables in describing and analysing 
human behaviour, as well as the central role of error in the research 
process. The nature of the control is either through experimental 
control or statistical control”.    
For the purpose of this research, a qualitative approach was selected and the study 
applied unobtrusive research techniques by analysing secondary data derived from 
the critical literature and documentary review. The study reviewed existing theories 
to attempt a conceptual analysis of written scholarly texts in an inductive direction. 
Mouton (2005:49) contends that,  
“qualitative research refers to a broad methodological approach to the 
study of social action. The concept is used to emphasise the collection 
of methods and techniques which share a certain set of principles or 
logic. Qualitative studies typically use qualitative methods to gain 
access to research subjects, qualitative methods of data collection and 
qualitative methods of analysis”.  
Merriam (2002:xv) concludes that “qualitative research is an accepted methodology 
in all social sciences and applied fields of practice”. Schurink (2003:2) maintains that 
“qualitative research means different things to different people; hence it is difficult to 
describe qualitative research in a way that will satisfy everybody”. In the same vein, 
Mouton (1986:2) asserts that “the term qualitative research is an indication that this 
approach concentrates on the qualities of human behaviour, that is, on the 
qualitative aspects and not the quantitatively measurable aspects of human 
behaviour”. Similarly, Schwand (2007 in Schurink 2009:798) states that qualitative 
research aims at understanding actors’ subjective meanings and interpretations to 
explain their behaviour, by accepting subjectivity as a legitimate domain for social 
scientific research.  
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According to Denzin and Lincoln (2011:3), “qualitative research is a situated activity 
that locates the observer in the world, and it consists of a set of interpretive material 
practices that make the world visible”. Greyling (2014:17) states that “qualitative 
researchers’ perceptions of how to best understand the subjective meanings and 
interpretations of the actors’ and the researchers’ beliefs of how knowledge should 
be generated are not uniform”. Denzin and Lincoln (2011:3) state that “qualitative 
researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or 
interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them”. What this 
means in essence is that qualitative research does not hinge on foregone 
conclusions. This stems from the fact that human behaviour is not absolutely 
predictable. 
Auriacombe (2016b:46) contends that a “qualitative research paradigm also provides 
a researcher with the perspective of the target audience members and is interaction 
based”. On the other hand, a qualitative approach can also be based on the 
observation of the researcher as a participant. Therefore, to prevent bias in this 
case, unobtrusive research techniques were used. Denzin and Lincoln (2011:5) 
explain that “qualitative research is inherently multi-method in focus, and the use of 
multiple methods, or triangulation, reflects an attempt to secure an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon in question”. Auriacombe (2016a:46) highlights 
that “qualitative methods are designed to help researchers understand the meanings 
people (for the observer) assign to social phenomena and to elucidate the mental 
process underlying behaviours”. In the same vein, “qualitative research, as a set of 
interpretive activities, privileges no single methodological practice over another; nor 
does it have a distinct set of methods or practices that are entirely its own” (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2011:6). 
Schurink (2003:2) notes the following aspects of qualitative research: 
 It is grounded in a philosophical position that is broadly interpretive in the 
sense that it is concerned with how the social world is interpreted, understood, 
experienced, or produced 
 It is based on methods of data generation that are flexible and sensitive to the 
social context in which data are produced (rather than rigidly standardised or 
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structured, or removed from “real life” or a “natural” social context, as in some 
forms of experimental methods). 
 It is based on methods of analysis and explanation building that involve 
understanding complexity, detail, and context. 
Following the foregoing paragraph, Schurink (2003:2) confirms that  
“while different versions of qualitative research might understand or approach 
the elements in different ways (for example, focusing on social meanings, or 
interpretations, or practices, or discourses, or processes, or constructions) all 
will see at least some of these as meaningful elements in a complex – 
possibly multi-layered – social world”.  
“Qualitative research aims at producing rounded understandings on the basis of rich, 
contextual, and detailed data” (Schurink 2003:3). Mason (1996:4) states that 
“qualitative research usually does use some form of quantification, but statistical 
forms of analysis are not seen as central”. 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011:3) point out that  
“qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of 
empirical materials – case study, personal experience, introspection, life story, 
interview, artefacts, and cultural texts and productions, along with 
observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts – that describe routine 
and problematic moments and meanings in individual lives”.  
Schurink (2003:3) indicates that “qualitative research is an umbrella term referring to 
several research strategies that share certain characteristics”. Denzin and Lincoln 
(2011:6) state that “qualitative researchers use semiotics, narrative, content, 
discourse, archival, and phonemic analysis; even statistics, tables, graphs, and 
numbers”. 
According to Schurink (2003:3), the data collected through qualitative research are 
termed soft data, which are rich in description of people, places, and conversations, 
and not easily handled by statistical procedures. Therefore, people who conduct 
qualitative research may develop a focus as they collect data, but do not approach 
the research with specific questions to answer or hypotheses to test (Schurink 
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2003:3). Merriam (1998:6) states that “qualitative research is based on the 
assumption that reality is constructed by individuals interacting with their social 
world”. Qualitative researchers are also concerned with understanding behaviour 
from the subject’s own frame of reference, and external causes are of secondary 
importance (Schurink 2003:3). 
Miles and Huberman (1994:10) highlight the importance of properly collected 
qualitative data as follows:  
 One major feature is that the data focus on naturally occurring, ordinary 
events in natural settings, so that there is a strong handle on what “real life” is 
like. 
 Another feature of qualitative data is their richness and holism, with strong 
potential for revealing complexity; such data provide thick descriptions that are 
vivid, nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth that has a strong 
impact on the reader. 
 The fact that such data are typically collected over a sustained period makes 
them powerful for studying any process (including history), as researchers can 
go far beyond snapshots of “what?” or “how?” to just how and why things 
happen as they do – and even assess causality as it actually plays out in a 
particular setting. 
 The inherent flexibility of qualitative studies, namely data-collection 
timeframes and methods, can be varied as the study proceeds. This gives 
further confidence that researchers have really understood what has been 
going on. 
 Qualitative data, with their emphasis on people’s “lived experience”, are 
fundamentally well suited for locating the meanings people attach to the 
events, processes, and structures in their lives: their perceptions, 
assumptions, prejudgements, presumptions, and to connect these meanings 
to the social world around them. 
Moreover, Schurink (2003:3) concurs that “qualitative researchers typically frequent 
places where the events they are interested in occur naturally; with data gathered 
through natural behaviours like talking, visiting, looking, walking, working, eating, 
etc”. In the same tone, Auriacombe (2013:120) states that a “qualitative research 
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paradigm provides the researcher with the perspective of target audience members 
through immersion in a culture or situation and direct interaction with the people 
under study (an insider view)”. 
Furthermore, Greyling (2014:21) explains that “the advantage of using qualitative 
methods is that they generate rich, detailed data that leave the participants’ 
perspective intact and provide a context for understanding behaviour”. An important 
decision a researcher must make when designing a qualitative research study is to 
start thinking how and according to what principles and logic claims an analysis will 
be formulated and substantiated (Schurink 2009:789). Auriacombe (2011:121) 
contends that the disadvantage is that data collection may be labour intensive and 
time consuming. Schurink (2009:789) also cautions that conducting qualitative 
research involves many ethical dilemmas and the researcher must constantly decide 
on the proper conduct.  
1.5.2    The nature of research 
Neuman (2011:6) asserts that “social research involves thinking about questions 
about the social world and following a set of processes to create new knowledge that 
is based on science”. The research process is characterised by a high degree of 
rigorous activities carried out with precision. Auriacombe (2016a:29) defines 
research as a “systematic process of enquiry aimed at obtaining accurate answers to 
significant and pertinent questions in order to increase the sum of human 
knowledge”. 
According to Neuman (2011:7), “science is a social institution and a way to produce 
knowledge”, and that “science has not always been around, it is a human invention”. 
Neuman (2011:7) explains that most people first think of natural sciences when they 
hear the word “science”; while few people associate social sciences with the word 
“science”. To buttress the discourse on the nature of science, Auriacombe 
(2016b:29) contends that “the enquiry process is carried out systematically; in an 
organised way, in order to ensure that no facts or processes essential to arriving at 
correct conclusions will be overlooked”. Auriacombe (2016a:29) presents the 
following points about research: 
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 “The answers are obtained by the use of the scientific method of gathering 
and interpreting information. 
 The main concern is ensuring that accurate answers are the only kind that is 
acceptable. 
 The enquiry is directed at some system or framework of ideas. 
 The enquiry is directed at significant and pertinent questions that must be 
asked in the process of analysing the problem. 
 The enquiry has some objective or purpose. 
 The purpose is to increase human knowledge”. 
Of importance, is that “the enquiry requires the discovery of information and will add 
to the sum of human knowledge, assuming this type of research has not been done 
before” (Auriacombe 2016a:30). Neuman (2011:8) highlights that “today, few people 
seriously question science as a legitimate way to produce knowledge about modern 
society”. Neuman (2011:8) also posits the following in relation to scientific research: 
 Science refers to both a system for producing knowledge and the knowledge 
produced from that system.   
 The system has evolved over many years and is slowly but constantly 
changing. 
 It combines assumptions about the nature of the world and knowledge, an 
orientation toward knowledge, and sets of procedures, techniques, and 
instruments for gaining knowledge. 
 Science is visible in a social institution called the scientific community. 
 The knowledge of science is organised in terms of theories. 
 The data are gathered using specialised techniques and the data are used to 
support or reject theories. 
To this end, Auriacombe (2016a:30-31) points out that the potential application of the 
outcomes of research will give it value in the opinion of society, especially because 
the generated knowledge may be applied to solve problems. Ngoma (2007:59) 
cautions that “knowledge is thus seen to be contextual and limited by how it is 
understood, perceived and interpreted”. Similarly, Neuman (2011:9) explains that 
“science is given life through the operation of the scientific community, which 
sustains the assumptions, attitudes, and techniques of science”. 
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Neuman (2011:11) explains that the scientific method refers to the ideas, rules, 
techniques, and approaches that the scientific community uses to create and 
evaluate knowledge. In a similar vein, “one can think of research as the use of 
scientific methods to transform ideas, hunches, and questions, sometimes called 
hypotheses, into scientific knowledge” (Neuman 2011:13). It could also be a set of 
procedures that scientists follow in order to gain knowledge about the world (Koch 
2013). 
According to Auriacombe (2016a:66), “scientific method” is a term that refers to the 
procedures followed by careful researchers in arriving at conclusions. In applying the 
scientific method, a systematic procedure consisting of the following points is 
employed: 
 Formulating a problem; 
 Measuring a problem; and 
 Testing the hypothesis/hypotheses concerning those occurrences 
(Auriacombe (2016a:66). 
Koch (2013) lists the six steps of the scientific process as follows: 
 Question: which is where scientists proposes the problem they want solved. 
 Hypothesis: a potential answer to the question at hand. 
 Experiment: which is an ordered investigation that is intended to prove or 
disprove a hypothesis. 
 Observation: a statement of knowledge gained through the senses or through 
the use of scientific equipment. 
 Analysis: which involves comparing the results of the experiment to the 
prediction posed by the hypothesis. 
 Conclusion: a statement of whether the original hypothesis was supported or 
refuted by the data gathered from observation. 
According to Koch (2013), the scientific method usually employs all six of the steps 
mentioned, but the steps do not always occur in the same order. Scientists mix and 
repeat steps many times before they come to conclusions. 
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1.5.2.1 Types of research 
The motive behind the use of research determines the type of research one is 
dealing with. According to Neuman (2011:24), the difference in orientation revolves 
around who consumes the findings and who uses them. Hence, some researchers 
use research to advance general knowledge, whereas others use it to solve specific 
problems.  
“Those who seek an understanding of the fundamental nature of social 
reality are engaged in basic research (also called academic research 
or pure research); while applied researchers primarily want to apply 
and tailor knowledge to address a specific practical issue” (Neuman 
2011:24).  
Auriacombe (2016a:32) contends that “basic or pure research deals with questions 
that are intellectually challenging to the researcher but may or may not have practical 
applications at the present time or in the future”. Auriacombe (2016a:32) further 
explains that pure research seeks an extension of knowledge, and that it is not 
necessarily problem orientated. 
Neuman (2011:24) maintains that,  
“basic research is the source of most new scientific ideas and ways of 
thinking about the world, with its primary audience being the scientific 
community. Furthermore, basic research is the source of most of the 
tools – methods, theories, and ideas – that applied researchers use”.  
In the same manner, Neuman (2011:24) states that “really big breakthroughs in 
understanding and significant advances in knowledge usually comes from basic 
research”. Neuman (2011:24) further argues that “in contrast to applied researchers, 
who want quick answers to questions for use within the next month or year, basic 
researchers painstakingly seek answers to questions that could have an impact on 
thinking for over a century”. 
Auriacombe (2016a:32) confirms that:  
 Applied research deals with findings that can be applied to solve social 
problems of immediate concern; 
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 Applied research is problem orientated because it is conducted to solve 
specific problems about which decisions must be reached; 
 Applied research covers a wide range of social science areas, namely 
education, poverty, crime, policy issues; and 
 Applied research deals with problems only partially in the area of social 
sciences; for example, the energy crisis. 
In view of the distinction between pure and basic research, Bailey (1978:16) 
contends that “some researchers feel that the ultimate goal of any study is to be 
helpful in solving social problems and at the same time making a valuable 
contribution to the theoretical social science literature”. Similarly, Auriacombe 
(2016a:33) asserts that  
“although it is customary to distinguish between pure and applied research in 
both the physical and social sciences, these two categories are not mutually 
exclusive in the sense that any study that is pure cannot have practical 
applications (and vice versa)”.  
On the same note, it is imperative to highlight that pure research and applied 
research are mutually reinforcing. Neuman (2011:24) notes that researchers in the 
two wings move from one wing to another at different stages in their careers.  
1.5.2.2 The purpose of research 
Theoretically and practically, researchers go about their core business of attempting 
to achieve specified objectives through the employment of exploratory, explanatory, 
and descriptive research. Various studies may employ multiple purposes, but one 
purpose is usually dominant (Neuman 2011:33). For the purpose of this study, the 
explanatory research approach was followed. 
(a)  Exploratory research 
Babbie and Mouton (2005:79) state that,  
“exploratory studies, sometimes called a pilot study, are undertaken 
when a researcher wants to satisfy his or her curiosity or desire for 
better understanding, or when the researcher wants to test the 
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feasibility of undertaking a more careful study, or to develop the 
method to be employed in a more careful study”.  
Auriacombe (2016a:34) indicates that “the main shortcoming of exploratory studies is 
that they seldom provide satisfactory answers to research questions”. Greyling 
(2014:29) states that the “purpose of exploratory research is to progressively narrow 
the scope of the research topic and consequently, paraphrase the research problem 
clearly”. 
According to Cant, Gerber-Nel, Nel and Kotze (2003:28), exploratory studies are 
used for the following purposes:  
 To formulate the research problem or opportunity for more precise 
investigation in order to formulate a hypothesis or a guiding research 
question; 
 To establish priorities for further research; 
 To gather information about practical problems of conducting research on 
particular conjectural statements; 
 To increase the researcher’s familiarity with the problem or opportunity; and  
 To clarify some key concepts connected with the research problem or 
opportunity. 
Neuman (2011:33) highlights that the researcher’s goal in exploratory studies is to 
formulate more precise questions that future research can answer; especially given 
the fact that the research may be the first stage in a sequence of studies. 
“Exploratory researchers frequently use qualitative techniques for gathering data and 
they are less wedded to a specific theory or research question” (Neuman 2011:34). 
(b)  Explanatory research 
Auriacombe (2016a:35) posits that explanatory research “involves undertaking 
scientific studies to explain causal relationships”. Neuman (2011:35) contends that 
“when you encounter an issue that is already known and have a description of it, you 
might begin to wonder ‘why’ things are the way they are”. Bailey (1978:38) points out 
that “through pursuing explanatory studies, not only do we understand society better, 
but we are sometimes able to predict the consequences of certain actions”. Babbie 
and Mouton (2005:81) state that “explanatory research goes beyond providing 
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information about isolated variables to providing hypotheses that explain 
relationships among variables”. 
This research is in most respect explanatory since it reviews the contribution that the 
Public Protector, together with other Chapter 9 institutions, makes in strengthening 
South Africa’s constitutional democracy. South Africa has laws, policies, and 
regulations in place, but the challenges of good governance still remain unresolved. 
Concerted efforts on the part of horizontal accountability institutions are also 
desirable to hold the executive to account. Government systems in place ought to 
pave the way for a unified approach to promoting good governance.  
In light of the aforementioned paragraphs, Auriacombe (2016a:35) notes that 
“explanatory studies attempt to provide answers to the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions”. 
Given the nature of this study, explanatory research was deemed the most 
appropriate to address how effective systems can best serve to enhance good 
governance. The study provides an explanatory case presentation in Chapter Five 
(see Sections 5.9 and 5.10) towards understanding the debate concerning the 
remedial actions of the Public Protector’s mandate in terms of the constitutional 
pronouncement. Neuman (2011:34) maintains that “qualitative research tends to be 
more open to using a range of evidence and discovering new issues”. Neuman 
(2011:34) also states that “explanatory research builds on exploratory and 
descriptive research and goes on to identify the reason something occurs” (Neuman 
2011:34). Mouton (1996:110) asserts that the question of explanatory potential refers 
to the degree of theoretical support or embeddedness enjoyed by the research 
questions. 
(c)  Descriptive research 
Neuman (2011:34) explains that descriptive research is appropriate when a 
researcher has a more highly developed idea about a social phenomenon and wants 
to describe it. According to Auriacombe (2016a:34), descriptive research is most 
suited to describing situations and events, where the researcher observes 
phenomena and then attempts to describe them; often without any formal 
hypothesis. 
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Neuman (2011:35) points out that descriptive research focuses on “how” and “who” 
questions and thus explores new issues or explaining why something happens. 
Neuman (2011:35) further explains that descriptive and exploratory research types 
have many similarities, thus blurring together in practice. In most cases, and to avoid 
being overinvolved in one particular research purpose, researchers have the option 
of using these research purposes interchangeably (Neuman 2011:35). 
1.5.2.3 The deductive versus the inductive approach 
Nel (2013:8) highlights that “inductive research suggests a more exploratory 
approach to theory building, whereas deductive research denotes a more 
confirmatory approach, where theory is tested”. The theories in this study are based 
on prior knowledge of existing frameworks in systems approach and good 
governance. This study follows an inductive approach in an effort to provide answers 
to the primary research question posed in Section 1.3 of this chapter. Jarbandhan 
(2012:22) asserts that a qualitative research strategy is inductive in that the 
researcher attempts to make sense of a situation without imposing pre-existing 
expectations on the research setting. 
(a)  The deductive approach 
Russell (2015) contends that the deductive research approach usually begins with a 
theory-driven hypothesis that guides data collection and analysis. Similarly, 
Auriacombe (2016a:69) posits that the deductive method consists of reasoning from 
a general rule or principle regarded as an accepted fact to a specific case that falls 
under the general rule. Auriacombe (2016a:69) concludes that it is sometimes seen 
as reasoning from the general to the particular, or as applying a general principle to 
a certain individual situation. 
According to Neuman (2011:59), “to theorise in a deductive direction, one begins 
with abstract concepts or a theoretical proposition that outlines the logical connection 
among concepts and then move toward concrete, empirical evidence”. Neuman 
(2011:59) therefore, maintains that one starts with ideas or a mental picture of the 
social world, and then tests one’s thinking against observable empirical evidence. 
Auriacombe (2016a:68) outlines the following about deductive thinking: 
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 “Deductive thinking proceeds from the general to the particular. 
 The general, opening premise (theory) is stated. 
 The supporting evidence is given (minor premises; particular information). 
 The conclusion follows inevitably. 
 Additional evidence will not strengthen the argument, it is complete”. 
To supplement the abovementioned points, Auriacombe (2016a:69) provides two 
conditions for satisfactory deduction, namely (i) the general rule or principle must be 
correct, and (ii) the general rule must only be applied to those cases that properly fall 
under that general rule. 
(b)  The inductive approach 
Inductive research begins with a research question and the collection of empirical 
data, which are used to generate hypotheses and theories (Russell 2015). Dewald 
(2013) contends that an argument in which acceptance of the conclusion depends 
on the strength of the premises, and in which the premises do not prove but merely 
support the conclusion, is an inductive argument. Auriacombe (2016a:69) maintains 
that “the inductive method of reasoning consists of studying many individual 
instances or cases in order to formulate a generalised conclusion”. 
According to Neuman (2011:60), “to theorise in an inductive direction; you begin with 
observing the empirical world and then reflect on what is taking place, thinking in 
increasingly more abstract ways, moving toward theoretical concepts and 
propositions”. Therefore, the starting point is a general topic and some vague ideas 
that the researcher refines and elaborates into more exact theoretical concepts 
(Neuman 2011:60).  
Auriacombe (2016a:70) outlines the following about inductive arguments: 
 “Inductive thinking attempts to proceed from the particular to the general. 
 It is more speculative and may be more creative than deductive. 
 One or more related but particular opening premises are made, followed by a 
probable, but not inevitable, general conclusion. 
 The results may support, falsify or expand existing theory, or even establish a 
new theory. 
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 Additional supporting evidence may strengthen the conclusion; but will not 
necessarily prove it beyond doubt”. 
Furthermore, Auriacombe (2016a:69) provides the following conditions essential to 
inductive research:  
 Observation must be correctly performed and recorded.  
 The data studied must be accurate and must be collected from the universe in 
which the researcher is interested.  
 Observations must cover representative cases. 
 Observations must cover a sufficient number of cases.  
 Conclusions must be confined to statements that are fully substantiated by the 
findings, and are not too general or too inclusive. 
1.5.2.4  The relationship between theory and knowledge  
Leedy and Ormrod (2014:20) define a theory as an organised body of concepts and 
principles intended to explain a particular phenomenon. Theory is the important link 
that turns data into knowledge (Handfield and Melnyk 1998:323). According to 
Morrison (2003:1), data and information report on experience, the “what” has been 
observed, while theory explains “why this has been observed” and “why this is likely 
to be observed” again. Knowledge is therefore the resulting understanding created, 
and the capacity to act differently (Morrison 2003:1).  
Odi (1982:3130) describes theory as “an internally connected and logically 
consistent proposition about relationship(s) between phenomena”. Auriacombe and 
Van der Waldt (2016:9) explain that “in science, the word ‘theory’ refers to a 
comprehensive explanation of an important feature of nature that is supported by 
many facts gathered over time; and they allow scientists to make predictions about 
as yet unobserved phenomena”. Furthermore, Auriacombe and Van der Waldt 
(2016:9) argue that theories are constructed to explain, predict, and understand 
phenomena, and in the process making generalisations about observation, and 
consisting of an interrelated, coherent set of ideas and models. 
Morrison (2003:2) states that “knowledge, therefore, is not a matter of content, but it 
is the capacity of content to bring about action, specifically more effective action”. In 
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addition, knowledge is what links information to meaningful action by a user. 
“Providing new knowledge is the capacity to change action or bring about new 
action. New knowledge should invite (if not convince) people to do something 
differently and better” (Morrison 2003:2). Auriacombe (2016a:31) indicates that 
information should not be confused with knowledge, and maintains that information 
may be defined as accessible facts or data, while knowledge derives from the 
coherent organisation and interpretation of information within a system of ideas. 
Furthermore, information may stand alone, while knowledge requires the presence of 
at least two concepts (Auriacombe 2016a:31).   
1.5.2.5  Unit of analysis 
The unit of analysis refers to the object or objects being studied, such as individuals, 
institutions, groups, or any issue relevant for such purpose. The Public Protector is 
the unit of analysis or object of study in this research, and this is merely to highlight 
the crucial role that the Public Protector plays in supplementing the oversight 
function performed by parliament and, to a limited extent, the courts. Like the 
Ombudsman in other countries alluded to in Chapter Three of this study, the Public 
Protector is better placed to strengthen South Africa’s constitutional democracy since 
this functionary is independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law. The 
Public Protector has a broader mandate than other Chapter 9 institutions as pertains 
to promoting good governance in the country. 
This study is fundamentally non-empirical and was conceptualised around adopting 
unobtrusive research methods to analyse the role of the Public Protector’s remedial 
role in contributing to the attainment of good governance in South Africa. Mouton 
(1996:109) defines conceptualisation as “referring to both the clarification and the 
analysis of key concepts in a study and also the way in which one’s research is 
integrated into the body of existing theory and research”. Furthermore, 
conceptualisation “refers to the underlying theoretical framework that guides and 
directs the research” (Mouton 1996:110). 
Babbie and Mouton (2005:84) maintain that when the object of study is in the World 
2 realm, it is considered a conceptual or non-empirical problem and it includes 
constructing theories and models, as well as analysing concepts or reviewing the 
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body of knowledge. This research attempts to carefully examine whether the Public 
Protector has remedial powers in executing the mandate of this office. Since the 
study is premised on examining the role of the Public Protector within the framework 
of government systems, it employed both inductive and explanatory dimensions.  
1.5.3 Unobtrusive research techniques employed in this study 
Qualitative research with its rigorous and intense character represents working 
progress since human behaviour may prove quite elusive. For this reason 
researchers are bound to be intellectually involved as their studies unfold and 
develop. Since this is a qualitative study, it is important to employ techniques that 
have a bearing on the qualitative research approach. Auriacombe (2016a:52) 
highlights that “when a social scientist decides to follow a qualitative approach, he or 
she is most likely to make use of methods and techniques associated with it, 
including ethnographic studies, grounded theory or a case study”. 
This study employed unobtrusive research techniques/methods, namely conceptual, 
content, comparative, and documentary analyses in order to attain triangulation, 
which is necessary to strengthen the validity of the collected research data. These 
techniques are expanded on in the paragraphs that follow.    
Yin (2011:146) asserts that unobtrusive measures record aspects of the social and 
physical environments already in place, and are not manipulated by researchers or 
affected by their presence. Unobtrusive research techniques involve studying social 
behaviour without affecting it (Babbie 2001 in Auriacombe 2016b:6). This is done “to 
counteract, or completely eliminate, bias and to promote conceptual and contextual 
analysis” (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, Sechrest and Grove in Huysamen 1994:136). 
Auriacombe (2007:459) states that “unobtrusive methods can also be used as the 
only source of data in a given research project; however, it has been found more 
useful when combined with other complementary methods”. The main value of these 
measures is that they involve nonreactive situations, where the researcher may not 
have influenced the participants’ behaviour that produced the physical traces (Yin 
2011:146). 
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Neuman (2011:321) points out that unobtrusive measures or research, also known 
as nonreactive research, emphasises how people being studied are not aware of it 
because the measures do not intrude. People being studied are not aware of it and 
leave evidence of their social behaviour or actions naturally. Furthermore, “the 
observant researcher infers from the evidence to behaviour or attitudes without 
disrupting those being studied” (Neuman 2011:321). 
Neuman (2011:158) explains that context is critical because qualitative researchers 
emphasise the social context for understanding the social world. As such, 
researchers maintain that the meaning of a social action or statement depends on 
the context in which it appears. When a researcher removes an event, social action, 
answer to a question, or conversation from the social context in which it appears, 
social meaning and significance are distorted. For the purpose of this study, the 
challenges and dynamics related to the pursuit of good governance, and the role of 
the Public Protector in supporting South Africa’s constitutional democracy, would be 
most appropriately examined by employing unobtrusive research techniques to 
complement other methods. 
1.5.3.1 Conceptual analysis 
Conceptual analysis encompasses the system of concepts, assumptions, 
expectations, beliefs, and theories that informs research and is generally regarded 
as an explanation proposed to reach a better understanding of the social reality or 
phenomena that are being investigated (Maxwell 2005 in Auriacombe 2011:96). 
Neuman (2011:182) indicates that conceptualisation is the process of taking a 
construct and refining it by giving it a conceptual or theoretical definition. Similarly, 
according to Mouton (2005:175), conceptual analysis refers to the type or method of 
research concerned with the analysis of the meaning of words or concepts. 
Furthermore, conceptual analysis explains the relationship of a concept to other 
concepts, and points out the implications of a concept as used in a particular context. 
It is for this reason, that the concept of the Ombudsman or Public Protector is viewed 
against the background of this functionary’s contribution to good governance.   
Conceptual analysis involves thinking carefully, observing directly, consulting with 
others, reading what others have said, and attempting possible definitions (Neuman 
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2011:182). According to Bryman (2012:8), conceptual analysis is preceded by a 
sound understanding of concepts, and this means knowing that concepts:  
 Are the way that people make sense of the social world; 
 Are essentially labels that people give to aspects of the social world that seem 
to have common features that strike them as significant; 
 Are very much part of the theoretical edifice that generations of social 
scientists have constructed; 
 Are key ingredients of theories; 
 Are important to how people organise and signal to intended audiences their 
research interest; 
 Help people to think about and be more disciplined about what it is they want 
to find out about and at the same time help with the organisation of the 
research findings; and 
 May be viewed as something people start out with and that represent key 
areas around which data are collected in an investigation. 
Zongozzi and Wessels (2016:214) note that “conceptual analysis relies on scholarly 
literature and reflections on the interpretation and interrelationships of the various 
related concepts and variables that influence the phenomenon”. Similarly, 
Auriacombe (2016b:7-8) states that the underlying assumption is to:  
 Assess and refine the goals;  
 Develop realistic and relevant research questions;  
 Substantiate arguments;  
 Clarify the theoretical framework and logic or reasoning used;  
 Define concepts;  
 Justify decisions; and  
 Direct data collection and analysis.  
It is about developing a conceptual framework that serves as a thread that runs 
through an entire research project from the beginning until the final conclusions 
(Badenhorst 2010:21). Jarbandhan (2012:20) emphasises that the conceptual 
framework is the operationalisation of the theoretical framework of a study and 
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therefore forms an intricate part of the research design. The key concepts that 
underpin this study are good governance and the Public Protector. 
Badenhorst (2010:21) explains that conceptualising includes a researchable problem 
that is relevant, an appropriate research design, and appropriate conceptual 
framework. Auriacombe (2016b:8) explains that conceptualising is a type of 
reasoning that starts with studying a range of specific individual cases, concepts, or 
instances in order to extrapolate patterns from the data obtained in order to form a 
conceptual category. There are two basic ways to define a complex concept: 
 Inductively building a generalised theoretical definition from one’s 
experiences, preferences, and assumptions. 
 Working deductively from a generalised theory, to analyse realities to 
determine how they fit into the theory, as well as modifying theory based on 
the results of the analysis (Auriacombe 2016b:8). 
A conceptual framework is an outcome of conceptual analysis and is metaphorically 
perceived as a roadmap that meticulously directs the researcher to the intended 
destination. A conceptual framework helps bind all the pieces of the puzzle called 
research together in a manner that provides coherence and synergistic outcomes.  
“A conceptual framework explains the constructs to be studied, either visually or in 
words, and their relationships” (Thomson 2014). Similarly, McArthur (2014) 
professes that “a conceptual framework evolves as a complete picture of your 
research study, which is a thinking tool and not a totem to be worshiped”. Concepts 
such as democracy and development are always linked to good governance, even 
though this is true only in theory. Thomson (2014) further argues that conceptual 
frameworks are underpinned by literature reviews and may be included as the 
selection of headings in a published manuscript. It is developed to: 
 decide which variables are relevant to the study; 
 make decisions about how to define variables during data analysis; and 
 interpret model results.  
Similarly, Ravitch and Riggan (2012:10-12) posit that a conceptual framework has 
three elements, namely: 
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 Personal interests, which include the researcher’s curiosities, biases, and 
ideological commitments; theories of action relating to why researchers think 
things happen; and epistemological assumptions relating to what constitutes 
useful and valuable knowledge to researchers – all of which are profoundly 
influenced by a researcher’s social location, institutional position, and life 
experience. 
 Topical research, which refers to empirical work that has focused on the 
subject in which a researcher is interested. It offers insights on the nature and 
severity of the problem, providing the researcher with potential arguments for 
a study’s significance. It also helps a researcher to identify gaps in the 
literature. Finally, it helps a researcher to survey the range of methodological 
approaches that have been brought to bear on the topic. 
 Theoretical frameworks, which comprise a collection of theories that will help 
to guide the study at hand. 
Badenhorst (2010:21) contends that “the conceptual framework is something 
particular to academic context. Since all academic writing is about argument, a 
researcher needs to show which interpretations of concepts and theories he or she 
believes to be most valid-supported by evidence”. Developing a conceptual 
framework is not straightforward because of the following reasons: 
 A conceptual framework is where the writer unpacks the key concepts used in 
the research and identifies the relationships between the concepts, for 
example social capital, mature students, and higher education. 
 Sometimes the conceptual framework includes theories, such as Foucault’s 
Theory of Discourse or Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Capital. 
 The methodology is sometimes part of the conceptual framework, for example 
narrative analysis and constructivism in education. 
 In most cases, the conceptual framework also provides the basic outline for 
analysing the data and drawing conclusions.  
 The conceptual framework is usually unpacked in the literature review 
(Badenhorst 2010:21).   
43 
1.5.3.2  Content analysis 
The key consideration in this study is how South Africa’s public sector could be 
geared towards operating on the basis of good governance. One of the ways to gain 
an elaborate understanding of the concept of good governance is through an 
intensive review of relevant literature and the content of various official, 
documentary, and media sources. Definitions of content analysis abound, with Holsti 
(1968 in Prasad 2008:175) stating that it is any technique for making inferences by 
systematically and objectively identifying the specified characteristics of messages. 
Kerlinger (1986 in Prasad 2008:175) defines content analysis as a method of 
studying and analysing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative 
manner for the purpose of measuring variables. Krippendorf (1980 in Prasad 
2008:175) defines content analysis as a research technique for making replicable 
and valid inferences from data to their context. Lastly, Weber (1985 in Prasad 
2008:175) states that content analysis is a research methodology that utilises a set 
of procedures to make valid inferences from text. 
Auriacombe (2007:463) emphasises that,  
“content analysis is a research technique for producing an objective 
and systematic description of communicative material ... This technique 
categorises answers into different types, and the number or category of 
each type is counted up ... Sometimes content analysis is referred to 
as a form of qualitative analysis that makes use of qualitative data”.  
Content analysis can be described as a method of analysing documents, hence in 
conducting it, the researcher attempts to be objective and systematic by using a 
quantitative coding scheme (Jarbandhan 2012:21-22). Babbie (2001:305) states that 
content analysis is particularly well-suited to studies answering the classic question: 
“Who says what, to whom, why, how, and with what effect?” On a cautionary note, 
Auriacombe (2007:464) posits that content analysis is not a substitute for qualitative 
analysis, but it does provide a general, if rather simplistic, way of looking at 
qualitative information. In content analysis, researchers examine a class of social 
artefacts known as written documents (Babbie 2001 in Auriacombe 2016b:7). 
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An attempt to establish what good governance entails by means of surveys would 
elicit different responses. Employing content analysis would, however, lead to 
analysing communications that people have produced and asking questions about 
communications instead of asking people to respond to questions (Kerlinger 1973 in 
Prasad 2008:175). Content denotes what is contained, and content analysis is the 
analysis of what is contained in a message (Prasad 2008:175). According to 
Auriacombe (2016b:9), the basic idea in content analysis is to reduce the total 
content of a communication to a set of categories that represent some characteristic 
of the research interest.  
Against the background of the information provided in this section, it is worth noting 
that the contribution of the Public Protector in supporting good governance is well 
documented in various official documentary and media sources. Auriacombe 
(2016b:9) explains that some bias might arise from lack of information on the actual 
way the recorded data were collected, the sample characteristics, the operational 
definitions, the instruments used, or the bias introduced by the person who collected 
the data. According to Prasad (2008:176), the material for content analysis can also 
include letters, diaries, newspaper content, folk songs, short stories, and messages 
of radio, television, documents, texts, or any symbol. Like any other research 
method, content analysis conforms to the following three basic principles of the 
scientific method: 
 Objectivity: which means that the analysis is pursued on the basis of explicit 
rules, which enable different researchers to obtain the same results from the 
same documents or messages. 
 Systematic: the inclusion or exclusion of content is done according to some 
consistently applied rules whereby the possibility of including only materials 
that support the researcher’s ideas is eliminated. 
 Generalisability: the results obtained by the researcher can be applied to 
other similar situations (Prasad 2008:176). 
Certain challenges emanate from the use of content analysis. Krippendorff (1980 in 
Prasad 2008:181) states that reliability and validity issues in content analysis remain 
unresolved. The method can also not be used to test causal relationships between 
variables (Prasad 2008:181). As with other research methods, sampling is a critical 
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issue in content analysis, and this is complicated by the fact that the unit of 
observation differs from the unit of analysis (Auriacombe 2016b:9). 
1.5.3.3 Comparative analysis 
This study employed comparative analysis to review the mandate of the Office of the 
Public Protector in contributing to good governance in the light of international 
practices. The fact that the idea of the Public Protector originated outside South 
Africa means that in carrying out the mandate of the office, inferences can be drawn 
from international counterparts’ practices with regard to advocating good 
governance. For this reason it is important to understand the history of the Public 
Protector / Ombudsman and how this functionary has evolved over the years and 
came to be adopted the world over (with a few exceptions).  
Auriacombe (2007:466) refers to historical/comparative analysis as a qualitative 
technique of which the main resources for observation and analysis are historical 
records. Pickvance (2005:2) asserts that the primary reason for comparative analysis 
is the explanatory interest of gaining a better understanding of the causal process 
involved in the production of an event, feature, or relationship. Furthermore, the two 
conventional types of comparative analysis focus on the explanation of differences 
and the explanation of similarities. 
However, what counts as a similarity or a difference depends not only on the 
observed values but also on the analyst and should therefore be regarded as a 
social construct rather than as objective reality (Pickvance 2005:2). Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer (2003:13) contend that comparative historical inquiry is distinctive 
because its practitioners engage in systematic and contextual comparisons of similar 
and contrasting cases. They also argue that comparative historical researchers 
explicitly analyse historical sequences and take seriously the unfolding of processes 
over time. 
Glass (1989 in Auriacombe 2016b:10) states that historical comparative analysis 
includes the study of the relationships among issues that have influenced the past, 
continue to influence the present, and will probably affect the future. Auriacombe 
(2007:466) posits that knowledge of the past provides necessary information to be 
used in the present to determine how things may develop in the future. Pickvance 
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(2005:4) postulates that since the starting point of comparative analysis is the 
explanation of similarities and differences, the obvious conclusions to draw are that 
universalising comparative analysis is used to make sense of similarities, and that 
differentiating comparative analysis is used to explain differences. 
It is against this background and in light of the international perspective on the roles 
and functions of the Ombudsman (see Chapter Five) that South Africa’s Public 
Protector has a crucial role to play in promoting good governance as mandated by 
the Constitution. The idea of the Public Protector / Ombudsman has received 
universal acclaim as an additional mechanism to exercise oversight over public 
sector institutions and, by extension, over the executive. In comparative analysis, the 
use of contrast and comparison facilitates analysis, which culminates in the creation 
of an extended analogy. This way the argument for the continuous support and 
assistance of the Public Protector by all other organs of state in strengthening South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy is imperative. 
1.5.3.4 Documentary analysis 
In the context of this study, documentary analysis is described as a method of 
analysing documents. Reports generated by the Office of the Public Protector, 
together with court findings, media reports and pieces of legislation, including the 
Constitution, are some of the documentary sources that spell out the contribution this 
functionary makes to promoting good governance. De Beer (1999:438) states that 
documentary analysis is associated with the reproductive reading of a text or 
document, or, in everyday language, knowing what something is about. 
Documentation serves the purpose of providing tangible evidence, which may take 
many forms such as archival materials, public records, media reports, biographies, 
official gazettes, minutes of meetings, reports, blueprints, and audio-visual 
documents, including art works (Annum 2016:2). Figueroa (2008 in Viswambharan 
and Priya 2015:4) emphasises that audio-visual material is the result of social 
interactions between, for instance, journalists, camera people, editors, and actors, 
among others. 
Auriacombe (2011:134) asserts that documentary content analysis is a technique 
used to systematically and objectively identify and describe specified characteristics 
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in the documentary texts. Annum (2016:2) explains that documentary analysis is a 
social research data collection method that is used as a tool to use relevant 
documentary evidence to support and validate facts stated in a research study, 
especially during the literature review chapter. The exercise involves analytic reading 
and reviewing of large amounts of written material. This is valuable to help the 
researcher to extract the relevant portions that can be deemed as statements of 
facts to validate individual research objectives (Annum 2016:2). More importantly, 
the sources of reading material must be acknowledged to prevent plagiarism. 
Denscombe (2010:216) postulates that documents can be treated as a source of 
data in their own right; in effect as an alternative to questionnaires, interviews, or 
observation. Denscombe (2010:216) further states that most documents are written 
sources, although there are alternative types of documents for research that take the 
form of visual sources such as pictures and artefacts, or even sounds, such as 
music. Document analysis entails a concerted effort to understand and interpret 
documents with a view to determine what is meant but not stated. Jarbandhan 
(2012:35) states that the importance of the use of a literature study and a 
documentary analysis is to corroborate and argue evidence from various sources. 
Denscombe (2010:217) cautions that the extent to which documents can live up to 
the image of being authoritative, objective, and factual depends very much on the 
data they contain. Some documents, as a form of data, include material obtained via 
the Internet, and therefore the medium through which documents are obtained is not 
an issue (Denscombe 2010:219). As a result, researchers scrutinise both hard and 
soft copies of documents. These specific information sources tend to be unobtrusive, 
stable, and relatively exact, although some of their weaknesses include access, 
retrievability, incomplete collection, and/or reporting bias (Yin 1994:80). 
1.5.4 Literature review 
This section considers the body of knowledge contained in secondary sources and 
which is readily available for enhancing scholarly research and providing users with 
information and knowledge. Leedy and Ormrod (2014:64) state that an important skill 
for any researcher is the ability to review the work of others and to evaluate the 
quality of their methods, results, and conclusions.  
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Critically examining what others have done has three distinct benefits: 
 It can help researchers determine which ideas, research findings, and 
conclusions should be taken seriously; 
 It can help researchers reconcile inconsistent findings obtained in previous 
research studies; and  
 It gives researchers ideas about how they might improve their own research 
efforts (Leedy and Ormrod 2014:64). 
An important point to consider when reviewing literature is to always give credit 
where credit is due, regardless of whether one is making use of printed materials, 
Internet sources, conference presentations, or informal conversations with others in 
one’s field (Leedy and Ormrod 2014:69). Auriacombe (2016b:115) indicates that the 
literature review offers a synthesis of: 
 What has been written on a topic; 
 What has not been written on that topic yet, or what is written in such a way 
that it is conceptually or methodologically inadequate, with the goal of 
clarifying; and 
 How the researcher’s proposal addresses the gap, silence, or weakness in the 
existing knowledge base. 
According to Rossman and Rallis (2003:123), discussing relevant literature helps in 
articulating the researcher’s perspective and to establish credibility as a researcher, 
indicating that the researcher is familiar with the conversation in the topic area. 
Rossman and Rallis (2003:123) caution that although extensive reviews are not 
necessary, some discussion is crucial for framing a study. Researchers should also 
aim for creative, inductive use of previous research and theory to build a case for 
their study. 
1.5.5  Theoretical framework 
This section explains the role and importance of a theoretical framework. Ravitch 
and Raggan (2012:12) contend that “theories that comprise a theoretical framework 
are usually found in the scholarly literature”. Ravitch and Raggan (2012:12) further 
assert that “theoretical frameworks may either be borrowed from other research or 
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fashioned by the researcher of the study at hand”. For this reason, Ravitch and 
Raggan (2012:12) argue that “theoretical frameworks represent a combination or 
aggregation of formal theories in such a way as to illuminate some aspect of the 
conceptual framework”. Additionally, Desjardins (2010) confirms that “a theoretical 
framework is a logically structured representation of concepts, variables and 
relationships involved in a scientific study with the purpose of clearly identifying what 
will be explored, examined, measured or described”. 
Rockinson-Szapkiw (2013) maintains that “a theoretical framework is a collection of 
interrelated concepts or a theory in which the researcher grounds their research”. 
Therefore, “a theoretical framework guides the research, determining what is 
measured, the relationships to look for, understanding the relationships between 
variables, as well as the boundaries that actually determine what to include and 
exclude” (Rockinson-Szapkiw 2013). Weaver-Hightower (2014) states that “instead 
of being about the topic itself, theoretical frameworks can be applied to the topic, not 
necessarily things that have arisen from the research”. To this end, theories serve as 
models that show how other researchers think of the way the phenomenon under 
study unfolds (Weaver-Hightower 2014). McArthur (2014) contends that “a 
theoretical framework is sometimes used as synonymous to a conceptual 
framework”. While a theoretical framework is about theories that underpin a study, a 
conceptual framework evolves as a complete picture of the research and is thus a 
thinking tool (McArthur 2014).    
Rockinson-Szapkiw (2013) highlights that a theoretical framework serves the 
following purposes: 
 To show how the research fits into what is already known (relationship to 
existing theory and research); 
 To show how the research makes a contribution to the topic and to the field 
(its intellectual goals);  
 To inform the research questions and methodology;  
 To help justify the research problem (why the research is important); and  
 To help guide the study, the literature review, and the organisation of ideas. 
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Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1999:56) contend that “a theory is a foundation for 
meaningful deliberation on the basis of which phenomenon can be explained”. 
Furthermore, these authors assert that a theory: 
 Helps to identify important aspects of a problem or a specific situation; 
 Predicts and investigates relationships between events; 
 Sets guidelines for determining and evaluating methods; and 
 Sets criteria for the selection of important information for use in the decision-
making process (Van der Waldt and Du Toit 1999:56). 
1.5.6 Validity and reliability 
A precaution generally provided by scholars in qualitative, non-empirical, and 
inductive research is for secondary data sources to be used with great care. This is 
essential to ensure that the researcher does not lose focus of validity and reliability, 
which are the core ingredients of guaranteeing the credibility of research output. 
Auriacombe (2016b:114) highlights the importance of validity and reliability by 
referring to the accessibility, availability, relevance, and quality of secondary 
information sources. Of particular importance, is the triangulation of research to 
achieve validity. Denzin (1970:310 in Bryman 2012:392) points out that triangulation 
refers to an approach that uses multiple observers, theoretical perceptions, sources 
of data, and methodologies, but the emphasis has tended to be on methods of 
investigation and sources of data. As for reliability, Bailey (1994:68) states that it 
simply implies consistency. Consequently, this study considered validity and 
reliability in the employment of secondary data sources.  
This study was based on qualitative analysis, with the result that most of the data 
were drawn from the interpretation of authoritative literature and analysis of other 
secondary sources, which to some extent relied on primary data. It is essential to 
highlight that secondary sources such as reports and policy documents may contain 
elements of bias with a resultant distortion of facts. It is also unlikely that data 
obtained from some secondary sources would reflect complete objectivity. However, 
it is important for the researcher not to allow one’s own perceptual distortions to 
creep in.  
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Literature on good governance is abundant, and this study endeavoured to make a 
careful selection of credible documentary sources and literature. Triangulation of 
diverse data sources also served to enhance the reliability and validity of the 
collected data. Scrutinising some of the best practices employed by well-governed 
states provided some measure of reliability. The rich literature on the characteristics 
of well-governed states provides the benchmark against which to measure what is 
an ideal model for countries that struggle with pursuing good governance. Each 
country’s circumstances must also be considered in an attempt to address its 
governance challenges, and failure to acknowledge this would be a serious 
limitation. 
1.6 Data-collection sources 
This qualitative and non-empirical study relied primarily on the interpretation of 
datasets; hence, the primary means of data collection were the body of literature 
available from literature and documentary sources. Secondary data sources were 
used as back-up data, especially when primary data were not available (Auriacombe 
2007:467). As noted previously, the data analysis for this study was mainly 
conducted through the operationalisation of unobtrusive techniques, notably 
conceptual, content, and comparative analyses, as well as documentary analysis by 
way of presenting it in a literature review format. 
The objective in research is to collect rich data that are useful, relevant, and aligned 
with the research conducted. Various data sources were used in this study to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of the many ways the ideal of good governance can 
be pursued. The documentary sources from which secondary data were obtained 
included: 
 Peer-reviewed journals; 
 Conference papers; 
 Published textbooks; 
 Published and unpublished research reports; 
 Unpublished dissertations and theses; 
 Oficial and unofficial government publications; 
 Oficial reports; 
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 Legislation; 
 Media reports and articles; 
 Newspapers; 
 Official court findings; 
 Unpublished lectures; and 
 Internet sources. 
1.7 Terminology 
This section serves to provide a brief clarification of certain terms used in this study, 
especially where these were not adequately conceptualised in the thesis. These 
concepts form part of the explanatory framework of the thesis. 
1.7.1 Accountability 
Accountability is a concept that is subject to misuse and convenience because of the 
obligation that it places on those who are expected to account. Accountability can 
take many forms, such as horizontal accountability, substantive accountability, and 
procedural accountability, among others. Fukuyama (2012:19) maintains that,  
“many procedurally accountable democratic regimes are in effect 
unaccountable in terms of actual governance. Furthermore, the idea 
that a regime can be procedurally unaccountable and yet morally 
constrained to act in response to perceived public interest is not one 
that receives traction today”.   
For the purpose of this study, horizontal accountability receives much focus since it 
is defined as “the capacity of governmental institutions including such agencies of 
restraint, independent electoral tribunals, anticorruption bodies, central banks, 
auditing agencies, and Ombudsmen to check abuses by other public agencies and 
branches of government” (Waldraugh 1998:1). 
1.7.2 Approach  
This is the practical way of implementing an objective (Auriacombe and Van der 
Waldt 2016:10). This concept is applied synonymously with the concept of 
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methodology and paradigm in the context of this study. Babbie and Mouton 
(2005:49) state that a methodological approach includes the actual methods and 
techniques that social researchers use, as well as the underlying principles and 
assumptions regarding their use. 
1.7.3  Bureaucratic corruption 
Bureaucratic corruption occurs when public officials break rules to abuse the power 
and resources entrusted to them for their personal benefit (Taghavi, Nikoomaram 
and Tootian 2011:94 in Mudeme 2017:36). 
1.7.4 Chapter 9 institutions 
Chapter 9 institutions are mandated by the Constitution to carry out their operations. 
Some, like the Public Protector and the Auditor-General, have an oversight function 
over the executive arm of government and thus support the legislature (Constitution 
of South Africa 1996). 
1.7.5 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation involves cascading the authority inherent in the national sphere of 
government down to the lower sphere of government for improved service delivery 
(Mashamaite and Hlongwane 2015:151). This is a process pursued in South Africa 
and other countries to promote democratic governance and participatory democracy, 
and it takes the form of political and administrative decentralisation (Mashamaite and 
Hlongwane 2015:151). 
1.7.6 Democracy, democratic governance and liberal democracy  
Democracy is a loaded concept that is often used at the convenience of time, and 
derives its meaning and purpose from the situation at hand. It never will and never 
can be interpreted to achieve universal satisfaction (Dipholo 2015:561). Democracy 
has many definitions, implications, and consequences, and accountability is one of 
its fundamental components (Madue 2015:709).  
On the other hand, democratic governance is dependent on the presence of 
institutionalised party systems that can participate in policy making (Khatib 
54 
2013:327-328). Key institutions in democratic governance include a strong state, 
Rule of Law, and democratic accountability (Fukuyama 2015b:12). The success of 
liberal democracies depends on achieving a balance between strong state power 
and the checks and balances constituted by legal and electoral systems (Fukuyama 
2012:15). 
1.7.7 Development  
Development is a critical variable that explains sudden increases in productivity 
based on the viability of state institutions rather than economic variables like natural 
resources and the skills of the population (Fukuyama 2014). There is widespread 
agreement among social scientists that development is a multidimensional 
phenomenon with economic, political, and social aspects, and that the different 
dimensions of development are interconnected with one another in complex ways 
(Levy and Fukuyama 2010:1). 
1.7.8 Governance 
The World Bank defines good governance as “the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for 
development” (International Fund for Agricultural and Development 1999:1). There 
are many definitions of governance and good governance. 
1.7.9 Leadership 
Leadership is defined as the process of influencing and directing the behaviour of 
individuals and groups in such a way that they work willingly to pursue the objectives 
and goals of an organisation (Callahan, Fleenor and Knudson 1986; Koontz and 
Weihrich 1990; Smith and Cronjé 1999; Cole 2004 in Nzimakwe 2011:52). It is a 
concept with much bearing on the ability of institutions to pursue an earnest course 
of action in implementing good governance. 
1.7.10 Legitimacy and credibility 
These two concepts refer to the just entitlements given to the incumbent government 
to exercise powers in governing a country (Levy and Fukuyama 2010:7). 
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1.7.11 Multilateral institutions 
These are global institutions that include multilateral agencies, humanitarian funding 
institutions, major donors, as well as the UN, whose purpose is to influence and 
steer governments towards pursuing an agenda of good governance as they define it 
(Fues, Dongyan and Vatterodt 2007:1). 
1.7.12 Ombudsman 
The original title used by the functionary whose duty was to support the legislature in 
the exercise of oversight over the executive branch of government. This title is still 
used in most Scandinavian countries (Brynard 1999:9). 
1.7.13 Public Protector  
This is the South African derivative of the concept of an Ombudsman. The choice of 
the title differs from country to country, but the purpose is to have an independent 
individual of high standing who has the authority to oversee government operations 
in countries with such a system. The activities of this functionary serve to reinforce 
the oversight function exercised by the legislature over the executive (OISD 2015:9). 
1.7.14 Public administration or public management 
According to Du Toit and Van der Waldt (1999:9), public administration as “an 
activity is the work carried out by public officials within the total spectrum of 
government institutions to enable them to achieve their objectives at the different 
spheres of government”. 
Lynn (2012:19) argues that “many public administration scholars have held that, of 
the two concepts, administration is original and primary, public management is novel 
and subordinate or specialised”. According to classic American literature, public 
management can be viewed as a “structure of governance”, whereas contemporary 
literature views public management as a craft, referring to it as a “skilled practice by 
individuals performing managerial roles” (Lynn 2012:18). Furthermore, Lynn 
(2012:18) emphasises that public management is also “an institution that observes 
rules of practice”, which implies “de facto restraints on or guides to behaviour, that 
ensure their legitimacy within a constitutional, or de jure, regime”. Both the concepts 
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of administration and management are considered as interdependent in this 
investigation of good governance. 
1.7.15  Rule of Law 
Rule of Law is “a set of rules, reflecting community values that are binding not just on 
citizens, but also on the elites who wield coercive power. If law does not constrain 
the powerful, it amounts to commands of the executive and constitutes merely rule 
by law” (Fukuyama 2015b:12). 
1.7.16 Statutory framework 
This refers to pieces of legislation or laws, policies, and regulatory guidelines that 
must be observed in implementing the government’s public programmes (Van der 
Waldt 2004:5). 
1.7.17 Systems Theory 
This is a theory that concerns an understanding of a system by examining the 
interconnections and interactions between components that comprise the entirety of 
that system (Fishwick 2011). 
1.7.18 Transparency 
Transparency is one of the key tenets that are aimed at empowering citizens to hold 
government accountable, preventing crises and safeguarding communities, 
increasing effectiveness while reducing waste, and engaging the public in 
democratic decision making (Bass, Brian and Eisen 2014:2). Transparency, and the 
accountability it brings, is even more important when it comes to another typical 
aspect of “honest graft”, namely campaign contributions (Bass et al. 2014:10).  
The right to access government information has long been viewed as essential to 
participation in the democratic process, trust in government, prevention of corruption, 
informed decision making, the accuracy of government information, and the 
provision of information to the public, companies, and journalists, among other 
essential functions in society (Jaeger and Bertot 2010:371).  
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1.7.19  Public service 
Public service is the way a government is organised to execute its operations; that is, 
government institutions are responsible for providing various general government 
services, comprising departments and agencies, and publicly controlled by the 
government (Berman, Bowman, West and Van Wart 2013:11 in Mudeme 2017:36). 
1.8    Ethical considerations 
Social interactions, with the purpose of deriving data for research, can in most 
instances lead to the compromising of participants. This may occur through 
omission, where the researcher intends no harm to participants; or by commission, 
where the researcher can cause harm to participants with full knowledge of the 
repercussions of his or her actions. Researchers should guarantee the respondents’ 
anonymity and confidentiality, and obtain their informed consent. Of concern to a 
researcher is to achieve a mutually beneficial situation, where both the researcher 
and the participants emerge unscathed from the conducting of the research. 
However, for the purpose of this study, the main concern is acknowledging the body 
of knowledge contributed by other authoritative research stakeholders. These are 
people who made a valuable contribution to scientific research and they thus 
deserve recognition in all earnestness.   
Babbie and Mouton (2005:521) maintain that it is important to note that conducting 
scientific research requires an awareness of the general agreements among 
researchers about what is proper and improper in the conduct of scientific inquiry. 
Some of the most important ethical agreements include voluntary participation, no 
harm to the participants, anonymity and confidentiality, deceiving subjects, and 
analysis and reporting. Researchers have an obligation to ensure that none of these 
ethical agreements are disregarded or compromised. Failure to adhere to these 
ethical agreements results in the researcher’s conduct being considered unethical. 
1.9 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter One serves as a general introduction to the research and provides a 
background to the research topic and problem statement. It outlines the guiding 
research question, which is addressed by aligning it to the secondary research 
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questions and research objectives. It provides an overview of the research design, 
methodology, and research techniques followed in the study.  
Chapter Two addresses the conceptual, contextual, and theoretical variables that 
influence democratic good governance in the public sector. It also discusses the 
origins of the theoretical variables that underpin good governance in South Africa 
and indicates how these paradigms are used to advance the practical application of 
good governance. It also explores the conceptual knowledge of the main paradigms 
that influence the theoretical and philosophical public administration frameworks that 
govern public sector activities. 
Chapter Three outlines the international perspectives of public oversight institutions 
in terms of the role and functions of an Ombudsman. It highlights how the public 
oversight functionary is constituted internationally and determines the operations of 
the Office of the Ombudsman as a “watchdog” institution in selected countries. 
Chapter Four reviews the statutory, regulatory, policy, and structural variables that 
influence the role of the Public Protector. It also determines the multilateral, 
structural, and external variables that oversee good governance.  
Chapter Five contextualises the scope, role, functions, and remedial power of South 
Africa’s Public Protector to promote good governance and democratic accountability. 
It contextualises the mandate of the Public Protector as an independent institution 
operating in a democratic state system by way of case examples. The chapter also 
aims to determine whether the recommendations made by the Public Protector have 
remedial power in terms of their enforcement.   
Chapter Six provides a synthesis of the variables that influence the credibility of the 
Office of the Public Protector. It provides an outline of the findings, interpretations, 
conclusions, and recommendations of the study. The chapter makes reference to all 
the previous chapters of the study to show their interconnection and 
interdependence.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL, CONTEXTUAL AND THEORETICAL VARIABLES THAT 
INFLUENCE DEMOCRATIC GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to address the following three study objectives listed in Chapter 
One (Section 1.6):  
 Clarify the conceptual, contextual, and theoretical variables that 
influence democratic good governance.  
 Discuss the origins of the theoretical variables that underpin good 
governance in South Africa, and how these paradigms are used to 
advance the practical application of good governance. 
 Provide an exploration of the conceptual knowledge of the main 
paradigms that influence the theoretical and philosophical public 
administration frameworks that govern public sector activities. 
Firstly, the chapter examines the concept “democracy”. The chapter also pays 
attention to the following principles of democracy: political equality, popular 
consultation, and majority rule. The concepts “governance” and “good governance”, 
and the measures of good governance are then discussed. The chapter also 
discusses concepts and phenomena that are closely linked to democratic 
governance and good governance. Notably, attention is paid to legitimacy and 
credibility, development, accountability and transparency, decentralisation, 
centralisation, and leadership. Furthermore, the chapter aims to locate the discourse 
on good governance within the explanatory frameworks that accounted for the 
development of the Public Administration paradigm.  
This chapter outlines several concepts and approaches developed over time to 
provide insight into the dynamic nature of public administration and management. 
The chapter explores the P(p)ublic A(a)dministration paradigm and its impact on the 
developments in the field of good governance. Theories are useful in providing a 
basis for analysing past and current developments in order to chart the future course 
of events. Theoretical frameworks provide the basis on which decisions in the public 
sector are made, especially taking into consideration the dynamic nature of events 
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that shape the lives of citizens across the global community. In this regard, 
explanatory frameworks interpret events and developments that led to the current 
good governance paradigm. In this regard, the chapter discusses the Public 
Management paradigm, the NPM paradigm, Post-NPM, NPG, and Network Theory. 
These theories shaped the domain of Public Administration.  
2.2   Conceptualising and contextualising democracy 
For the purposes of this thesis, concepts are “ideas or abstract principles that relate 
to a particular subject or view of that subject” (Collins Cobuild Advanced Dictionary 
2012:288). 
This study will not attempt to delve into the academic debate of defining democracy 
since there are many experts who have provided a plethora of such definitions. 
Dipholo (2015:561) explains that “whereas the concept of democracy has no 
universal meaning, many have settled for its attributes and indicators as being a 
sufficient definition of the concept”.  
The focus in this section is to highlight some of the key components of democracy. 
Diamond (2015:143) asserts that democracy includes “freedom of multiple parties 
and candidates to campaign and contest; opposition access to mass media and 
campaign finance; inclusiveness of suffrage; fairness and neutrality of electoral 
administration; and the extent to which electoral victors have meaningful power to 
rule”. In the same manner, Khatib (2013:327-328) posits that “democratic 
governance is dependent on the presence of institutionalised party systems that can 
participate in making politics”. Leftwich (2005:695) postulates that “in a liberal 
democracy, these characteristics are supplemented, in general, by a wide range of 
institutionalised civil rights and liberties for citizens, including freedom of expression, 
association and religion, the Rule of Law, individual rights and autonomy”. Hence, 
Khatib (2013:315) points out that “political participation and democratic transition are 
tightly linked”. Khatib (2013:315-316) adds that “not only is viable transition 
dependent on viable political participation, the way forward for political participation 
is also dependent to a greater extent on the trajectory that democratic transition 
takes”. 
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Giddens (1986:7) argues that “real democracy exists where the citizens are regularly 
informed of the activities of the state, and the latter in turn is aware of the sentiments 
and wishes of all sectors of the population”. This is an ideal best conceived by the 
proponents of democracy, but real-life situations have proved otherwise. Burde 
(2004:3) states that “public participation can provide the mechanism by which 
citizens can communicate their interests, preferences and needs, putting pressure 
on government to respond to these”. In the same context, Mavee (2015:138) 
explains that,  
“public participation in the political process, the ability to influence the 
formulation and implementation of decisions and policies, 
responsiveness to the needs and demands of the population, 
accountability and transparency of the government in its dealings are 
indicators of the quality of democracy”. 
Warner (2015) contends that “the role of private citizens in a democracy is manifest 
through voting, hence less voter turnover reflect citizens not living up to their social 
contract. Also, citizens have to engage their government and hold the rulers to 
account”. Albrecht (2008) defines political participation as “deliberate activity in the 
formal political sphere that is aimed at changing policy”. Democracy requires that 
democratic institutions be in place so that citizens can participate in decision making. 
Khatib (2013:318) defines democratic institutions as “political institutions that have a 
recognisable, direct relationship with making of decisions that are mandatory within a 
given territory, the channels of access to decision-making roles, and the shaping of 
the interests and identities that claim such access”. According to Khatib (2013:318-
319), “such institutions include the legislature, the judiciary, electoral institutions 
(including political parties), local government, the media, and civil society. For 
democracy to flourish, those institutions must exist and be viable”. Also, “it would 
hardly be a liberal democracy without institutions which seek to constrain the 
behaviour of the state and to ensure transparency and accountability” (Leftwich 
2005:695).  
Diamond (2015:143) contends that,  
“most approaches to classifying regimes (as democracies or not) rely 
on continuous measurement of key variables, like political rights, in the 
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case of the polity scale, or both political rights and civil liberties, in the 
case of Freedom House, along with a somewhat arbitrary cut-off point 
for separating democracies from non-democracies”. 
Leftwich (2005:695) argues that “democracy is best thought of as a set of 
institutions, rules, by which the political game is played out, though it is also often 
thought of normatively, as a good thing, which it may, of course, be too”. Conversely, 
Huntington (1984) postulates that “where strong military juntas exist, these juntas 
may cede power to civilians to escape their own inability to govern effectively, but 
this means that neither authoritarian nor democratic institutions are effectively 
institutionalised”. Additionally, under certain circumstances, “countries go from 
despotism to democracy, and then back to authoritarianism before finally 
progressing to longer-lasting democracy” (Huntington 1984). 
Annunziata, Johnson and Kramer (2014:6) “are not arguing that democracy is 
irrelevant to good governance [but] rather believe that important improvements in 
governance can be secured before a fully democratic system is established”. 
Leftwich (2005:695) states that “democracy is essentially a conservative system of 
power, geared to stability, not change”. It is for this reason that Annunziata et al. 
(2014:6) contend that “Africa’s strong growth spurt has failed to trickle down to the 
majority of the continent’s people”. This is given the fact that the majority of countries 
under consideration are democracies. Furthermore, “after a decade of strong 
economic growth, governments’ ability to deliver services and reduce poverty falls 
short of what their citizens aspire to” (Annunziata et al. 2014:6). Furthermore, 
Annunziata et al. (2014:6) argue that  
“while there is strong evidence that good governance and strong 
democratic institutions are important for sustainable economic growth, 
the key is identifying what definition of governance is relevant to 
economic performance – realising that the answer might differ at 
different stages of a country’s development”. 
Fukuyama (2012:15) emphasises that  
“modern liberal democracy is a combination of three sets of institutions: 
the state itself; the Rule of Law, which is a system of social rules 
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regarded as binding on the actions of the de facto ruler; and 
mechanisms of accountability, which in the modern world are periodic 
multiparty elections”. 
Leftwich (2005:695) affirms that “sustained growth and development has almost 
everywhere required a coherent, consistent and continuous policy path which has 
normally only been achieved by strong states through either non-democratic 
authoritarian rule or dominant party politics in democracies”. In line with the 
democratic principle that electoral victors should have meaningful power to rule, the 
notion of Just Enough Governance (JEG) is critical “to kick start a substantial 
improvement in economic performance” (Annunziata et al. 2014:6). Annunziata et al. 
(2014:7) contend that,  
“Africa’s governments have largely opted for Just Enough Governance 
(JEG) strategy, and this has helped Africa improve its economic 
performance. Governments across the sub-continent have increased 
privatisation of moribund state-owned enterprises, lowered trade 
barriers, decreased corporate taxes, strengthened regulatory and legal 
systems, and increased infrastructure investment”. 
However, Annunziata et al. (2014:7) caution that JEG “is a successful starting point 
but should never be seen as an ending point”. For “formal institutions of electoral and 
liberal democracy to survive and prosper, it is necessary for there to be a strong 
state, capable of applying the rules, and an independent legal system that enforces 
the laws predictably and fairly” (Leftwich 2005:695-696). In addition, Leftwich 
(2005:697) contends that,  
“democratic electoral victory is not the same as a licence for the 
winners to undermine, attack or eliminate the vital interests or 
resources of the losers; on the contrary, there must be significant limits 
to what they can do with their newly-won power, and they must agree 
to that”.  
Leftwich (2005:696), however, cautions that,  
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“new or born again democracies are more likely to consolidate and 
prosper if their new governments do not pursue highly contentious 
policies too far or too fast, especially where these policies seriously 
threaten other major interests, whether such policies are economic, 
distributional or social”.     
On the contrary, Weiming (2012) asserts that “the key challenge or problem facing 
democracies as manifest in their delegation of authority to the rulers is how you 
monitor the performance of those you give this responsibility”. Furthermore, Weiming 
(2012) contends that “the society needs production but it also needs security within 
which production can occur, hence the political process is the minimum condition for 
security”. Under certain circumstances, a regulatory system is established, because 
this “system is designed deliberately to control power, especially where there are 
those who are too powerful” (Fukuyama and Weiming 2013). Fukuyama and 
Weiming (2013) posit that “rulers must be held responsible and accountable for the 
wellbeing of the people, and not the elites”. Dipholo (2015:561) concedes that 
“democracy as a system of government has been trending for a long time in the 
process becoming the supreme good in the management of public affairs and 
continues to be presented as an end in itself”. The developments in East Asian 
states with regard to delivery of quality public goods and services have proved that is 
not true.  
Dipholo (2015:561) argues that “the perspective that democracy ensures political 
stability necessary for economic prosperity and the protection of rights has lulled 
citizens into assuming that democracy will automatically result in good governance 
and universal benefits”. However, Fukuyama and McFaul (2007:41) maintain that 
“good governance is widely accepted as a requisite for economic growth, 
widespread poverty undermines democratic legitimacy, growth reduces poverty, 
democratic accountability is often required to combat corruption and poor 
governance, and growth creates a favourable climate for democratic consolidation”.  
The principles of democracy safeguard citizens against a centralised government 
and require decentralisation to various spheres of government with a view to be 
accessible and responsive to citizens. Therefore, citizens in democracies not only 
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have rights but also the responsibility to participate in the political system to ensure 
that their respective rights are protected. 
The core principles of democracy include, among others, transparency, 
accountability, equity, access, participation, and human rights. These principles 
come into play in the government’s governance processes.  
Generally, there are two ways of looking at democracy. The issue of participation is 
critical in the distinction. These approaches have varied implications for 
understanding the abovementioned foundations of democracy. The one view, the so-
called public ballot perspective, views democracy through the lens of representivity, 
where citizens identify their representatives through regular free and fair elections 
(Sen 2004:1-2). The second perspective, known as the public reasoning perspective, 
attempts from within what is feasible to move to a situation of direct representation, 
emphasising opportunity for participation by citizens where participatory reasoning 
could play itself out in public decision-making processes (Sen 2004:1). This public 
reasoning perspective, with its roots in ancient approaches of direct democracy in 
Hellenic and other societies, encourages open and informed discussion as part of 
interactive decision-making processes (Sen 2004:1).   
It is an extension of the fundamentals for democracy to be wider than only focused 
on the electoral processes (Sen 2004:1-2). The public reasoning perspective is 
relevant to the discussion of deliberative policy approaches in democratic settings. In 
view of the argument for interactive decision-making processes, the discussion turns 
toward the theories of public administration and good governance, which are 
concepts that must be explained for the purposes of this thesis.  
Public policy is defined as issues governed by the government through regulation, 
which has a common (public good) purpose or goal (Parsons 1995:xvii). In more 
theoretical terms, policy is seen as the central concept to the analysis and the 
practice of governance (Colebatch 2002:1). To analyse public policy, public 
administrators and political scientists study public policy and public governance 
within the context of the policy cycle (policy process).  
The policy cycle is a theoretical and analytical construct that assists with 
understanding the impact, trends, development, and change of policy. The policy 
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cycle identifies in a circular format a policy problem, it requires the policy makers to 
define the problem, find alternative solutions to the problem, and monitor and 
evaluate options for the ideal solution. In the second half of the cycle, the policy 
makers make a selection of the possible options to the policy problem, the 
implementation of such alternatives, and an evaluation of the policy choices that 
were made (May and Wildavsky 1978). In this regard, it is important to note that for 
the purposes of this thesis, the policy cycle is a visual map and not an approach to 
this particular research per se. The policy process, as Dunn (1993:5-35) and 
Parsons (1995:81) state, is a very complex process which is in no way a set of neat 
steps but rather a multiplicity of different internal and external forces and approaches 
at play. 
Against this democratic background, this chapter sets out to explore the value of 
public protection. It makes an argument for the importance of Public Administration 
approaches in modern governance in order to improve the democratic quality as 
experienced by citizens. Public protection cannot be disregarded in any context of 
the democratic state, even though the results of it are not always acknowledged as 
contributing much to “scientific” research undertaken in the positivist tradition. To 
take the discussion forward, it is necessary to have an understanding of the role of 
the Public Protector and the role of citizens in having oversight institutions to protect 
them as beneficiaries of the social contract. The social contract is a fundamental part 
of the democratic organisation of the state. The social contract states what is 
required from the citizens and what is required from the state. The concept of the 
social contract is not new, but requires more attention in the context of developing 
democracies.   
The challenges of using oversight institutions and the value thereof to add to the 
quality of public accountability are investigated in the context of the foundations of 
democracy in the democratic state, in order to understand ex ante and post facto 
good governance. The question is how best to utilise information for the longer-term 
governance process over and above the first round of reports that effectively has as 
its purpose resolving implementation and operational challenges of a short-term 
nature. Related to this is the challenge of utilising the softer, more subjective, and 
valuative information within the governance process to supplement data of a more 
empirical and quantitative nature.    
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2.2.1   Principles of democracy  
Democracy is based on certain principles, such as popular consultation, majority 
rule, sovereignty, political equality, universal participation, and the government’s 
feedback and responsiveness to public opinion (Holden 1993:9-12 in Masango 
2001:1-52; Janda et al. 1989:40 in Masango 2001:1-52; Ranney 1975:307 in 
Masango 2001: 
1-52).  
According to Janda et al. (1989:37-40 in Masango 2001:30) and Ranney (1975:307 
in Masango 2001:40), the principles listed above indicate the indispensable nature of 
public participation in terms of protection in democratic settings. Janda et al. 
(1989:38 in Masango 2001:43) argue that participation must form part of the 
decision-making process and that a “climate conducive to continued public 
participation” must be facilitated for this purpose. Certain principles are addressed in 
the next sections in order to establish the role of public oversight and protection in a 
democracy.  
2.2.1.1   Political equality  
The principle of political equality requires citizens to be treated equally. Equal 
opportunities for participation in the political milieu are essential, especially in relation 
to voting and elections. This does not, however, necessarily entail equal participation 
by citizens and also does not entail all the levels of participation by citizens (cf. 
Holden 1993:9-12 in Masango 2001:50; Ranney 1975:308 in Masango 2001:50).   
2.2.1.2   Popular consultation  
Popular consultation requires that decisions on policy are best promoted by the 
needs of the citizens. This implies that citizens themselves take these decisions. 
Therefore opportunities and mechanisms to consult citizens must be created within a 
democratic state. Encouraging popular consultation ensures continued participation 
and a responsive government (cf. Janda et al. 1989:40 in Masango 2001:38; Ranney 
1975:308 in Masango 2001:38).  
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2.2.1.3   Majority rule  
The principles of majority rule focus on the understanding that the will of the people 
prevails. Majority rule is coupled with individual and minority rights and these rights 
are protected. Ranney (1975:310 in Masango 2001:43) explains that decision 
making is based on choosing between various alternatives in a democratic state.  
2.3 Conceptualising and contextualising governance and good 
governance      
Governance and good governance are examined as concepts in this section. The 
academic discourse on governance and good governance points to one common 
aspiration, which is the delivery of quality public goods and services to citizens. 
Leftwich (2005:690) defines governance as “the formation and stewardship of the 
formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as 
well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions”. 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010:4) define governance as “the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”. These scholars argue that 
this includes  
“(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate 
and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the 
state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them” (Kaufmann et al. 2010:4).  
According to Manasan, Gonzalez and Gaffud (1999:4), although governance has 
been defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development, governance is not simply 
about how a government conducts business in its own sphere but also about how it 
interacts with civil society. Furthermore, governance entails how well a government 
has encouraged and facilitated people’s participation not only in the delivery of 
services, but also in the evaluation and monitoring for government performance 
itself. Van der Waldt, Auriacombe and Ströh (2013:162) assert that  
69 
“good governance focuses essentially on the ingredients for effective 
public management. In other words, irrespective of the quality of 
policies set by a government, good governance is required to ensure 
that those policies have their desired effect. In essence it helps to 
ensure that governments actually deliver to their citizens what they say 
they will deliver”. 
Manasan et al. (1999:6) confirm that it is the quality of governance and not the type 
of political regime that has made the difference in the economic performance of 
Asian countries. Similarly, Annunziata et al. (2014:6) state that while there is strong 
evidence that good governance and strong institutions are important for sustainable 
economic growth, the key is identifying which definitions of governance are relevant 
to economic performance – realising that the answer might differ at different stages 
of a country’s development. Van der Waldt et al. (2013:162) contend that 
governments are expected to perform certain key functions regarded as “good”, 
including maintaining macro-economic stability, developing infrastructure, providing 
public goods, preventing market failures, and promoting employment equity. The key 
to improving the level of governance is to find rules and norms that create incentives 
for state agencies, officials, and civil society to act in the collective interest at the 
least cost to society (World Bank 1997 in Manasan et al. 1999:4). 
Andrews et al. (2013) assert that “the concept governance and in particular its 
conflation with the notion of good governance has been deeply normative in ways 
that hinder finding ways to make governance work better”. Schwella (2015:13) posits 
that  
“while governance refers to a process that involves a wider range of 
actors than government, government refers to formal institutional 
processes that operate at the national level to make the law and 
maintain public order in the best interest of the general welfare of 
society”.   
Andrews et al. (2013) contend that “the main focus of governance should be on the 
implementation side of government, meaning that state capacity is critical for 
development”. Consequently, “without state capacity it would be difficult or 
impossible to achieve developmental objectives” (Andrews et al. 2013). 
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Mugambiwa, Tirivangasi and Yingi (2015:389) posit that the two aspects of 
governance worth considering in satisfying the basic necessities of life, especially in 
developing countries, are the political aspect, which must focus on the manner in 
which a nation is governed, and the economic aspect, which must focus on how 
societal resources are managed. 
For this reason, “good governance must provide a platform where citizens freely 
participate in the decision-making process” (Mugambiwa et al. 2015:389). 
Participation must not be the preserve of the elite to the exclusion of the masses. In 
the same way, Madonsela (2013) argues that transparency in exercising entrusted 
power is an important part of good governance and that citizens are key to good 
governance. The Office of the Public Protector is thus available for citizens and non-
citizens, as well as officials who are also citizens. Seery and Arendar (2014:13) 
assert that “the influence and interests of economic and political elites have long 
reinforced inequality. Money buys political clout, which the richest and most powerful 
use to further entrench their unfair advantage”. In the same way, the UN Research 
Institute for Social Development (2010) maintains that “without deliberate policy 
interventions, high levels of inequality tend to be self-perpetuating. They lead to the 
development of political and economic institutions that work to maintain the political, 
economic and social privileges of the elite”. 
Mugambiwa et al. (2015:389) argue that “governance in many African countries is 
still far from ‘good’ because the systems are not as open as they should be”. 
According to Msaule (2015:948), “African good governance is a term introduced in 
1989 by the World Bank report, titled ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: From crisis to sustainable 
growth. A long-term perspective study’”. Leftwich (1993:60) points out that  
“good governance, according to the World Bank report, includes a 
public service that is efficient, a judicial system that is independent and 
a functional legal system, perfect for the Rule of Law and human rights 
as well as a free press, among others”.   
Additionally, Dipholo (2015:569) highlights that “good governance decentralises 
authority and resources to local government to give citizens a greater role in the 
conduct of state affairs and the management of public resources”. Maserumule 
(2014:963) postulates that “the term ‘good governance’ eludes precise definition, it is 
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more prescriptive than descriptive; it is defined in ‘what ought to be’ instead of what it 
really ‘is’”. Similarly, “good governance ensures that civil society plays an active role 
in setting priorities and meeting the needs of the most vulnerable people in society” 
(Dipholo 2015:569). In the same vein, Dipholo (2015:570) states that “when people’s 
interests, needs and human rights are at the centre of governance institutions and 
practices, there can be real progress in combating poverty”.  
Matsiliza (2015:447) propounds that “the involvement of society cannot be ignored or 
underestimated, especially on issues of sustainable development and governance”. 
Hence, Rowlands (2014:3) confirms that “failures of governance are usually failures 
of power-holders in the state to enable citizens to participate in decision making and 
governance”. Such governance failures may culminate in a state of fragility. While 
acknowledging that South Africa is not a fragile state in all respects, and that fragility 
is not a rigid category, the broad characteristics of fragility are worth considering and 
exploring. Rowlands (2014:2) contends that  
“countries might be regarded as fragile for a number of reasons, 
principally where governments fail – through lack of capacity or will – to 
reduce poverty and vulnerability and to provide public goods such as 
safety and security, economic wellbeing, and essential social services 
to their citizens”. 
Annunziata et al. (2014:2) state that a country’s growth potential is dependent on 
economic reforms and improvements in governance and institutions, which have the 
ability to break a long history of economic instability, conflict, and corruption. 
Additionally, Rowlands (2014:2) states that 
“fragile contexts are also often characterised by poor infrastructure and 
communications, dysfunctional markets, vulnerability to shocks 
(including sudden and unpredictable political developments), 
inaccessible or ineffective security and justice systems, inability to 
mobilise resources for development, and weak or authoritarian 
governance”.  
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Any government that is oblivious of the impending signs, whether by omission or 
commission, will sooner or later find itself entangled in this situation. Rowlands 
(2014:2) states that  
“the experience of poverty for people living in fragile contexts involves 
far more than not being able to meet their basic needs. It may include: 
lack of access to justice; previous experience of conflict; high risk of 
conflict in the future; social inequality; lack of social mobility; lack of 
access to basic services; lack of an effective voice; high vulnerability 
and weak resilience to shocks; significant gender inequality; lack of 
productive assets; and an unaccountable government that does not 
engage with its citizens”. 
Consequently, Rowlands (2014:2) argues that  
“civil society in fragile contexts is often not well organised and has 
limited capacity and legitimacy; it is therefore not able to express the 
views and needs of citizens effectively to ensure that those views are 
taken into account by government, or push for more accountable and 
effective government”.  
Andrews et al. (2013) state that “improving governance effectiveness requires 
determining the right level of interface between political and administrative levels, 
which are critical elements of good governance”. What is important, however, is the 
realisation that political constraints and obstacles have an impact on bureaucracy, 
and finding ways to understand their mandates will thus help ease challenges of 
delivery of public goods and services (Andrews et al. 2013). Interestingly, “many of 
the administrative problems are tied to bad mandates from politicians; a situation 
resulting from clientelism in most cases” (Andrews et al. 2013). Andrews et al. (2013) 
explain clientelism as a situation where a politician fills a bureaucracy with political 
appointees that are his or her followers. For this reason, the bureaucracy loses its 
autonomy in the sense that it is politically micro-managed. 
Madonsela (2013) explains that “good governance is about good decisions arrived at 
through good decision making by those exercising entrusted power. Good decisions 
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are those made in the best interest of the people that have entrusted the decision 
makers with power”.  
Fukuyama (2012:18) maintains that “indices like the worldwide governance 
indicators developed by the World Bank Institute [WBI] to try and capture some of 
the qualities of states in their measure of governance effectiveness, regulatory 
quality and control of corruption are ineffective”. These are not “well thought out 
concepts based on a theory of how a state should work, rather they are convenient 
baskets in which WBI researchers’ aggregate existing quantitative governance 
measures”. According to Andrews et al. (2013), some of the answers to improving 
governance effectiveness lie in restoring the dignity of public administration. Hence 
there is a dire need for professional bureaucracy that can do things on its own.  
Grindle (2013 in Andrews et al. 2013) points out that governance, with specific 
reference to “a bundle of many good things”, should include the following: 
 Accountability 
 Transparency 
 Efficiency 
 Rule of Law 
 Ordered politics 
 Participation 
 Effectiveness 
 Equity 
 Macroeconomic stability 
 Poverty-reduction policies 
 Universal provision of 
basic services 
 Fairness 
 Decency 
 Security 
 Sustainability 
 Human rights 
 Limited government 
Andrews et al. (2013) contend that improving governance effectiveness also requires 
current thinking to take into account the context and understanding of how countries 
improve and develop. In the same way that the patronage system has its own 
negative side effects, it also has a positive side. Table 2.1 is an indication of how the 
patronage system has produced good and bad governance. 
Table 2.1: Effects of governance in a patronage system   
Good governance produced by the patronage 
system 
Bad governance produced by the patronage 
system 
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 Organised states 
 Order, stability, and efficiency 
 Technical and professional experts 
 Effective organisations 
 Accountability to politicians 
 Consolidation of political parties 
 Consensus within the state 
 Possibility of change and flexibility 
 Corruption and nepotism 
 Centralisation of power 
 Authoritarianism and political dynasties 
 Incompetence 
 Spoils system 
 Violent elections between “ins” and “outs” 
 Short-term rotation of officials 
 Capriciousness 
Source: Andrews et al. (2013) 
Grindle (2013 in Andrews et al. 2013) provides a clear line of demarcation between 
what could work well for the purpose of improving governance or remaining trapped 
in a vicious cycle of poor governance and lack of development. This is reflected in 
differentiating elements of a patronage system from elements of a Weberian system, 
as highlighted in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2: Patronage and Weberian systems     
Patronage system 
(Inefficient and corrupt) 
Weberian system 
(Ideal and efficient) 
 Corruption 
 Nepotism 
 Favouritism 
 Partisanship 
 Incompetence 
 Spoils 
 Pre-modern 
 Inequality 
 Capture 
 Mediocrity 
 Electoral fraud 
 Violence 
 Undemocratic practices 
 Malfeasance 
 Professionalism 
 Meritocracy 
 Neutrality 
 Non-partisan 
 Competence 
 Uniformity 
 Modernity 
 Rule orientation 
 Efficiency 
 Honesty 
 Equity 
 Autonomy 
 Democratic practices 
 Continuity 
Source: Andrews et al. (2013) 
Notably, good governance demands that  
“working in the public interest and tackling extreme inequality should be 
the guiding principle behind all global agreements and national policies 
and strategies. Effective and inclusive governance is crucial to 
ensuring that governments and institutions represent citizens rather 
than organised business interests” (Seery and Arendar 2014:113). 
Furthermore, this means “curbing the easy access that corporate power, commercial 
interests and wealthy individuals have to political decision-making processes” (Seery 
and Arendar 2014:113). Grindle (2007:1) maintains that “good governance implies a 
very wide range of institutional preconditions for economic and political development 
and for poverty to be significantly reduced”. In addition,  
“getting good governance calls for improvements that touch virtually all 
aspects of the public sector – from institutions that set the rules of the 
game for economic and political interaction, to decision-making 
structures that determine priorities among public problems and allocate 
resources to respond to them, to organisations that manage 
administrative systems and deliver goods and services to citizens, to 
human resources that staff government bureaucracies, to the interface 
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of officials and citizens in political and bureaucratic arenas ... Not 
surprisingly, advocating good governance raises a host of questions 
about what needs to be done, when it needs to be done, and how it 
needs to be done” (Grindle 2007:1). 
With specific reference to the importance of good governance in providing public 
goods and services, a brief explanation of what is at the core of these public services 
is essential. Cavero (2015:39) maintains that  
“public services are not a luxury, but an investment in the future, 
guaranteeing human development and equality of opportunity for 
everyone. Investing in stronger social protection systems will safeguard 
vulnerable people in the short term and help combat inequality over the 
longer term”.  
Seery and Arendar (2014:90) state that  
“public services have the power to transform societies by enabling 
people to claim their rights and to hold their governments to account. 
They give people a voice to challenge unfair rules that perpetuate 
economic inequality and to improve their life chances”.  
Grindle (2007:15) cautions that “good governance is important; but like many other 
good ideas, it is not a magic bullet”. Furthermore, as soon as “concepts like 
governance take on strong normative content; good governance, their importance 
and impact are attractive to researchers, practitioners, and advocates, who in turn 
may add to the inflation of the concept”. 
Grindle (2007:14) asserts that  
“not all governance deficits need to be (or can be) tackled at once and 
... institution and capacity building are products of time; governance 
achievements can also be reversed. Good enough governance means 
that interventions thought to contribute to the ends of economic and 
political development need to be questioned, prioritised, and made 
relevant to the conditions of individual countries. They need to be 
assessed in light of historical evidence, sequence, and timing and they 
should be selected carefully in terms of their contributions to particular 
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ends such as poverty reduction and democracy. Good enough 
governance directs attention to consideration of the minimal conditions 
of governance necessary to allow political and economic development 
to occur". 
Manasan et al. (1999:8) state that good governance promotes the wellbeing of its 
citizenry in a manner that is equitable. Annunziata et al. (2014:8) contend that 
improving governance should go hand in hand with better delivery of basic services 
to a broader share of the population. This could be accelerated by a close 
partnership between the government and private sector companies to support the 
development of distributed power and portable cost-effective health care, for 
example. The characteristics of good governance are decentralised, catalytic, 
community-owned, competitive, mission-driven, results-orientated, customer-driven, 
enterprising, anticipatory, and market-orientated (Osborne and Gaebler 1992 in 
Manasan et al. 1999). The next section will discuss measures to establish whether a 
country is governed on the basis of good or poor governance.  
2.4   Measures of good governance  
The endeavour to establish if a country is governed on the basis of good or poor 
governance requires that some yardstick be used to provide valuable information in 
this regard and to enable decision making. Project evaluations conducted by the 
ADB and the World Bank show that the project performances of countries are largely 
determined by the overall capacity for administration or implementation (Manasan et 
al. 1999). Kaufmann et al. (2010:2) state that the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
are a compilation of the perceptions of a very diverse group of respondents, 
collected by a large number of surveys and other cross-country assessments of 
governance. Furthermore, Kaufmann et al. (2010:2) assert that the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators cover 200 countries and territories, measuring six dimensions 
of governance, starting in 1996, namely:  
 Voice and Accountability; 
 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; 
 Governance Effectiveness; 
 Regulatory Quality; 
 Rule of Law; and 
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 Control of Corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2010:2). 
Andrews et al. (2013) explain that there are quality governance indicators or 
measures that are universally fair and just; these are based on the preferences of 
multilateral agencies. These scholars posit that good governance measures, 
although laudable, are fraught with problematic aspects such as, for instance, 
substantive public policy. Fukuyama (2012:18) argues that contemporary measures 
of corruption do not, for example, distinguish between patron-client relationships 
within a bureaucracy and prebendalism, whereby officials simply appropriate public 
resources for private use without any obligation to take care of clients. 
Kaufmann et al. (2010:4) constructed two measures of governance corresponding to 
each of the three areas, resulting in a total of six dimensions of governance, outlined 
as follows: 
(a) The process by which governments are selected, promoted, and replaced: 
 Voice and Accountability: capture perceptions of the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, 
as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. 
 Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: capture 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically 
motivated violence and terrorism. 
(b) The capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies: 
 Governance Effectiveness: captures perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. 
 Regulatory Quality: captures perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development. 
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(c) The respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them: 
 Rule of Law: captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 Control of Corruption: captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
Thomas (2006:2) points out that in order to test claims about the importance of good 
governance, or to implement policies that aim either to strengthen governance or to 
target aid to well-governed countries, measurements of the quality of governance are 
needed. Kaufmann et al. (2010:5) caution that these six dimensions of governance 
should not be thought of as being somehow independent. Hence it is expected that 
better accountability mechanisms will lead to less corruption, that a more effective 
government can provide a better regulatory environment, or that respect for the Rule 
of Law will lead to fairer processes for selecting and replacing governments and less 
abuse of public office for private gain. 
For the purpose of this study and in line with the constitutional mandate of the Public 
Protector, the area identified under the two measures of governance best suited to 
address the concerns of citizens entails the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Hence, the 
focal point of the Public Protector, among other priorities, is more on adherence to 
the Rule of Law and dealing with corruption at all cost. Where the Public Protector’s 
mandate is questioned, the Constitutional Court is the final arbiter. The Constitutional 
Court clearly spells out the jurisdiction of the Public Protector as outlined in the 
Constitution, and also pronounces on the rulings of the Public Protector if there are 
aggrieved parties.   
According to Fukuyama (2013:3), the Rule of Law is defined differently by different 
scholars, and can alternatively mean law and order, property rights and contract 
enforcement, observance of substantive Western norms of human rights, and 
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constitutional constraints on the power of the executive. Furthermore, some scholars 
have distinguished between the rule by law, in which the executive uses law and 
bureaucracy as instruments of power; and Rule of Law, in which the executive itself 
is constrained by the same laws that apply to everyone else. In many respects, rule 
by law overlaps with state quality, since citizens want states to operate by general, 
transparent, impartial, and predictable rules. Rule of Law in the narrow sense of 
constitutional constraints on the executive, on the other hand, is closely associated 
with democracy.  
2.5 Other concepts and phenomena related to democratic good 
governance 
This section provides an overview of various concepts and phenomena that are 
linked to good governance. Some concepts are truly aligned to good governance but 
it cannot be true that they have universal association with the term “good 
governance”.  
2.5.1 Development 
Development is one of the most broadly defined concepts owing to its wide usage 
across all academic fields and domains. Dipholo (2015:566) asserts that 
“development generally means the whole range of economic, social and cultural 
progress to which people aspire”. Dipholo (2015:566) further explains that “in effect, 
as with democracy, development evokes different interpretations depending on 
context”. According to Matshabaphala (2015:585), “the history of development 
presents a deployment of resources in efforts to enhance the quality of people’s 
lives”. Noticeably,  
“in the course of the implementation of development initiatives, there emerged 
some disequilibrium in the handling and utilisation of resources for 
development. There was enhancement of the quality of life for some people 
and unfortunately in some instances at the expense of the broader community 
of life” (Matshabaphala 2015:585). 
For the purpose of this study, the focus is on social and political development insofar 
as they relate to democratic good governance. Levy and Fukuyama (2010:7) confirm 
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that “having a Weberian state at peace is a precondition not just for sustained 
growth, but for virtually all of the other development objectives”. Fukuyama (2014) 
maintains that “political development entails the establishment and maintenance of 
political institutions related to democracy, Rule of Law, human rights and the like”. 
On the contrary, “social development has no genetic code, and thus depends on 
opinions, the will, and decisions of people, amongst others” (Fukuyama 2014). 
The South Commission Report (1990:10) defines development as  
“a process that enables human beings to realise their potential, build 
self-confidence, and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment. It is a process 
that frees people from the fears of want and exploitation. It is a 
movement away from political, economic or social oppression. Through 
development political independence acquires its true significance. And 
it is a process of growth, a movement essentially springing from within 
the society that is developing”. 
Dipholo (2015:567) postulates that “the connection between development and 
democracy may not always be apparent but what is not disputable is that to some 
degree both impact each other”. Liberal democracies “cannot limit themselves to the 
promotion of democracy, they must also use its leverage to promote development 
and good governance” (Fukuyama and McFaul 2007:41). As such, “democracy 
would be more meaningful if it delivers development in the same way as 
development would be fulfilling if people’s rights, interest and welfare are protected 
and promoted” (Dipholo 2015:567). Fukuyama and McFaul (2007:41) contend that 
“democracy promotion should be placed in a broader context of promoting economic 
development, reducing poverty, and furthering good governance”. 
Levy and Fukuyama (2010:2) state that “there are more dimensions of development 
than economic growth and democracy, and therefore more entry points to consider 
when designing a national development strategy”. As a result, all five dimensions of 
economic growth – development of civil society, state building, and liberal 
democratic institutions, including both the Rule of Law and electoral democracy – are 
goals of development in themselves, and can exist, for the most part, independently 
of one another (Levy and Fukuyama 2010:6). 
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Levy and Fukuyama emphasise (2010:6) that,  
“one can have growth without social development, and social 
development without increases in either state capacity or democracy. It 
is possible to have an illiberal democracy and a liberal autocracy, and 
both democracies and autocracies can experience either low or high 
growth. While a rudimentary state is a necessary precondition for 
economic growth, Rule of Law, and democracy, it is also possible to 
have some or all of the latter three conditions in a weak state”.  
In light of the discourse on the interconnection between good governance and 
development, Figure 2.1 highlights the modern development paradigm as an 
important variable of good governance. 
Figure 2.1: The modern development paradigm 
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Source: Fukuyama (2014) 
Figure 2.1 illustrates that “some countries are much more developed in one 
dimension but not others” (Fukuyama 2014). Levy and Fukuyama (2010:2-3) 
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contend that all five of these dimensions must be developed to have a fully 
modernised state, but there will always be interrelationships among these 
dimensions of development. Fukuyama (2014) concludes that each country can be 
located in any, all, or some of the matrices of the development paradigm. Social 
mobilisation means the emergence of new social actors demanding representation in 
a more open political system (Levy and Fukuyama 2010:9-10). Huntington (1968) 
argues that there is often a negative relationship between the mobilisation of new 
social actors and political order when existing political institutions cannot 
accommodate their demands for participation.  
Levy and Fukuyama (2010:15) caution that,  
“in the early years of new political leadership, it can be difficult to tell 
whether a seeming commitment to development and associated state 
capacity building is real, or simply a useful cover for the perpetuation of 
longstanding patterns of corrupt, patrimonial rule”.  
Levy and Fukuyama (2010:19) also concede that,  
“the transformation of political institutions and the development of civil 
society are strongly complementary. As such, transformation of citizen-
state relations and the emergence of a rich array of civil society 
institutions could enhance the legitimacy of state institutions, thereby 
bolstering investor confidence and hence growth”. 
Following from the foregoing statement, Leftwich (2005:692) proposes that 
development,  
“needs to be understood as a process, a transformative process 
involving, at least initially, in relatively low income, or highly unequal 
economies, quite radical and rapid change in the social economic and 
political institutions, and inevitably, in the social structure and in the 
underlying distribution of wealth and power which they express. What 
crucially distinguishes development from growth is the issue of the 
distribution of the benefits of growth”.  
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2.5.2 Legitimacy and credibility 
Fukuyama (2014) asserts that the state is legitimated by certain ideas such as 
nationalism and patriotism. Hence, these are big temptations for everybody because 
these are what gives legitimacy to the state. Levy and Fukuyama (2010:7) argue that 
credibility and legitimacy are critical to good governance, and, by implication, 
development. “Credibility has to do with expectations that the government will do 
what it promises, whether that is upholding individual human rights or protecting the 
interests of property owners” (Levy and Fukuyama 2010:7). 
Credibility allows the government to enjoy the support of its citizens without doubt. In 
the same manner, “legitimacy has to do with the degree to which the society’s 
citizens believe that the system as a whole is just, and deserving of their support, 
even if they disagree with certain of the government’s policies” (Levy and Fukuyama 
2010:7). A point to consider is that “credibility and legitimacy arise as by-products of 
other dimensions of development, but are not in themselves entry points for 
development” (Levy and Fukuyama 2010:7).  
2.5.3 Accountability and transparency 
The nature of accountability explored in this study is that which is normally referred 
to as horizontal accountability, which pertains to the oversight function exercised 
over the executive arm of government. Mashamaite and Hlongwane (2015:150) 
profess that “accountability and transparency as key tenets that underlie democratic 
governance can be attained in situations where the citizenry is well informed and 
educated about participatory democracy”. Staddon (2008:2) elaborates that 
“horizontal accountability consists of counterbalancing state institutions which are 
charged to oversee government; which includes the legislature, an independent 
judiciary, and other institutional watchdogs reporting to the legislature”.  
Madue (2015:709) maintains that “in democracies, horizontal accountability is 
arguably a relevant variable for understanding how the legislature and the executive 
interact, and therefore a key element for assessing the quality of democracy”. On the 
contrary, Madue (2015:709) argues that “in South Africa, attempts are continuously 
made by the executive to weaken horizontal accountability by undermining the 
oversight reports generated by institutions supporting democracy”. Consequently,  
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“the findings of the Office of the Auditor-General are often met with 
court challenges by the organs of the state. It is also fashionable in 
South Africa to see government departments using public funds to 
institute court case challenges against the Office of the Public Protector 
whenever those departments view its findings and recommendations 
for remedial action as negative” (Madue 2015:719). 
Waldraugh (1998:1) posits that “horizontal accountability refers to the capacity of 
governmental institutions including such ‘agencies of restraint’, independent electoral 
tribunals, anticorruption bodies, central banks, auditing agencies, and Ombudsmen 
to check abuses by other public agencies and branches of government”. Staddon 
(2008:13) postulates that,  
“the growth and expansion of the modern state and a wide range of 
state activities has reinforced the need for a robust system of horizontal 
accountability with a strong legislature at its centre, sharing the burden 
of accountability alongside other accountability agencies or 
constitutional watchdogs”.  
Madue (2015:711) postulates that,  
“most scholars share the view that accountability is a relationship 
between two sets of actors; most of it is played out not between 
individuals, but between organisations or institutions; in which the 
former accepts to inform the other, explain or justify his or her actions 
and submit to any pre-determined sanctions that the latter may 
impose”.  
Schmitter (2007:1) explains that,  
“[d]emocracy has many definitions, implications and consequences, but 
accountability is one of its most important components. Citizen 
participation, political equality, civic consciousness, self-realisation, 
decent treatment by authorities, sense of individual political efficacy, 
respect for constitutional norms, protection of human rights, 
responsiveness to public opinion, social and economic levelling and, of 
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course, freedom has all been associated with this form of political 
domination – either as a defining feature or a likely product of it – but 
they are all contingent and vulnerable if citizens cannot reliably hold 
their ruler accountable for the actions that they take in the public 
realm”.  
Loney (2008:160) states that “most governments, while they accept scrutiny, do not 
welcome it. If they are allowed to get away with not providing information to the 
legislature, then it is unlikely that they will volunteer to do so”. To demonstrate the 
thinking behind this assertion, Madue (2008:719) emphasises that “a classical 
encroachment in the South African experience is the passing over of the Public 
Protector’s report on the security upgrades conducted on the private home (Nkandla) 
of the state president to the Ministry of Police”. The Nkandla example is indicative of 
the state of affairs perceived to be prevalent in the South African governmental 
context. Madue (2015:719-720) contends that “this encroachment undermines the 
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Public Protector as enshrined in Chapter 9 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996”. Furthermore, Madue 
(2015:720) concludes that “whereas horizontal accountability institutions are 
generally viewed as the nerves and muscles of exercising oversight over the 
executive and minimising its power, politicians would not let them function 
effectively”. Instead, Madue (2015:720) argues that politicians “would rather disband 
their existence, as experienced by the fate of the then National Directorate of Public 
Prosecutions known as [the] Scorpions”. 
According to Madue (2015:720), an impediment of horizontal accountability is that,  
“in the South African legislative-executive context, the state president 
appoints the heads of the horizontal accountability institutions; the 
Public Protector, the Auditor-General, etc.; which effectively makes the 
president their employer. Thus, weak leaders of the horizontal 
accountability may tend to shy away from holding the executive 
accountable, due to the popular career-limiting theory”.  
The other impediment is,  
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“a lack of understanding by members of the legislature and the media 
generally of the difference between accountability and responsibility. If 
there is to be a strong demand for good accountability throughout the 
community it must be led by these people” (Madue 2015:721).  
Loney (2008:157-158) states that if those charged with holding the executive to 
account “fail to understand the concepts, then it is likely that the community 
perception will also be confused”.  Horizontal accountability is central to the 
operations of the executive’s functionality and it can never be ignored if the general 
welfare of the community is considered to be of paramount importance. Madue 
(2015:718) asserts that “accountability concerns both the governing (executive) and 
the governed (citizens)”. On the same note, Hudson (2009:13) emphasises that 
“legislative oversight can contribute to ensuring that the relationship between the 
state and its citizens is one which is characterised by accountability”. Failure to hold 
the executive to account is tantamount to allowing pockets of authoritarianism to 
flourish within a democratic framework, thus undermining the aspirations for 
governing on the basis of good governance. Tshiyoyo (2014:134) contends that 
“governance also implies that a society has a major role to play in governance”. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates how horizontal accountability plays out in the public sphere. 
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Figure 2.2: Governance system and actors in the accountability cycle 
.  
Source: World Bank (2006) 
Figure 2.2 indicates that the golden thread that runs through good governance and 
service delivery is accountability, which is the major responsibility of horizontal 
accountability institutions (Madue 2015:718). Madue (2015:719) points out that 
“horizontal accountability institutions are reflected as the checks and balances 
institutions”. However, “in South Africa, horizontal accountability is still not fully 
understood or is deliberately undermined by the legislature, particularly when the 
findings and recommendations of its institutions call for sanctions to be imposed on 
the executive” (Madue 2015:719). 
It is prudent at this junction to state that one should not confuse judicial 
accountability with judicial enforcement. These two terms should be placed in the 
whole context of political accountability. Judicial enforcement triggers the judicial 
accountability of those against whom judgment is passed. It is not the judiciary that 
accounts, but the judiciary that holds public officials accountable (Tchawouo Mbiada 
2017:1). Tchawouo Mbiada (2017:1) states that,  
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“[b]y deferring to other branches of government to decide on issues, 
courts feel they might avoid to step into the terrain of other branches of 
government, but they then fail in their transformative duty to guarantee 
judicial and constitutional accountability”.  
According to Tchawouo Mbiada (2017:1), “[i]t is undeniable that this deferential 
approach to socio-economic rights adjudication in general is rooted in the doctrine of 
the separation powers … The courts view themselves as being constrained in their 
enforcement role by the separation of powers”. 
“Accountability suggests the obligation of individuals to provide information about 
and to justify their action to others, along with the imposition of sanctions for a failure 
to comply. Indeed, accountability is the cornerstone upon which the Constitution is 
built” (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:1). Accountability is the pillar that drives the whole 
new constitutional dispensation. To this effect, section 1(d) of the Constitution 
provides that,  
“the Republic of South Africa is a sovereign, democratic state founded, 
inter alia, on universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, 
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, 
the purpose of which is to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness”.  
All these values entrench a culture of justification and explanation of one’s actions. 
Political accountability, which encompasses the founding values and principles of the 
Constitution, is supported by the following mechanisms: elections, the judiciary, the 
Ombudsman, decentralisation, public participation, constitutional limitations, 
information, and transparency (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:1).  
All these mechanisms,  
“ensure in one way or another that a person has to account for his or 
her actions. Put differently, political accountability entails that a person 
justifies his or her action ... The requirement for the establishment of 
the Office [of the Public Protector] is to improve the performance of 
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public administration in order to enhance government’s accountability 
to the public” (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:1). 
2.5.4 Decentralisation 
The activities of the public sector institutions are carried out across all levels of 
government to facilitate service delivery, and at the local level, to bring the 
government closer to the people.  
“South Africa’s Constitution, government policy, and accompanying 
legislation specifically conceives of local government as 
developmental, and as having a key role to play in redistribution, the 
promotion of local democracy through citizenship participation, and the 
empowering of marginalised groups as outlined by section B of the 
White Paper on Local Government” (South Africa 1998).  
Mashamaite and Hlongwane (2015:150) indicate that “the political and administrative 
decentralisations are crucial aspects towards achieving democratic and participatory 
governance which is developmentally orientated”.  
Mashamaite and Hlongwane (2015:151) state that,  
“[d]ecentralisation is a process whereby the authority inherent in the 
national sphere of government is cascaded to the lower sphere of 
government for better service delivery. This has to be implemented in 
such a manner that it will yield the desired results, and based on this 
notion, the success of decentralised governance could be reflected 
through democratic participation and good governance at the local 
government”.  
Greyling (2014:120-121) states that decentralisation is when there is a clear 
movement towards delegated state functions away from central government control. 
As a result, some functions are delegated to subordinate government levels, while 
other powers and functions are horizontally transferred and outsourced to private 
sector enterprises and community agencies. In the same manner, Yuliani (2004:3) 
argues that “administrative decentralisation aims at transferring decision-making 
authority, resources and responsibilities for the delivery of select number of public 
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services from the central government to other levels of government, agencies, and 
field offices of central government line agencies”. 
Furthermore, “decentralised government can provide space for people to participate 
in local government development” (Mashamaite and Hlongwane 2015:153). On the 
same note, “political decentralisation can contribute to some key elements of good 
governance, such as increasing people’s opportunity for participation in economic, 
social and political decisions, assisting in developing people’s capacities, and 
enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability” 
(Mashamaite and Hlongwane 2015:153). Notably, “it can ensure a more efficient 
allocation of resources, enhance local resource mobilisation and improve local 
governance, therefore, paving the way for more effective poverty reduction 
strategies” (Mashamaite and Hlongwane 2015:153). 
Mashamaite and Hlongwane (2015:153) assert that “more often than not, political 
decentralisation fails to achieve its objective because of the complex phenomenon 
involving many geographic entities and societal factors”. Furthermore, “political 
decentralisation often requires constitutional or statutory reforms, the development of 
pluralistic political parties, the strengthening of legislatures, creation of local political 
units, and the encouragement of effective public interest groups” (Mashamaite and 
Hlonwgane 2015:153). “The main challenge is that decentralisation in the South 
African local government is not reciprocated by allocation or equitable distribution of 
resources, especially to the municipalities that are not financially sustainable” 
(McEwan 2003:480). Robertson (2002:6) states that “administrative decentralisation 
is often simultaneous with civil service reform; it seeks to redistribute authority, 
responsibility and financial resources for providing public service among different 
levels of government”. Mashamaite and Hlongwane (2015:153) confirm that “if the 
people do not exercise democratic control over the central state, it is unlikely that 
decentralisation of the state will be accompanied by increased political power of the 
people”. 
2.5.5 Centralisation 
Auriacombe (2011:1) highlights that  
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“centralisation occurs when an organisation’s decisions are primarily made by 
a small group of individuals at the top of its organisation while it delegates 
little or no authority to the lower levels of its organisation. Centralised 
organisation can be described according to Max Weber as bureaucracy”.  
Furthermore, Auriacombe (2011:1) states that in South Africa’s system of 
government, national government’s decision-making power may be centralised in 
parliament, but certain powers are delegated to provincial and local spheres. 
Greyling (2014:249) emphasises that the advantage of a unitary form of government 
is that it ensures uniformity of laws and administration. The following disadvantages 
are, however, noted: 
 Over-centralised control of local affairs; 
 Unsuitable for large and culturally heterogeneous communities in which local 
problems require specific rather than standardised policies, as in the case of 
South Africa; and 
 Public interest in public affairs is discouraged, owing to the impact of a 
centralised bureaucracy (Greyling 2014:249-250). 
2.5.6 Leadership  
A key driver of service delivery in the public sector is the effectiveness and efficiency 
of leadership. Matsiliza (2015:452) contends that “responsibility and accountability 
are crucial attributes of a leader in the public sector”. For this reason, “public sector 
leaders are obligated to be answerable for their actions and the decisions they make 
while discharging their duties” (Matsiliza 2015:452). Msaule (2015:949) notes that 
“good governance is also dependent on good leadership, a leadership that is 
prepared to take unpopular decisions when the need arises” (cf. Fourie 2009:1118; 
Seemela and Mkhonto 2007:201). According to Msaule (2015:950), “good 
governance measures in an organisation largely depend on leadership of an 
organisation for their successful existence. Good governance measures may exist in 
an organisation but without a leader to adhere to and enforce, they will remain paper 
tigers”.  
Msaule (2015:950) suggests that “the relationship between good governance and 
good leadership is symbiotic, hence this should not be taken to mean that 
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everywhere where there is good leadership there is also good governance and vice 
versa”.  
Similarly, Maserumule (2014:964-965) states that,  
“although the term good governance entered our vocabulary recently, 
the equivalent concepts could be traced back to as early as the ancient 
Greeks. For instance, in The Republic, Plato spoke of a good society 
founded on good principles and grounded on good leadership”.  
Matsiliza (2015:452) concludes that “leadership in the public sector is intertwined 
with responsibility and accountability that influence a particular pattern of governance 
designed to increase the likelihood that leaders serve the people”. It is for this reason 
that Schwella (2015:26) asserts that “good governance is associated with effective 
institutions and constitutionalism, while bad governance seems to thrive under 
conditions of arbitrariness and authoritarianism”.  
Matshabaphala (2015:587) argues for continuous development on the part of public 
leadership. Ruiz (1997:25) states that, 
“[l]eadership development generally entails the development of both 
character and competence; where the character development has to 
do with entering into covenant with the self on matters such as 
patriotism, humility, integrity, credibility, fairness, respect, passion and 
all those leadership attributes that are associated with leadership 
success”.  
Matsiliza (2015:445) explains that,  
“the performance of public agencies and departments are directly 
related to quality of leadership; and in today’s changing environment, 
organisations desire that most members of management possess, 
among other competencies, some leadership traits in order to improve 
performance and manage effectively and efficiently”.  
Christie (2010:37) posits that “leading an organisation involves establishing direction 
and developing a vision for the future”. To this effect, Matshabaphla (2015:58) 
propounds that “the concept of the social contract is found to be predicated on the 
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impulses geared at the search for leadership in the creation of public value and 
prosecution of good governance”. 
Still on the subject of leadership and its impact on governance, Matsiliza (2015:446) 
professes that “leadership is about setting direction and coping with changes in the 
organisation”. As a matter of principle, and “in respect of moral obligation, leaders 
should be honest, open and transparent, and be responsive to social and cultural 
demands of the constituencies they serve” (Matsiliza 2015:446). Concurring, 
Schwella (2015:29) asserts that “leaders should uphold societal values and manage 
without any bias and be professional at all times”. Similarly, Naidoo and Thani 
(2013:1) propound that “the South African democratic leadership and management 
in the public service are challenged by citizens to improve service delivery, thus 
enhance good governance”. Matshabaphala (2015:582) posits that “doing duty in the 
public service requires men and women of good will who would provide leadership in 
the business of governance”.  
Bennett (2010:11) states that “officials in the public service have an obligation to 
society; hence once they are offered a job, they sign up that they will honour their 
side of society’s wide range of obligations to itself”. In the same vein, Matshabaphala 
(2015:581-582) contends that “there generally is consensus among commentators 
on the concept of leadership, that leadership in the main entails people making a 
choice to serve and make the world a better place for others and the broader 
community of life”. Msaule (2015:950) states that “good governance cannot be 
simply decreed by good leadership – it has to be institutionalised, and 
institutionalised good governance does not per se turn bad leaders into good 
leaders”. 
2.6  Development of P(p)ublic A(a)dministration paradigms 
The concept “paradigm” has a strong scientific basis in research. Babbie and Mouton 
(2005:6) assert that a paradigm has “the authority of a certain theoretical tradition”. 
There are opposing views as to the question of the paradigm of Public 
Administration. One school of thought contends that Public Administration has the 
status of a paradigm (Botes 1988; Freysen 1988), while the other argues that it does 
not  
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(cf. Barton and Chappell 1985; Denhardt 1981; Arnold 1974). According to 
Maserumule (2011:327), “the argument that Public Administration cannot be 
assigned a paradigmatic status is based on the fact that, as a field of study, it does 
not have universally accepted theories”. This chapter considers the developments in 
Public Administration from the points of view of the traditional and contemporary 
paradigms. The concept “Public Administration” can be employed in two ways.  
Conventionally, scholars in the field of Public Administration use capital letters in 
“Public Administration” to symbolise the subject, theory, or science; while using small 
letters in “public administration” to refer to that which is investigated by the subject 
(Maserumule 2011:4). The need for a mechanism to provide communities with public 
goods and services has existed from time immemorial. Plato asserts that “the 
rationale behind the formation of human communities lies in the awareness that 
individual human beings have needs or requirements that they cannot fulfil on their 
own” (Lötter 2003:194). However, providing public goods and services to 
communities requires that those entrusted with these responsibilities, namely the 
“Guardians”, be monitored against possible abuse of power (Lötter 2003:195). 
In an attempt to understand Plato’s assertion, a distinction is made between politics, 
which concerns policy, and administration, which focuses on executing policy (Lötter 
2003:194). An assumption can be made that Plato propagated guidelines for just and 
fair administration detached from the controversies of politics (Lötter 2003:194). The 
emphasis is on serving for the good cause of the communities without exception. For 
this reason, Lötter (2003:196) highlights that “Plato says that the rulers of the 
community can lie for the good of the community, when either an external or internal 
threat makes it necessary”.  
Public administration and the personnel who administer state organisations are 
closely intertwined to the extent that one cannot exist without the other. For the 
purpose of this study, public administration is an activity associated with state 
execution of service delivery. Maserumule (2011:6) contends that public 
administration is “limited to administration, which merely studies government 
activities or functions”. In the same way, Pauw (1999:22) argues that public 
administration should simply be understood as “organised ... executive functions of 
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the state”. For this reason, public administration is in all respects linked with the 
operations of the government or the executive.  
As such, public administration is seen as an instrument of the state employed to 
serve in the most efficient manner. When Public Administration first gained 
widespread acceptance and prominence, it was “based on the Weberian concept of 
neutral competence and the logic of a dichotomy between politics and 
administration” (Soni 2007:82). Politics focuses on policy and all the debates 
emanating from political engagements, while administration is concerned with 
delivering public services. Miruka (2007:48) contends that “there is a direct 
relationship between effective and efficient public administration and democratic 
governance”. Politicians provide visionary leadership, which finds expression in 
implementation by public officials charged with administration. The traditional 
approach of public administration emphasises maximising effectiveness, efficiency, 
and economy, with little regard for individual employees (Soni 2007:82). Miruka 
(2007:48) highlights that “traditional public administration was perceived as a set of 
structures, institutions and processes characterised by, among other, things, 
hierarchy, continuity, impartiality, legal-rational authority and professionalism”. For 
this reason, public administration is severely criticised for its “slowness, red-tape, 
paternalist approach to citizens, waste of resources and its overwhelming focus on 
process and procedures instead of outcomes” (Miruka 2007:48-49). 
2.6.1  Public Management paradigm 
To counter the criticisms levelled against Public Administration, new ideas surfaced 
around injecting managerial practices into the realm of the public sector. This 
resulted in the transition to Public Management as the panacea to the operations of 
the public sector. Nel (2013:16) contends that “the debate which arose in the 1970s 
to 1980s introduced the concept of public management into the discipline in South 
Africa”. Likewise, Thornhill (2008:12-14) states that this “represented a paradigm 
shift for extending beyond an administrative focus of processes and procedures in 
the study of government, to the more meaningful and comprehensive approach of 
Public Management”. 
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Cheema (2004:2) maintains that “Public Management focussed on the application of 
management principles including efficiency, effectiveness, customer-orientation and 
greater sensitivity to public needs”. This way there was a dire need to view the public 
sector as people-centred machinery rather than power-driven machinery that is self-
serving. Cheema (2004:2) notes that “Public Management sought to use private 
sector principles in public sector organisations”. Because private sector institutions 
operate within the broader framework of the public sector, and are one way or the 
other also recipients of public services, it makes sense for best practices from either 
sector to be adopted if need be.  
There are divergent views as to whether the concepts “public administration” and 
“public management” are similar. What is important is that one complements the 
other in an attempt to achieve organisational goals and mandates. Lynn (2012:18) 
contends that because public management is “an institution that observes rules of 
practice, it abides by restraints and guides to behaviour that ensure their legitimacy 
within a constitutional regime”. Nel (2013:17) argues that “both the concepts of 
administration and management are considered as interdependent in the 
investigation of government”. For this reason and for the purpose of this study, public 
administration and public management are vital ingredients in the functioning of 
public sector institutions. Failure to acknowledge the role that both administration 
and management play in public sector operations is detrimental to the success of the 
state, hence the integration of the two into public management and administration. 
2.6.2  New Public Management (NPM) paradigm  
In the discourse of this study, NPM is considered a contemporary paradigm of Public 
Administration. Cheema (2004) terms NPM as the third phase in the evolution of 
Public Administration paradigms. “NPM became a powerful paradigm in the 1980s 
but started to wane in the 1990s against the backdrop of the complex and diverse 
governance challenges” (Schmidt 2008:111). The key challenge facing governments 
was the dire need to attain financial stability following the financial turmoil of the 
1970s. Denhardt (2008:137) posits that “the fundamental thrust of the NPM’s 
evolution was the attempt to engender productivity, performance, accountability, and 
flexibility in government”. Maserumule (2011:360) highlights that there are scholars 
who argue that NPM emerged in the 1980s but came to full fruition and established 
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itself as a paradigm only in the 1990s (cf. Dreschsler 2005). Contrastingly, “the 
substantive evidence of the contention of most scholars on the emergence and 
paradigmatic status of the NPM is the same” (Maserumule 2011:361).  
Hood (1995:3) argues that “the rise of NPM is one of the most striking international 
trends in public administration”. Maserumule (2011:361) suggests that “some 
interpreted the emergence of the NPM as a revolutionary paradigm that supplanted 
the traditional Public Administration”. Likewise, Tshikwatamba (2007:755) suggests 
that “the emergence of NPM amounted to an equivalent of intellectual coup on Public 
Administration”. Cameron and Milne (2009:390) state that NPM “was presented as a 
framework of general applicability”. In the same manner, Hood (1991:8) postulates 
that NPM is “public management for all seasons, with global influence”. Similarly, 
Gasper (2002:19) states that “at one stage, NPM’s proponents claimed to have 
intellectually defeated the older public management and to be in the process of 
replacing it”. On the whole, the consensus around NPM is that it is “the attempt to 
implement management ideas from business and private sector into the public 
services” (Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 2011:192). 
Bonina and Cordella (2008:4) assert that,  
“as a policy framework, the reforms under NPM agenda were seeking 
to solve the problems of a public administration that was too big, 
inefficient and too expensive and therefore unable to serve public 
services as it was supposed to do”.  
Hence, “the public sector reforms initiated in the United States under the Clinton 
Administration in 1993 were probably among the most ambitious projects of public 
sector reforms that incorporated NPM strategies” (Kettl 2005:22). The Clinton 
Administration intended to cut costs and create a working government. Van de Walle 
and Hammerschmid (2011:190) suggest that “there are two sets of NPM-style 
changes and reforms; namely that of specific managerial innovations within public 
organisations, and another consisting of changes to the role of government and 
citizens as a result of NPM ideas”. 
Soni (2007:84) highlights the following about NPM: 
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 The new approach is reform orientated and seeks to improve public sector 
performance. 
 It starts from the premise that traditional bureaucratically organised public 
administration has become dysfunctional and, consequently, the public has 
lost faith in the government. 
 NPM focuses attention on the achievement of results and the personal 
responsibility of managers. 
 NPM requires additional emphasis on programme evaluation, performance 
measurement, and increased importance of private sector practices into the 
area of public management. 
 Advocates of NPM argue that by enhancing the elements of accountability, 
responsibility, free flow of information, and streamlined management, public 
management has the potential to contribute to the establishment of good 
governance. 
Consequently, Nel (2013:28) indicates that “government activity is no longer immune 
to market pressures, and in order for government to reach its goals in a sustainable 
manner, it has to align decision making to market demands”. However, Van de Walle 
and Hammerschmid (2011:190) contend that,  
“NPM is not a well-defined or coherent set of ideas since it reflects a 
number of changes in public-sector management that started to 
develop in the 1980s, and many of its associated reforms were not 
planned strategically and implemented at a precise point in time”.   
Van de Walle and Hammerschmid (2011:190) argue that the majority of academic 
research has focused on the first set of changes, while approaches to the second set 
have mainly been of a critical nature, with relatively limited attention to empirical 
studies. Hood (1991:4-5) distinguishes between seven doctrines of NPM:  
“1)  Hands-on and entrepreneurial management;  
2)  explicit standards and measures of performance;  
3)  output controls;  
4)  desegregation and decentralisation;  
5)  competition in the provision of public services;  
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6)  stress on private-sector styles of management; and  
7)  discipline and parsimony in resource allocation”. 
Mongkol (2011:4) explains that the emergence of NPM in Western governments in 
the 1980s was basically related to two factors, namely the attitude toward status quo 
institutions which were dominated by a bureaucratic mode of government, and 
increasingly well-educated and more demanding citizens who became less and less 
tolerable of poor service delivery by public officials. 
The debate on the influence of NPM on public administration has spread to all parts 
of the world. Developed and developing countries alike embraced NPM openly, with 
some degree of scepticism. As Koike (2000:2) posits, “NPM is neither a first-aid kit 
nor a ‘magic sword’ for government reform. In an attempt to adopt some measures 
thereof, it is important to distinguish which is adoptable and valuable to our 
government and which is not”. It is clear from the foregoing paragraphs that NPM 
has two sides. These are attempts to change government structures, as well as 
adopting managerial systems and ways into the public sector. NPM, however, also 
opens government to a variety of service providers, who partner with public sector 
institutions in the provision of public goods and services (Gratto, Preston and 
Snilsberg 2002:3). 
Gratto et al. (2002:3) state that NPM has two implications for corruption: 
 NPM creates the potential for corruption among a wide range of actors, and 
that the flexibility of these networks makes it more difficult to maintain 
accountability and oversight; and 
 The line between the government and private actors becomes increasingly 
blurred in NPM. 
While the public sector is expected to deliver on its promises, it must do so by 
ensuring that it partners with players who have the interests of the citizens as their 
top priority. Hence, Soni (2007:84) asserts that “agencies should view the public and 
their clients as customers to whom they should be responsive”.  
Gratto et al. (2002:16) state that “[a]lthough NPM does create the increased 
possibility of corruption it can be controlled”. Roberts (n.d.) explains that the origins 
of NPM resulted from three important pressures. These are as follows: 
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 Fiscal pressure: stemming from the impact of budgetary crises on Western 
governments, leading to acute concerns about public spending. 
 Organisational pressure: in which critiques of “bureaucracy” highlight waste, 
delay, and unresponsiveness in the provision of public goods and services. 
 Ideological pressure: which came about as a result of growing belief in the 
value of the private sector approach. 
The year 1991 marked the introduction of NPM elements in South Africa (Cloete 
2008:33). The focus of NPM in the mid-2000s was on the efficiency of the 
government through exploring new approaches such as governance, networks, and 
alternative service delivery mechanisms towards more holistic research and practice 
(Cloete 2008:35-36). NPM therefore paved the way for paradigm shifts to 
governance, and then good governance (Nel 2013:18).  
NPM emphasises a calculated partnership between the private and public sectors in 
meeting the needs of citizens. Nel (2013:18) argues that while “NPM does factor in 
market efficiency; it nevertheless does not build its foundations solely on market 
efficiency, rather NPM encourages efficiency through competition in both 
government and the market”. Similarly, Hood (1991:5), in explaining the origin of 
NPM, uses the metaphor of it being a “marriage of opposites”, meaning that it is a 
product of “two different streams of ideas”, namely “new institutional economics” and 
“business-type managerialism in the public sector”. Maserumule (2011:368) asserts 
that “NPM is consistent with the theory of a minimalist state, where in contrast with 
bureaucracy; it is concerned with the results rather than hierarchy, rules, regulations, 
processes and procedures”. Schmidt (2008:111) contends that NPM heralds the 
need for “involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services on a 
more competitive rather than control basis”. Noble as it may have been thought of, 
NPM started losing its intensity as a paradigm when the shift towards governance 
took centre stage. Maserumule (2011:373) posits that “Information and 
Communication Technologies bequeathed to the parlance of Public Administration 
concepts such as e-governance, e-government, e-democracy, and e-citizen, which 
basically refer to the use of technological tools to enhance the quality of 
governance”.  
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2.6.3   Post-NPM  
The developments within the domain of Public Administration have generated 
widespread perspectives of governance to the extent of presenting more 
disagreements than agreements on the prevalent paradigm. Nel (2015:85) contends 
that “current public administration and management practices are moving towards 
governance approaches to reform, causing some countries to witness varying 
degrees and patterns of amendment of reform approaches”. At this point in time it is 
worth stating that different reform waves are by no means supplanting one another; 
rather they each emanate from prevailing conditions of the time. According to 
Christensen (2012:6),  
“the historical development of public institutions shows that at certain 
points in time elements of their basic structures and cultures are either 
pushed aside or deinstitutionalised when a new wave comes along or 
else manage to remain viable and influence the further development of 
the organisation, regardless of new reforms”. 
Newman (2012:370) asserts that “the present is comprised of multiple governance 
regimes and ideologies overlaid on each other, producing a field of tension”. 
Christensen (2012:8) states that a “common characteristic of post-NPM is that this 
wave of reforms does not represent a break with the past, nor do they fundamentally 
transform public administration”. Continuing, Christensen (2012:1) postulates that 
“post-NPM reforms are mainly inter-organisationally oriented, seeking to improve the 
horizontal coordination of governmental organisations and also to enhance the 
coordination between government and other actors”. As such, “the horizontal 
dimension typically concerns policy areas that cut across traditional boundaries, so-
called ‘wicked issues’” (Christensen 2012:3). Also, “post-NPM reforms have been 
rebalancing existing administrative systems in several countries” (Christensen 
2012:1). Similarly, Lodge and Gill (2011:143) state that “most post-NPM reforms 
recover some neo-Weberian elements with a mix of NPM features, and the focus of 
post-NPM is about surmounting the weakness of the NPM model, including 
specialisation, fragmentation and marketization”. Drechsler (2005:8) highlights that,  
“the term ‘neo-Weberian state’ (NWS) as suggested by the authors 
Pollit and Boukart combines Weberian elements such as the 
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reaffirmation of the role of the state, democracy, public service and 
administrative law, with the ‘neo’ elements suggesting 
professionalization of the public service, supplementing of 
representative democracy, and resource management”. 
Christensen (2012:4) states the following about post-NPM: 
 “Post-NPM seems generally to be more about working together in a pragmatic 
and intelligent way than about formalised collaboration. 
 The post-NPM reforms are also culturally oriented governance efforts, thus 
focusing on amongst other things, cultivating a strong and unified sense of 
values, cultural integration, teambuilding and trust. 
 Post-NPM is also related to governance efforts thus, directly influencing public 
services as the ‘real thing’”. 
2.6.4  New Public Governance / New Political Governance (NPG) 
Developments in the domain of Public Administration and Management have 
necessitated the need to find ways and means of striving to make the public service 
more responsive to societal demands. The emergence of “New Political Governance, 
also referred to as New Public Governance (NPG), is explained as the organisational 
interaction among public, private and nongovernmental sectors” (Patapas, Raipa and 
Smalskys 2014:28).  
Aucoin (2012:178) contends that NPM has led to a phenomenon called NPG in 
some Westminster regimes, for example Australia, the UK, Canada, and New 
Zealand. The NPM principle of ministerial direction and control instead of centralised 
control over resources has amounted to NPG that is a form of politicisation. 
Nemec and De Vries (2012:1) assert that “NPG is about a change towards public 
value pragmatism and the new paradigm on good governance emphasising the 
increased need and recognition that the quality of the public sector should be 
improved instead of a sole focus on efficiency”.  
NPG recognises that,  
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“in the evolution of modern public management where the modern 
vector is good public governance, which requires improved and more 
accurate theoretical conceptualisation, public sector managers’ 
competencies and skills to master the methodological processes of 
change are of key importance” (Patapas et al. 2014:27).  
“The emergence of NPG opens up new challenges, however, and instead of 
governance networks and new network governance replacing the traditional Public 
Administration model and NPM, hybrid practices will emerge” (Klijn and Koppenjan 
2012:587). 
Patapas et al. (2014:27) propound that,  
“the strategic nature of NPG is defined by modern state financial 
economic possibilities, quality characteristics of all resources 
coordination, inter-sectoral interaction of effective new planning, supply 
of information technologies for all kinds and levels of organisations, 
organisational behaviour and the levels of governors’ and managers’ 
competency”.  
Patapas et al. (2014:28) further state that,  
“the importance of NPG is the preparation of public policy, the 
elements of globalisation context that define their quality when the 
essential task in public structures activity, in the state strategy 
becomes the necessity to balance the inside state (organisation) 
factors and outside environment conditions and subjects”. 
Bao, Wang, Larsen and Morgan (2013:446) point out that “NPG can be viewed as an 
opposite movement to NPM, and NPG emphasises three characteristics essential for 
building trust and legitimacy which are ignored and/or undervalued by NPM”. Bao 
et al. (2013:446) posit that these characteristics are as follows:  
 NPG is value centred, the goal of government being to promote the larger 
common good. 
 NPG focuses on the importance of creating government processes that 
facilitate the generation of implementable agreements among wide-ranging 
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stakeholders who may disagree on what course of action will produce the 
maximum public value. 
 NPG’s predominant perspective is that government performance must be 
viewed from the perspective of organic wholeness of a political system in 
which the public, private, and non-profit sectors work together to create 
uniqueness of a given political community. 
Nel (2015:87) contends that “the ability to reform according to NPG, implies a mature 
and developed society that has the ability to accomplish the required levels of 
transformation and performance”. However, “this might be problematic in a 
developing country, like South Africa, where there is a lack of mature institutions and 
a fragmented capacity across government” (Nel 2015:87). It can be inferred that the 
proponents of every paradigm intend to affect public administration and management 
practice in whatever way possible. 
2.6.5  Network Theory  
This theory lends itself to the envisaged desire to include as many stakeholders as 
possible in addressing governance issues and challenges in an inclusive manner. 
Torfing and Sørensen (2012) state that “governance networks are a subset of 
governance that emphasises the interactive aspect of public policy making and 
service delivery”. In the same manner, Cloete (2000:15) posits that “Network Theory 
is concerned with the complex interaction between the public, private and the 
voluntary sector constituting civil society”. As such, “this is in sharp contrast to other 
theories of Public Management, which are concerned with the differentiation of the 
responsibilities of each sector” (Cloete 2000:15).  
However, “governance networks proliferate to an astonishing extent in different 
countries, policy areas and levels of governance” (Torfing and Sørensen 2012). 
Maserumule (2011:375) asserts that “the concept of networks features prominently 
in most definitions of governance to emphasise the importance of that link and 
relationships among various actors with a stake in the business of government”. 
Schmidt (2008:111) contends that the idea that differentiates governance from the 
governance networks perspective is that of “partnership with civil society, co-
innovation and civic leadership”. 
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Torfing and Sørensen (2012) define governance networks as follows:  
 Stable and horizontal articulation of interdependent, but operationally 
autonomous actors. 
 The actors interact through negotiations. 
 The interactions take place within a relatively institutionalised framework of 
norms, values, rules, and procedures. 
 The networks facilitate self-regulated policy making in the shadow of hierarchy 
(bounded autonomy). 
 The networks contribute to the production of public value. 
Khan (2009:7) explains that “compared to NPM, governance emphasises a link 
between the civil society organisations and the state”. Maserumule (2011:377) 
affirms that “network governance extends far beyond intergovernmental relations, 
which focuses only on the relationships between and among government institutions 
within a particular nation state”. To expand on the discourse, Charabarty and 
Bhattecharya (2003:02) propound that “the concept of networked governance 
expands and redefines the locus of Public Administration to include influential and 
meaningful relationships that are found to exist between Public Administration and its 
surrounding socio-political and economic milieu”. Nel (2015:82) highlights that 
“Network Theory functions on the principle of conjunction. Conjunction is a process 
where events happen simultaneously”. Furthermore, “Network Theory accentuates 
the benefits of interagency conjunction. Conjunction encourages the exchange of 
professionalism and functional specialisation between ‘like-minded’ agencies” (Nel 
2015:82). 
Frederickson (2003:224) criticises the concept of conjunction, stating that “politics in 
any given jurisdiction may produce powerful forces opposing cooperation”. 
Furthermore, “conflicts may be inevitable within the network society and the network 
approach does not operationalise these contingencies” (Nel 2015:83). Klijn (2003:32) 
postulates that “Network Theory paves the way for networks reflecting more or less 
stable patterns between actors, and that network rules offer a frame of action”.  
Nel (2015:83) disagrees by pointing out that “this is not the circumstance in practice; 
actors can break away from rules”. Similarly, Klijn (2003:32) confirms that “while 
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network rules lend a certain stability and predictability to the strategic action of 
actors, they do not determine the action”. Furthermore,  
“these interactions are not easy, due to the large audience; a number of 
complexities are introduced, and consensus must be reached, by synthesising 
the large number of actors’ strategic goals, ensuring that conflicts do not arise 
and that there is no exclusion of actors” (Klijn 2003:32).  
Torfing and Sørensen (2012) point out the following three caveats regarding 
governance networks:  
 Governance networks are not entirely new, but they are increasingly seen as 
an effective and legitimate mechanism of governance. 
 Governance networks clearly provide an alternative to hierarchy and market 
modes of governance, and also provide a crucial supplement. 
 Governance networks are no panacea, but have their strength in relation to 
“wicked problems”. 
Network Theory, like all other theories that came before it, also offers some 
advantages that are in line with the developments in modern times and modern ways 
of conducting government affairs. Torfing and Sørensen (2012) highlight that future 
studies of governance networks will benefit from a more careful analysis of:  
 the discursive structures that help unify different and conflicting actors around 
common objectives and joint policy making; 
 the power structures that define the political conflicts and cleavages among 
the network actors and take us beyond the post-political vision that denies the 
antagonistic character of politics to the detriment of democracy; 
 the collaborative processes in networks and how they contribute to public 
innovation; and 
 the democratic problems and merits of governance networks. 
According to Torfing and Sørensen (2012), governance networks have democratic 
potentials that derive from their capacity to include citizens and organised interests 
actively in political life. This could be noticed through participation of the intensely 
affected parties directly engaged in political communication. This has the potential to 
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lead to broad ownership of decisions among those involved and affected. Torfing 
and Sørensen (2012) further state that although governance networks have a 
democratising effect, it does not mean that they themselves are democratic. This, 
Torfing and Sørensen (2012) contend, can only be established through empirical 
analysis.  
Contemporary modern organisation theories, including any number of management 
theories, have also served to advance developments in the Public Management 
domain. The two theories considered for this study are the Contingency Theory and 
the Complexity Theory of Organisations. Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1999:59) 
contend that the Contingency Theory alleges that there is no one best way to 
develop effective leadership or efficient and effective organisations, but that this is 
situational or contextual. This theory is dependent on the analysis of all internal and 
external environments of the organisation and aligning these with organisational 
objectives. The outcome of this theory is that organisations are influenced by both 
internal and external constraints from environments. The conclusion of the 
Contingency Theory is that these constraints determine the status of the organisation 
in the environmental supra-system, as well as the state of each subsystem.  
The Complexity Theory of Organisations is premised on understanding how 
organisations adapt to their environment. The theory emphasises that organisations 
should be treated as collections of strategies and structures. The theory further 
states that adapting to the environment depends on sharing complex adaptive 
systems. The theory offers an opportunity to consider various epistemological 
ramifications. It has received widespread support from various institutional and 
organisational scholars and audiences (Van der Waldt and Du Toit 2002:59). 
2.7    Summary 
As noted in Chapter One, this thesis focuses on the importance of the Public 
Protector’s oversight function as a counterbalancing state institution charged with 
overseeing government abuse and citizen protection. In particular, the study focuses 
on the overriding role played by the Office of the Public Protector in promoting and 
enhancing democratic good governance. In South Africa, Chapter 9 institutions are 
mandated to strengthen constitutional democracy, and thus support good 
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governance. The oversight function exercised over the executive cannot be left to 
chance as the citizens’ hope for good governance to be upheld is dependent on the 
accountability institutions’ commitment to this task. 
This chapter described various conceptual and contextual variables that impact on 
democratic good governance. The concept of democracy in general and the 
concepts of governance and good governance in particular were discussed in this 
chapter. The chapter also discussed other phenomena that are closely aligned to 
democratic good governance, such as political equality, popular consultation, 
majority rule, and the measures of good governance. Other concepts and 
phenomena that are closely linked to democratic governance and good governance 
that were discussed included legitimacy and credibility, development, accountability 
and transparency, decentralisation, centralisation, and leadership. Good governance 
is not an end in itself but a means to achieving a public sector orientated towards 
serving the broader community.  
Good governance is hailed as an ideal critical for the success or failure of any state 
to achieve much sought-after development. Furthermore, the chapter aimed to locate 
the discourse on good governance within the explanatory frameworks that account 
for the development of the P(p)ublic A(a)dministration paradigm. This chapter 
outlined several concepts and approaches developed over time to provide insight 
into the dynamic nature of public administration and management. The research also 
explored certain theories related to the study of Public Administration and their 
impact on the developments in this field. Notably, in addition to the P(p)ublic 
A(a)dministration paradigm, the chapter discussed the Public Management 
paradigm, the NPM paradigm, Post-NPM, NPG, and Network Theory. These 
theories shaped the domain of Public Administration.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF PUBLIC OVERSIGHT INSTITUTIONS: 
THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF AN OMBUDSMAN  
3.1    Introduction 
This chapter sets out to address the following study objective articulated in Chapter 
One (Section 1.6): To highlight how a public oversight functionary is constituted 
internationally, and to determine the operations of the Office of the Ombudsman as a 
“watchdog” institution in selected countries.  
This chapter serves to provide an overview of how the Ombudsman in other 
countries influences the ideal of attaining good governance and maintaining public 
administration that is fair, just, efficient, and effective. The sample of countries 
chosen for the purpose of this study is by no means exhaustive, but is intended to 
highlight the context in which the Office of the Ombudsman operates in other 
countries.  
This chapter discusses the roles and functions of the Ombudsman in selected 
countries and the reasons behind the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman 
in these countries. These discussions are presented, firstly, in terms of the institution 
of the Ombudsman in Scandinavia and Europe. Selected countries in this regard 
include Sweden (as the first country that instituted this office), Finland, Denmark, 
Norway, and the Netherlands. Secondly, the Ombudsman institution in the UK, 
Canada, Oregon in the USA, New Zealand, and Singapore receive attention. Thirdly, 
in Africa attention is given to Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, and Botswana.    
3.2 The Ombudsman in various countries 
Mothupi (2002:4) explains that “in its modern form, the concept of an Ombudsman 
has its roots in Sweden, where in 1713 King Charles XII appointed an Ombudsman 
called the Chancellor of Justice”. This act by the monarch was a milestone in paving 
the way to entrench an independent accountability institution. “The Chancellor’s 
function was to ensure that the laws of the land were being upheld and the king’s 
officials, public servants and other government officials exercised their duties and 
responsibilities in a proper and efficient manner” (Mothupi 2002:4). It follows that 
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accountability measures were in the process of being formally adopted outside the 
traditional repositories of power. 
Subsequent to the monarch’s decree, “the adoption of a democratic constitution by 
the Swedish people in 1803 brought about the new Office of the Ombudsman for 
Justice” (Mothupi 2002:4). Mothupi (2002:4-5) further highlights that  
“[t]he new institution was independent of the king and government and 
represented the model of the classic Ombudsman. The idea of an 
Ombudsman did not spread until the twentieth century when other 
Scandinavian countries adopted it, and in the early 1960s various 
Commonwealth and European countries followed suit. Over the past two 
decades many more Ombudsman Offices were established in Latin America, 
Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa”. 
Rudolph (1983:4) defines an Ombudsman as  
“an office provided for by the Constitution or by an act of parliament and 
headed by an independent, high-level public official who is responsible to 
parliament, who receives complaints from aggrieved persons against 
government agencies, officials and employees or who acts on own motion 
and who has the power to investigate, recommend corrective action and issue 
reports”.  
In line with the aforementioned, Brynard (1999:8) contends that “wherever the 
Ombudsman system is employed, it is adapted to the unique circumstances of the 
country concerned”. Rudolph (1983:95-96) posits that “the features of the 
Ombudsman are a product of the country in which the Ombudsman is appointed and 
in which he or she operates, but all Ombudsmen share a common objective of 
serving the public and its administration”.   
There are several countries where the position of the Ombudsman has been 
institutionalised in the Office of the Ombudsman. According to the OISD (2015:22), 
the nature of the state in these countries ranges from constitutional, presidential, to 
parliamentary systems of government. For the purpose of this study, the sample of 
selected countries is centred on ensuring representation in underdeveloped, 
developing, and developed states. Care is taken to ensure continental representation 
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by reviewing selected countries in Africa, Asia, America, and Europe, as well as New 
Zealand. 
The common denominator in all countries is that the Ombudsman provides a 
complementary oversight function to the traditional oversight function normally 
rendered by parliament. Tonwe (2013:11) asserts that the Ombudsman had not only 
always played a complementary role alongside the traditional mechanisms of legal 
protection of citizens, but has proved to be a useful tool for building good 
governance by increasing accountability in public administration. Various states have 
a stake in the wellbeing of their citizens; the establishment of the Office of the 
Ombudsman is therefore one way of guaranteeing that service excellence is upheld 
at all costs. Leaving the responsibility to exercise oversight over public administration 
to parliament has resulted in inadequacies that require action. 
3.3    The Ombudsman in Scandinavia and Europe  
This section focuses firstly on the country that first experimented with the institution 
of an Ombudsman, namely Sweden, as well as other Scandinavian and European 
countries that embraced the importance of this functionary. These countries, in no 
particular order, are Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and the UK. 
Akpomuvire (2014:7) contends that following the establishment of the Ombudsman 
in Sweden, other Scandinavian countries subsequently moulded the office into its 
contemporary form. The Office of the Ombudsman is tailor-made to meet the unique 
needs of the people in the respective countries. 
3.3.1 The Ombudsman in Sweden 
According to the OISD (2015:23), Sweden is a constitutional monarchy with a 
parliamentary form of government, and the king acts as the head of state within the 
guidelines of the Swedish Constitution. The Swedish Constitution is set out in four 
different fundamental laws instead of a single codified law. One of the laws, the 1974 
Instrument of Government (Swedish: Regeringsformen) outlines the basic principles 
for fundamental rights, and spells out the terms for the creation of Swedish 
Ombudsmen called Parliamentary Ombudsmen (OISD 2015:23).  
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Akpomuvire (2014:6) highlights that the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman was 
instituted in 1809, and that the word “Ombudsman” in Swedish means 
“representative”. Stacey (1978:1) highlights that the Swedish Ombudsmen are the 
longest established and the most powerful of all Ombudsmen. The OISD (2015:23-
24) states that Sweden has four Ombudsmen, namely the Chief Parliamentary 
Ombudsman, the other Parliamentary Ombudsman, and the Deputy Parliamentary 
Ombudsmen.  
The Swedish Ombudsmen are elected from the members of the judiciary and they 
form part of parliamentary control. One of the Ombudsmen is elected by parliament 
(the Riksdag) to hold the Office of Chief Ombudsman and the Administrative Director 
of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Chief Ombudsman coordinates the work of the 
other Ombudsmen and, in consultation with them, decides on the areas of 
government for which they have responsibility of investigating complaints and 
initiating investigations. 
Akpomuvire (2014:6) asserts that the Parliamentary Ombudsmen are constituted to 
safeguard the rights of citizens by acting as supervisory agencies independent of the 
executive branch. The OISD (2015:24) points out that the authority of the Swedish 
Ombudsman is not provided for in the Swedish Constitution but in terms of their own 
constitution, with parliament prescribing rules for their authority. Accordingly, the 
power and function of the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsmen are spelled out as 
follows: 
 They have the responsibility to supervise the application of laws and other 
statutes in public activities. 
 They have the responsibility to supervise that public activities, including courts 
and commissioned army officers with the rank of second lieutenant and 
above, comply with the laws and fulfil their obligations. 
 They must ensure that these public authorities observe the principles of 
impartiality and objectivity as required by the Swedish Constitution. 
 They must guard against the infringement of the basic freedoms and rights of 
citizens. 
 The Act with Instructions for the Parliamentary Ombudsmen empowers the 
Ombudsmen, in consultation with the Chief Ombudsman, to investigate on 
their own initiative and in response to public complaints. 
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 The Act empowers them to conduct regular inspection visits of public 
authorities and courts to review files and relevant documents. 
 The Ombudsmen can issue guiding statements to promote uniform and 
appropriate application of laws. 
 The Ombudsmen have powers to prosecute any criminal violation of the law 
and are viewed as extra-ordinary prosecutors (OISD 2015:24-25). 
Stacey (1978:5) highlights that the Swedish Ombudsmen have power over judges, 
are not confined to looking at procedural questions, and sometimes, but not often, 
may need to scrutinise judges’ decisions. Furthermore, the Ombudsmen may 
prosecute a judge, but this can only happen in a court superior to the court over 
which the judge presides. The Ombudsmen therefore have a very high standing and 
are very effective in securing redress for complaints (Stacey 1978:15). 
A point to consider, however, is that the outcomes of their investigations are not 
legally binding and the investigated authority does not have to comply with such 
outcomes since they are merely recommendations (OISD 2015:24). The Swedish 
Ombudsmen have limitations, and their powers and authority do not extend to the 
following institutions: 
 Members of parliament, its structures, and the Clerk of the House. 
 The government or ministers, except prosecuting them on behalf of the 
parliament and its Committees Assembly when a committee decides to initiate 
legal proceedings. 
 The Chancellor of Justice (Government Ombudsman). 
 Members of policy-making municipal bodies (OISD 2015:25). 
Stacey (1978:2) states that part of the rationale of Swedish ministers being exempt 
from investigation by the Ombudsmen is that most areas of central government in 
Sweden are administered by boards and are not under the direct control of ministers. 
However, the conduct of administration by the board is subject to investigation by the 
Ombudsmen.  
Akpomuvire (2014:7) postulates that the authority of the Swedish Ombudsmen to 
prosecute does not extend to violations of freedom of the press and the right to 
freedom of expression. Each of the Swedish Ombudsmen has a direct individual 
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responsibility to parliament for his or her actions. The Chief Ombudsman cannot 
intervene in another Ombudsman’s inquiry or adjudicate in any case within another 
Ombudsman’s supervision (OISD 2015:25).  
In terms of reporting and accounting lines, the Swedish Ombudsmen have the 
following responsibilities: 
 To annually report on their performance in writing to parliament. 
 Their reports can include matters that affect the competence, organisation, 
personnel, or working procedures of the body under investigation and any 
issue that has arisen in their supervisory activities. 
 Their reports must contain a survey of their activities in other respects. 
 The reports are processed by the Constitutional Committee. 
 The Constitutional Committee uses such reports to scrutinise the performance 
and activities of the Ombudsmen and report to the House (OISD 2015:25). 
3.3.2  The Ombudsman in Finland 
Finland’s Ombudsman was instituted in 1919 and was included in the Finnish 
Constitution. According to Kastari (1968:65), Finland has both an Ombudsman and a 
Chancellor of Justice; with the former elected by parliament and the latter appointed 
by the president. These two institutions are referred to as Finland’s Guardians of the 
Law. The Ombudsman is more concerned with the rights of the individual, and 
attempts to safeguard the rights of those subject to official acts. Kastari (1968:67) 
states that the Ombudsman and the Chancellor of Justice make use of their own 
initiative as a result of incidents published in the newspapers. 
However, the Ombudsman’s own initiative also arises from inspection trips which he 
or she makes with respect to different administrative offices, courts, police stations, 
prisons, penal camps, and closed reform institutions (Kastari 1968:64). The main 
distinction to point out is that the Ombudsman can only bring charges for an offence 
committed by someone in office, while the Chancellor of Justice can bring them in 
the case of a crime or misdemeanour by a private person. 
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Kastari (1968:72-73) highlights the following with respect to the powers of Finland’s 
Ombudsman; which are shared with the Chancellor of Justice: 
 The Ombudsman has the duty of making proposals to amend conflicting and 
defective laws. 
 The Ombudsman may make suggestions to officials to correct omissions in 
procedures or in the rendering of justice. 
 The Ombudsman determines how well the cabinet has fulfilled the wishes of 
parliament. 
 The Ombudsman possesses a right to speak similar to that of cabinet 
members, although they cannot be members of parliament. 
 The Ombudsman may gather documents for perusal in the conduct of 
investigations, and publish them for the benefit of the public. 
 The Ombudsman is entitled to be present at the meetings of administrative 
officers and the sessions of the courts to express his or her opinion during the 
handling of a case. 
 The Ombudsman has the power to involve expert legal knowledge, has 
complete objectivity, good judgement, and tact, and at times also the courage 
and energy to deal with important matters and with the alleged offences or 
mistakes of even the highest officials. 
 The Ombudsman has extensive powers comparable with and that overlap to 
an extent with that of the Chancellor of Justice. The use of these powers is an 
important and positive part of the judicial system, the guardianship of the law, 
and the guarantee of the rights of the individual. 
3.3.3 The Danish Ombudsman 
The Danish Ombudsman has received more traction than the Swedish counterpart 
since the institution was established in 1955. According to Stacey (1978:19), the 
Office of the Ombudsman in Denmark owes much to the Swedish prototype, hence it 
is not surprising to find that the Danish Ombudsman has wide jurisdiction. The 
Danish Ombudsman is elected by parliament after every general election. 
The Ombudsman must submit annual or special reports to the Select Committee on 
the Ombudsman, which follows up the reports to determine whether the 
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recommendations of the Ombudsman are implemented (Stacey 1978:25-26). This 
serves as a valuable parliamentary backing of the Ombudsman’s work. Furthermore, 
the Ombudsman’s reports have from time to time served as the basis for discussion 
between ministers and the specialist committees of parliament. 
The Danish Ombudsman has the following powers and functions: 
 To investigate complaints against almost any aspect of central administration. 
 To investigate complaints against ministers but only in their capacity as heads 
of departments, not as members of cabinet. 
 To investigate complaints against the activities of local authorities, specifically 
decisions by officials or council committees. 
 To criticise discretionary decisions when he or she can cite knowledge of 
experts in support, and, when as far as can be ascertained, there exists 
reliable documentary evidence of an arbitrary or unreasonable decision. 
 To investigate on his or her own initiative and use this power quite widely. 
 To carry out inspections of state institutions. 
 To suggest, with the greater freedom that he or she has, that there have been 
faults in administrative behaviour and to recommend changes in procedure. 
 In cases that are complicated, or if it appears that a department may have 
been at fault, the Office of the Ombudsman asks the department to take a 
stand on the case and explain why it reached the decision it did (Stacey 
1978:20-23). 
The Ombudsman is, however, also subject to some binding limitations, which are 
outlined below: 
 The Ombudsman may not investigate complaints against judges. 
 The Ombudsman is also limited by a rule that provides that he or she may not 
investigate complaints against a decision taken by the full council of a local 
authority. This is not a serious limitation; however, since he or she has power, 
on his or her own initiative, to investigate a decision by a full council although 
he or she may not investigate the decision in pursuance of a complaint. 
 The Ombudsman’s jurisdiction does not include the courts. 
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 The Ombudsman may not investigate a complaint about a decision until the 
citizen concerned has exhausted the remedies available to him or her in 
appeal to higher authorities. 
 The Ombudsman may not require that all documents in a case be shown to 
him or her, whereas in Sweden the Ombudsman can view all documents. 
 The Ombudsman has no powers to criticise unreasonable decisions by 
administrative authorities (Stacey 1978:21-22). 
To conclude this section on the Danish Ombudsman, Kastari (1968:91) contends 
that much of the influence of the Ombudsman is based on his or her direct contact 
with the civil service through correspondence, conference, and telephone 
conversations, among others. Stacey (1978:24) highlights that the Ombudsman can 
decline cases in which the avenues of appeal have not been exhausted. It should 
also be noted that although the Ombudsman is not able to investigate complaints 
against judges, he or she can investigate complaints against administrative tribunals. 
3.3.4 The Norwegian Ombudsman for Administration 
According to Stacey (1978:32), Norway has had an Ombudsman for the armed 
forces since 1952, and for administration since 1962. The Office of the Ombudsman 
for Administration is modelled on the Danish Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is 
elected by parliament after every general election, for a four-year term, and the law 
provides that the Ombudsman must have the qualifications to be a Justice of the 
Supreme Court (Stacey 1978:36). The Ombudsman is assisted by his or her chief of 
office, first legal assistant, and seven legal assistants. The Ombudsman’s jurisdiction 
concerns all central administration except judges, the Auditor of Public Accounts, 
and the Armed Forces. The powers and functions of the Norwegian Ombudsman are 
as follows: 
 To investigate decisions by ministers and complaints against administrative 
tribunals. 
 To criticise discretionary decisions if they are manifestly unreasonable. 
 To consider whether or not a decision has been made in conformity with the 
law and within the limits that the law prescribes. 
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 To demand that documents in a case be shown to him or her, but not 
necessarily all the documents. 
 To initiate own investigations, normally as a result of a press report or 
broadcast. 
 To order, as prescribed by the law, that complaints be submitted to his or her 
office in writing. 
 To inspect state or local institutions only to supplement his or her investigating 
function in a case (Stacey 1978:33-35). 
The Ombudsman must also comply with the following limitations: 
 To observe and follow a rule requiring exhaustion of remedies by the 
complainant. 
 As regards discretionary decisions, the Ombudsman has a limited function but 
the limits under which he or she can operate are not quite the same as those 
that apply to the Danish Ombudsman. 
 To publicise reports, but he or she is not obliged to give journalists access to 
documents as the office is exempt from the law on publicity (Stacey 1978:33-
35). 
With specific reference to reporting lines, Stacey (1978:35) states that the Norwegian 
Ombudsman makes annual reports to parliament, and in these reports, besides 
giving an analysis of his or her activities, also gives summaries of some of the cases 
he or she decided in the year. “The report is received by the Committee of Justice of 
the Storting, but there is usually only a rather brief and formal discussion of the 
report in the Committee” (Stacey 1978:35). 
3.3.5 The Ombudsman in the Netherlands 
According to the OISD (2015:34), the Netherlands is a hereditary constitutional 
monarchy with a parliamentary form of government based on principles of ministerial 
responsibility. The government in the Netherlands is subject to parliamentary 
scrutiny; and the Ombudsman is the High Council of State. The Ombudsman and the 
Deputy Ombudsman are appointed by the House of Representatives in terms of the 
National Ombudsman Act. 
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The following are the powers and functions of the Ombudsman in the Netherlands: 
 To promote good governance within the public administration. 
 To defend citizens’ interests and to keep a critical eye on government 
operations. 
 To be an independent and impartial intermediary between citizens and the 
public administration. 
 The Constitution, General Administration Law Act, and National Ombudsman 
Act empower the Office to proactively and reactively investigate the actions of 
state bodies or other public entities. 
 To conduct on-site investigations, summon any person or authority, and make 
recommendations to the government on its findings (OISD 2015:35). 
Similarly, the Ombudsman in the Netherlands has limitations that are critical in the 
constitutional dispensation of the country; these are as follows: 
 Section 16 of the National Ombudsman Act states that the Ombudsman may 
not investigate a case where there is a possibility of a judicial review 
procedure under administration law and conduct subject to the supervision of 
the judiciary. 
 The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over cases that are sub judice, nor a 
complaint that is before another independent complaints body, nor is he or 
she authorised to investigate a matter of policy (OISD 2015:35). 
In terms of reporting and accounting responsibilities, the Ombudsman submits 
written annual reports to the House of Parliament and the cabinet, and must present 
these in person (OISD 2015:36). These reports may also be published for public 
scrutiny. The impact of the Ombudsman’s work is monitored by parliament, which is 
composed of the senate and House of Representatives.    
3.3.6 The Ombudsman in the United Kingdom (UK) 
The UK is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system, and the monarch 
is technically vested with sweeping executive powers called “the royal prerogative” in 
terms of the British Constitution (OISD 2015:32). It is important to highlight that the 
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UK does not have one constitutional document, it thus has an uncodified or unwritten 
constitution. 
According to Stacey (1978:84), the Ombudsman in the UK is called the 
Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is appointed by 
the Crown on the recommendation of the prime minister in terms of section 1 of the 
Parliamentary Commissioner Act of 1967 and Schedule 1 of the Health Services 
Commissioner Act. The OISD (2015:33) explains that the Parliamentary and Health 
Service Ombudsman is an office that combines two statutory roles, namely 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration (Parliamentary Ombudsman) and 
Health Service Commissioner (Health Service Ombudsman). 
The Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman has the following powers and 
functions as provided for in the Parliamentary Commissioner Act and Health 
Services Commissioners Act: 
 To investigate citizens’ allegations of unfair treatment, maladministration, 
improper conduct, or poor service by government departments and public 
authorities. 
 To require from any person any information or document relevant to the 
investigation. 
 Subpoena powers and administration of oaths or affirmations, and has final 
decision-making authority on these matters. 
 To make independent decisions on their case work without any form of 
intervention whatsoever. 
 The Ombudsman’s decisions can only be challenged in the courts by way of 
judicial review (OISD 2015:33). 
In the same way that the two aforementioned acts empower the Ombudsman to 
carry out certain mandates, there are also limitations within which the Ombudsman 
ought to act, namely: 
 The Ombudsman can investigate only subject to a member of parliament filter 
system in terms of section 5(1) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act. This 
section provides that the Ombudsman can investigate only upon referral of a 
complaint to him or her by a member of parliament. 
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 In terms of section 4(1) of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act, the 
Ombudsman cannot investigate courts, members of parliament, political 
parties, or the police. 
 The Ombudsman does not have powers to investigate a matter where the 
aggrieved has a right of appeal. This includes where the matter has been 
referred to a tribunal in terms of both the Parliamentary Commissioner Act and 
the Health Service Commissioner Act. 
 The Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over a matter where the complainant has 
a remedy by way of legal proceedings in any court of law in terms of the two 
acts. However, the Ombudsman can do so only if it is not reasonable to 
expect the aggrieved to use such other legal remedies (OISD 2015:34)   
In terms of reporting and accounting lines, the UK Ombudsman is accountable to 
parliament through the Public Administration Select Committee, which is a 
committee of the House of Commons (Stacey 1978:86). The Parliamentary 
Commissioner Act and the Health Service Commissioner Act require the 
Ombudsman to submit annual reports on the performance of his or her functions to 
each House of Parliament. These two acts also require the Ombudsman to submit 
other reports relating to the work to each House of Commons and House of Lords 
when the Ombudsman thinks it necessary to do so.        
3.4  The Canadian Ombudsman  
The idea of the Ombudsman in North America did not receive broad attention as was 
the case in Europe and elsewhere where this office was integrated as part of 
complementary parliament oversight. In North America, the most rapid application of 
the Ombudsman idea has taken place in Canada, where eight of the ten Canadian 
provinces had set up an Ombudsman (Stacey 1978:52). Stacey (1978:52) further 
maintains that neither the USA nor Canada has an Ombudsman at the federal level, 
although Canada has had a language Ombudsman at the federal level of 
government since 1971.  
The provincial Ombudsman in Canada’s Quebec province is, according to Stacey 
(1978:52), “Le Protecteur du Citoyen”, or in the English translation, the “Public 
Protector”. The Quebec Ombudsman is modelled on the New Zealand one, with the 
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Public Protector Act passed in 1968. The Public Protector is appointed by the 
National Assembly of Quebec for a five-year term according to a motion by the prime 
minister. The appointment of the Public Protector is approved by a two-thirds 
majority in the National Assembly, and can be dismissed on the approval of a similar 
two-thirds majority. The Act also provides for the appointment of an assistant to the 
Public Protector, but this appointment is made by the lieutenant-governor of the 
province, as recommended by the Public Protector. 
The Quebec Public Protector has powers and functions that are provided for in the 
Public Protector Act of 1968; namely: 
 To investigate complaints against all departments of the province without 
exception. 
 To deal directly with ministers and the permanent heads of departments. 
 To examine complaints against a number of quasi-judicial bodies, to a limited 
extent. 
 To investigate a complaint that the proceedings of a government body 
exercising a quasi-judicial function have been affected by some gross 
irregularity and that justice has not been done, or will not be done. 
 To examine all the files relevant to a complaint against any department or 
commission, including police files. 
 To investigate wherever there is reason to believe that a provincial official has 
“wronged” the person complaining. The word “wronged” is defined as in a 
case where the functionary, officer, or employee: 
a) has not complied with the law; 
b) has acted in an unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary, or discriminatory 
manner; 
c) has failed in his or her duty or has been guilty of misconduct or 
negligence; 
d) has committed an error of law or fact; and 
e) in the exercise of a discretionary power, has acted for an unjust 
purpose, has been actuated by irrelevant motives, or has failed to give 
reasons for his or her discretionary act when he or she should have 
done so. 
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 In relation to quasi-judicial bodies, the Public Protector can report that there 
have been faulty procedures and that, as a consequence, the complainant 
has suffered injustice. 
 In relation to decisions or other acts of provincial departments, to report that 
an official has acted in an unreasonable, unjust, arbitrary, or discriminatory 
manner (Stacey 1978:54-56). 
Inasmuch as the Quebec Public Protector has powers and functions that serve as 
the cornerstone of his or her mandate, certain observed limitations are in place: 
 Section 17 of the Public Protector Act of 1968 provides that the Public 
Protector shall not investigate when the person applying for an investigation 
has under any law a right of appeal or an equally adequate recourse (Stacey 
1978:57). 
 The Public Protector must work within the context of a less open system of 
government, and he or she operates very effectively within this context 
(Stacey 1978:67). 
Stacey (1978:68) confirms that in terms of accounting and reporting duties, the 
Public Protector presents an annual report to the National Assembly of Quebec for 
scrutiny. In this annual report, which is also published for public consumption, the 
Public Protector provides general conclusions on the operations of his or her office, 
examples of the complaints investigated, and full statistics of the handling of cases. 
Rowat (1968:31) contends that, within limits, the Ombudsman does valuable work, 
both with respect to accounting and executing the mandate of his or her office. 
3.5  The Ombudsman in the state of Oregon in the United States of 
America (USA) 
The idea of the Ombudsman has only been adopted in some states of the USA, 
without the broad acceptance as in the Scandinavian countries, the UK, and New 
Zealand to a greater or lesser extent. The City Club of Portland (1971:261) maintains 
that in those states that have adopted the concept of an Ombudsman, there have 
generally been no specific qualifications set forth for the office, except that “the 
Ombudsman shall be a person well-equipped to analyse problems of law”. 
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According to the City Club of Portland (1971:262), the bills introduced in Oregon in 
1967 and 1969 provided that the Ombudsman would be appointed by the governor 
and would be subject to confirmation by the senate by an affirmative vote of two-
thirds of those voting. The term of office was set at four years, and the governor has 
the right to dismiss the Ombudsman during a term for good cause, but only after a 
hearing at which members of the Legislative Assembly are present. 
The Oregon Ombudsman has powers, functions, and limitations that are intertwined 
and are elaborated on in this section. The Ombudsman has powers to investigate on 
his or her own initiative or upon complaint of any person the administration action of 
state agencies (City Club of Portland 1971:264). The Ombudsman also undertakes 
the following functions: 
 To participate in the dissemination of and accessibility to information about 
government and its services. 
 To receive and undertake to investigate, resolve, and recommend correction 
of causes of inept administrative performance. 
 To act as a commentator on substantive law reforms (City Club of Portland 
1971:258-259). 
The limitations facing the Office of the Ombudsman are as follows: 
 The Office of the Ombudsman, so established and lacking a legislative base, 
may be unable to function in a manner or scope significantly different from 
that heretofore covered on an ad hoc basis by the governor’s office and its 
staff. 
 In many cases, information is not supplemented by practical follow-up to 
establish productive contact between the citizen and a specific government 
staff member who can consider and take timely action with reference to the 
citizen’s need. 
 Most of the problems that the Ombudsman handles are services dealing with 
matters of law and which rely chiefly on the judicial process for 
implementation. However, problems contemplated for handling by the 
Ombudsman are not suited to efficient resolution by litigation or the judicial 
process. 
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 The Ombudsman is not omniscient and should not be regarded as a 
substitute for the collective wisdom of the legislative arm of government in 
determining public policy or establishing the controlling priorities of public 
effort. 
 The Ombudsman is not in a position to respond most satisfactorily on behalf 
of the citizens because of lack of jurisdiction across state, country, municipal, 
and metropolitan sub-district levels (City Club of Portland 1971:259-260). 
Regarding accounting and reporting, the City Club of Portland (1971:264) indicates 
that the Ombudsman reports regularly to the governor and the legislature. This 
executive concept operates from the premise that the governor is the true 
Ombudsman for the people, and that his or her access to and from the people of the 
state is enhanced and increased by the amplifying efforts of the new officer.  
3.6 The Ombudsman experience in New Zealand 
The New Zealand Ombudsman is called the Parliamentary Commissioner, and this 
office is established in terms of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act of 1962 (Stacey 
1978:54). The success of the Scandinavian Ombudsman has had a profound 
influence on the establishment of the office in New Zealand. Rowat (1968:132) 
proposes that the institution enjoys the confidence of the legislature, the 
administration, and the general public. It is therefore natural that public servants 
should respect an institution that indirectly protects them from unfair criticism. 
Rowat (1968:133) asserts that the Parliamentary Commissioner is appointed by the 
governor-general on the recommendation not of the government but of the House of 
Representatives, although he or she cannot be a member of the House or hold any 
other office without the approval of the prime minister. Rowart (1968:127) 
emphasises that the decision to appoint an Ombudsman was presumably taken 
because the government had become convinced that the means available to citizens 
for ventilating their grievances against officials and gaining redress for administrative 
injuries were inadequate. Stacey (1978:54) confirms that the Parliamentary 
Commissioner can report on any decisions, recommendations, acts, or omissions, 
which, in his or her opinion, after investigation: 
 appear to have been contrary to law;  
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 were unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or improperly discriminatory; 
 were based wholly or partially on a mistake of law or fact; or  
 were wrong. 
According to Rowat (1968:127), New Zealand has 41 departments of state or 
government agencies. Like their counterparts in the UK, all of them are subject to the 
control of a minister who is answerable to parliament for their administration. 
However, in New Zealand most decisions are communicated in the name of the 
permanent head or senior local officer, not the minister him- or herself. 
Some of the powers and functions of the Parliamentary Commissioner include the 
following: 
 To act independently of the government and to have access to files and 
documents relevant for investigation. 
 To call officers before him or her, and be able to obtain the facts, either in 
writing or by hearing a complaint. 
 To act as a watchdog over departmental administration (Rowat 1968:132-
133). 
Rowat (1968:135-136) notes that  
“under section 11 of the Act, the Commissioner’s principal function is to 
investigate, on complaint or of his own motion; any decision or 
recommendation made (including any recommendation made to a minister of 
the Crown), or any act done or omitted, relating to a matter of administration 
and affecting any person or body of persons in his or its personal capacity, in 
or by any of the departments or organisations named in the schedule to this 
Act, or by any officer, employee, or member thereof in the exercise of any 
power or function conferred on him by any enactment”. 
Like Ombudsmen in most Scandinavian countries, the New Zealand Commissioner 
has limitations that are duly observable; namely: 
 The Parliamentary Commissioner should not be concerned with questions of 
legality, a sphere of courts, nor of policy, which is a matter for parliament. 
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 The Parliamentary Commissioner’s jurisdiction is confined to the acts or 
omissions of the departments of state and other organisations listed in the 
schedule. 
 The Parliamentary Commissioner has no jurisdiction over any decision, 
recommendation, act, or omission of any person acting as legal advisor to the 
Crown pursuant to the rules for the time being approved for the conduct of 
Crown legal business, or acting as counsel for the Crown in relation to any 
proceedings. 
 The Parliamentary Commissioner has no jurisdiction over any decision, 
recommendation, act, or omission in respect of which there is, under the 
provisions of any enactment, a right of appeal or objection, or a right to apply 
for a review, on the merit of the case, to any court, or to any tribunal 
constituted by or under any enactment, whether or not that right of appeal or 
objection or application has been exercised in the particular case, and 
whether or not any time prescribed for the exercise of that right has expired 
(Rowat 1968:135-136). 
In relation to accounting and reporting duties, Stacey (1978:57) explains that the 
Parliamentary Commissioner is responsible to parliament for the operations of his or 
her office. However, to avoid the Parliamentary Commissioner’s office being 
swamped by burdensome cases, there would also have to be a filing fee to restrain a 
rush of reviews as might follow if it were free. 
3.7 The Ombudsman in Singapore 
Singapore is one of the East Asian countries that has managed to pursue good 
governance for the ultimate benefit of its citizens. Andrew, Fukuyama and Grindle 
(2015) argue that it is important to separate implementation by state from democracy 
– a policy which in the hands of a weak state may prove disastrous. Singapore has 
pursued implementation by state, which helps the country to achieve exceptionally 
better results than most democracies. Good implementation of policy programmes is 
the basis of Singapore’s governance, thanks to the presence of strong accountability 
institutions (Andrews et al. 2015). 
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According to the OISD (2015:30), Singapore has a parliamentary system of 
government with no clear-cut separation of powers between the legislature and the 
executive. The prime minister, who is the head of government or the executive, is 
appointed by the president. Singapore has a unicameral system of parliament, with 
the Singaporean Constitution being the supreme law of the country; however, the 
independence of the Ombudsman is not guaranteed in the Constitution. 
The OISD (2015:31) confirms that the Office of the Ombudsman in Singapore is 
known as the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and is enabled by the 
Prevention of Corruption Act of 1960. The CPIB is headed by a director appointed by 
the president in terms of the Act. The director is assisted by the deputy director, 
assistant directors, investigators, and staff – all also appointed by the president in 
terms of the Act. 
The CPIB has powers and functions that enable this office to carry out its 
constitutional mandate, which include the following: 
 To safeguard the integrity of the public service. 
 To primarily focus on preventing corruption as its top priority. 
 To investigate offences under the penal code, including proactive or reactive 
arrest, search, and seizure without a warrant of search if the officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that any delay in obtaining the warrant is likely 
to frustrate the purpose of the search in terms of the Prevention of Corruption 
Act (OISD 2015:31). 
According to Stacey (1978:185), only one limitation faces the CPIB, and that is, in 
terms of the Constitution, that the prime minister can deny the Ombudsman (CPIB) 
authority to investigate any matter. However, the Constitution gives the president the 
final say in this regard. It is important to highlight that, in reality, the CPIB is allowed 
to carry out its mandate without interference, since Singapore prides itself on being 
one of the best-governed states with zero tolerance for corruption (Stacey 
1978:185).   
The OISD (2015:32) emphasises that, in terms of accounting and reporting lines in 
Singapore, it is essential to highlight the CPIB is under the charge of the prime 
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minister’s office. The director reports, preferably in writing, to the prime minister, who 
is also directly accountable to the president. 
3.8    The Ombudsman on the African continent 
The African situation is unique in many respects and incomparable to other 
continents. Africa has had the challenge of transforming from the colonial era to a 
modern-day good governance context. Africa is caught up in a web of attempting to 
adopt foreign practices and models, without necessarily assessing whether they 
would be easy to adapt to the unique circumstances of the African states. 
According to Akpomuvire (2014:3), with the adoption of the concept of an 
Ombudsman, it is hoped that this would help the African public service to attempt a 
self-check that would enforce accountability, prevent corruption, and guard against 
maladministration.  
Akpomuvire (2014:3) states that,  
“[a]part from a history of individual case studies of countries on their 
own instituting the portfolio of the Ombudsman into their public sector 
practice in Africa, a wholesome approach to building an alternative 
mechanism for protecting the ordinary citizens against powerful state 
bureaucracies has not become popular”.  
Akpomuvire (2014:3) argues that the existence of the Office of the Ombudsman 
reflects an affirmation of a commitment to assisting citizens who seek redress 
against maladministration to access some reasonable solution. 
Akpomuvire (2014:5) contends that embracing the idea of an Ombudsman sends a 
message to public officials in Africa regarding the need to treat citizens with fairness 
and impartiality. A critical look at the situation shows that several countries in Africa 
have realised the need to adopt Ombudsman plans and anti-corruption institutions in 
their bureaucracies. “One fact however remains very fundamental, and that is these 
erected institutions for redress seeking have not succeeded in raising the level of 
accountability and good governance in Africa” (Olowu 2002:85). 
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For the purpose of this study, the African countries selected for discussion in this 
section are Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, and Botswana. The number of 
countries with an Ombudsman’s office in Africa is by no means conclusive. The 
selected countries were not included based on preference, but the idea is to review 
their Office of the Ombudsman and its structural constitution and operations. 
3.8.1 Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in 
Ghana  
Ghana has a unitary system of government led by an executive president. The OISD 
(2015:29) reveals that this country does not have a typical Ombudsman but rather an 
institution that combines what is known as an Ombudsman, a human rights body, 
and an anti-corruption agency into what is now termed the CHRAJ. This institution 
was created in terms of article 218 of the Constitution of Ghana of 1992. The 
institution is a three-person office made up of a commissioner and two deputy 
commissioners appointed by the president in terms of the CHRAJ Act of 1993 (OISD 
2015:29). 
The powers and functions of the CHRAJ are provided for in the Act and, according to 
Akpomuvire (2014:17), include the following: 
 To foster a culture of respect for fundamental human rights and freedom of 
expression in Ghana. 
 To investigate complaints of human rights violations and to provide redress for 
administrative injustices. 
 To educate the public about human rights and freedoms in accordance with its 
constitutional obligations. 
 To promote integrity and decency in the Ghanaian public service by 
investigating corruption and educating the public to appreciate the high cost of 
corruption, and, conversely, the significant pay-offs of a relatively corruption-
free society. 
 To enhance the scale of good governance, democracy, integrity, peace, and 
social development by promoting, protecting, and enforcing human rights and 
freedoms and administrative justice for all in Ghana. 
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The OISD (2015:29) states the following about the powers and functions of the 
Ghanaian Ombudsman: 
 The Ombudsman must protect and promote administrative justice for an 
accountable and transparent government. 
 The Ombudsman must investigate complaints concerning injustice and unfair 
treatment of any person by a public authority. 
 The Ombudsman may issue subpoenas. 
 The Ombudsman may initiate legal proceedings and seek any suitable 
remedy. 
The limitations facing the Ghanaian Ombudsman are as follows: 
 The Ombudsman does not have the power to investigate a matter that is 
pending before a court or judicial tribunal. 
 The Ombudsman does not have authority to investigate any matter involving 
the relations or dealings between government and any other government or 
any international organisation in terms of article 219(2) of the Ghanaian 
Constitution. 
 The Commission and the Commissioner shall, in the performance of their 
functions, not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority, 
except where the law allows it to happen (OISD 2015:29).  
According to the OISD (2015:30), the CHRAJ has the following duties with regard to 
the accounting and reporting lines: 
 To submit an annual report to parliament. 
 The report must include a summary of investigated matter and action taken to 
remedy the situation. 
 To publish reports generally relating to exercise of its functions. 
3.8.2 Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance in Tanzania 
Bergman (2014:6) reveals that it is noteworthy that the first Ombudsman institution in 
Africa was established in Tanzania. Thereafter the institution became widely adopted 
by a significant number of African states as an instrument for making government 
responsible and accountable to the governed. Makaramba (2006) explains that in 
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Tanzania a human rights institution-cum-Ombudsman exists, but initially there 
existed a Ministry for Good Governance headed by a fully fledged minister. Shivji 
(2004) reveals that it was the government of Denmark that assisted the Tanzanian 
government to establish a Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance.  
Makaramba (2006) states that this Commission is an independent government 
department incorporated in Tanzania’s Constitution, and it became operational in 
March 2002. The president appoints the Commissioners of this Commission. The 
Commission also took over some of the functions of the defunct Permanent 
Commission of Enquiry; the first Ombudsman institution among the English-speaking 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Akpomuvire (2014:14) lists the powers and functions of this Ombudsman 
(Commission) in dealing with the five broad constitutional mandates: 
 Protection or investigative mandate; 
 Promotive or educative mandate; 
 Advisory mandate; 
 Mediators mandate; and 
 Quasi-adjudicatory’s mandate. 
According to Akpomuvire (2014:14), the Commission functions both as a national 
human rights institution as well as an Ombudsman. The Commission embarks on 
regular outreach activities that involve conducting regional and district tours, as well 
as public meetings and holding talks. The Commission also makes use of both print 
and electronic media to carry out its public awareness campaigns. Furthermore, the 
Commission carries out public hearings and inquiries into some specific human 
rights and good governance issues.  
3.8.3 Commission on Administrative Justice (CAJ) in Kenya 
According to the OISD (2015:26), Kenya is a presidential representative democracy, 
with the Office of the Ombudsman as the most important commission. The 
Ombudsman in Kenya is called the CAJ, created in terms of the Kenyan 
Constitution. The Commission on Administrative Justice Act (CAJA) is the enabling 
legislation. The Kenyan Ombudsman has constitutional proactive and reactive 
135 
investigative powers and any powers necessary for conciliation, mediation, and 
negotiation (Akpomuvire 2014:18). 
“In terms of article (59)(5)(b) of the Kenyan Constitution, the Ombudsman has the 
powers equivalent to the Human Rights and Equality Commission, as provided for in 
the Constitution” (OISD 2015:27).  
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According to the OISD (2015:26-27), the Commission or Ombudsman has powers 
and functions that reflect the mandate of this office, which are outlined as follows: 
 To ensure that public authorities respect the sovereignty of the people of 
Kenya in terms of the Constitution. 
 To perform any other functions and exercise any powers prescribed by 
legislation in terms of the Kenyan Constitution. 
 To inquire into allegations of maladministration, inefficiencies, or ineptitude 
within the public service. 
 To recommend compensation or other appropriate remedies against persons 
or bodies to which CAJA applies. 
 To investigate any conduct, abuse of power, omission in the public 
administration, or by any organ that is alleged or suspected to be improper or 
prejudicial.  
 To issue summons to discharge its mandate. 
 To obtain, by any means lawful, any information it considers relevant, 
including reports and any information from any person, including government 
authorities. 
 To seek a court order to enter any premises for any purpose material to the 
fulfilment of its mandate. 
The OISD (2015:27) clarifies the following limitations pertaining to the Ombudsman 
in Kenya: 
 In terms of section 30 of the CAJA, the Ombudsman does not have the 
powers to investigate a matter pending before any court or judicial tribunal, or 
the commencement or conduct of criminal or civil proceedings before a court 
or other body carrying out judicial functions. 
 The Ombudsman does not have the power to investigate anything in respect 
of which there is a right of appeal or other legal remedy, unless, and in the 
opinion of the Ombudsman, it is not reasonable to expect that right of appeal 
or other legal remedy to be resorted to. 
 The Ombudsman cannot investigate any matter that is still a subject of 
investigation by any other person or commission established under the 
Kenyan Constitution or any other written law. 
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In terms of the accounting and reporting lines of the Kenyan Ombudsman, 
Akpomuvire (2014:19) posits that the Ombudsman is independent and only 
accountable to the president and parliament. The Ombudsman is not subject to the 
direction or control of any authority in terms of the Kenyan Constitution. The 
Ombudsman is subject only to the Kenyan Constitution and the law. The Kenyan 
Constitution requires the Ombudsman to submit a written report annually to the 
president and parliament. The report should include the office’s financial statements 
and a description of its activities. The reports must also include recommendations on 
specific actions to be taken in furtherance of the findings of the Commission.   
Akpomuvire (2014:19) further explains that the CAJA requires that all the 
Ombudsman’s reports be published and publicised. The president, the National 
Assembly, or the senate may at any time require the Ombudsman to submit a report 
on a particular issue in terms of the CAJA. The CAJA also requires the Ombudsman 
to report bi-annually to the National Assembly on complaints investigated and 
remedial action taken and to publish periodic reports on the country’s status of 
administrative justice.   
3.8.4  Public Complaints Commission (PCC) in Nigeria 
According to Ayo and Anthony (2011:61), in Nigeria the institution of the 
Ombudsman is known as the PCC and is regarded as the “ears” of the people 
because it serves as a mechanism to redress the grievances of citizens in a political 
system. The Ombudsman is one of the two methods of enforcing accountability that 
shows some promises of effectiveness in African countries that accept them. 
Adamolekun (2006:6) highlights that there are two variations of enforcing 
accountability in some African countries. These variations are the French-style 
control through administrative courts, and a permanent commission of enquiry in 
others.  
Ayo and Anthony (2011:62) explain that in Nigeria, the Udoji Public Service Review 
was mandated to examine the organisation, structure, and management of the public 
service and to recommend reforms where desirable. The review team made 
recommendations that brought about the establishment of the PCC in 1972, which 
the federal military government accepted.  
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Ayo and Anthony (2011) state that enabling decree number 31 established the PCC 
in October 1975 in terms of the 1990 laws of the Federation of Nigeria as PCC Act 
377 (PCC General Information) section 273(5) of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria of 1999.  
Each Nigerian state has one state office headed by a commissioner (Ayo and 
Anthony 2011:65). The Commissioner is assisted by the Chief Investigating Officer, 
as well as the Assistant Chief Investigating Officer. The PCC also has directors and 
supporting staff (Ebiziem and Amadi 2015:2). Nigeria also has a Chief Public 
Complaints Commissioner based in the national office in Abuja and is assisted by 
the National Secretary (Acheneje 2001:41). 
Kolawole (1998:191) asserts that the dominant role of the military institution in the 
Nigerian state has been all pervading, making the PCC seem to be working together 
in the past with military rulers to deny the greater proportion of citizens’ happiness. 
Ayo and Anthony (2011:62) state that  
“[i]n the current democratic settings, democracy as a Western concept allows 
for Rule of Law to prevail, freedom of speech to thrive, happiness of the 
citizens, popular participation of the citizens, and above all acceptance of 
people’s fundamental human right in the Nigerian state”. 
The powers and functions of the PCC are provided for in the PCC Act. Ebiziem and 
Amadi (2015:1-2) caution that this is not a definitive list but that it points out the most 
important powers and functions: 
 To protect the citizens from the arbitrary, repressive, and oppressive 
application of the executive powers of government. 
 To initiate investigations on matters within its competence, in addition to cases 
brought to it by aggrieved citizens. 
 To enhance protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens from arbitrary 
intimidation, harassment, and justice. 
 To access all documents and records, including secret ones. 
 To act as a legal safeguard against the excesses of overzealous government 
officials (federal, state, and local). 
 To compel the attendance of any person so required to give evidence, supply 
information, or produce documents. 
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 To investigate complaints lodged before it or actions or inactions, which 
deprive the citizens their right and cause them to suffer from injustices. 
According to Ebiziem and Amadi (2015:9), there are also limitations that the PCC 
must consider as a reality in the execution of its mandate. The PCC is restricted from 
dealing with the following: 
 Matters that are pending before the National Council of States or the 
Executive Council. 
 Matters that are before the National Assembly. 
 All matters relating to anything done or purported to have been done by any 
member of the armed forces in Nigeria and the police force under the Nigeria 
Army Act of 1960, the Navy Act of 1964, the Air Force Act of 1964, or the 
Police Act of 1967, as the case may be. 
 Cases in which the complainant has not, in the opinion of the Commission, 
exhausted all available legal and administrative procedures. 
 Cases relating to any act or thing done before the establishment of the 
Commission in July 1975 (Ebiziem and Amadi 2015:9). 
In examining the scope of Nigeria’s PCC, Ebiziem and Amadi (2015:9-10) also note 
some contending challenges that the PCC is faced with as follows: 
 The PCC’s jurisdiction on administrative procedure of a court in Nigeria, 
especially regarding drawing the line between purely administrative and 
judicial matters in the context of the courts’ administration.  
 Exercise of power over an issue or issues, which the provisions of other laws 
may declare the finality of the administrative act on the issue. 
 Non-enforcement of its decisions, which renders it toothless. 
 Inadequate publicity, which implies that the people for whom the PCC was 
established are not fully aware of the free and quick services of the 
Commission. 
According to Ayo and Anthony (2011:66), the Nigerian PCC must annually submit its 
report to the National Assembly. The report is also published for the benefit of the 
public in the spirit of transparency. This report serves as an accountability instrument 
of the activities of the PCC in a year. 
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3.8.5 Office of the Ombudsman in Botswana 
According to Mungiu-Pippidi (2011:145), Botswana is a parliamentary republic with 
the president selected by the National Assembly. The other legislative house, the 
House of Chiefs, represents the country’s main tribe but has no real legislative 
power. “Some executive and legislative powers are not clearly distinguishable, and 
the executive has a strong legislative role” (Mungiu-Pippidi 2011:147). 
Akpomuvire (2014:20) states that the Office of the Ombudsman in Botswana only 
came into existence in 1997. Botswana is founded on a very solid platform under 
quality political leadership. Ittner (2009:94) explains that the institutions that play the 
most important role in Botswana in enforcing laws against corruption are the police 
force, the attorney-general, the judiciary, as well as the Ombudsman. Mungiu-Pippidi 
(2011:150) reveals that the other legal enforcement institutions are the Directorate 
on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC), parliamentary committees, and the 
auditor-general. 
According to Tonwe (2013:14), Botswana’s Ombudsman institution was established 
in terms of the Ombudsman Act of 1995 but only came into operation on 1 
December 1997. The DCEC was established in 1994 prior to the Ombudsman 
institution, after “it was evidently reasoned that the corruption problem had to be 
tackled first as an Ombudsman institution cannot achieve much in a situation where 
the civil service is very corrupt” (Tonwe 2013:4). Furthermore, Tonwe (2013) 
explains that in terms of content and scope, Botswana’s Ombudsman is akin to the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration in Britain. 
Section 3(1) of the Ombudsman Act prescribes the powers and the areas of 
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman in Botswana. Subject to the provisions of this section, 
the Ombudsman may investigate any action taken by or on behalf of a government 
department or other authority to which this Act applies, such as action taken in the 
exercise of administrative functions of that department or authority in any case 
where: 
 a complaint is made to the Ombudsman by a member of the public who 
claims to have sustained injustice in consequence of maladministration in 
connection with the action so taken; 
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 the complaint is referred to the Ombudsman, with the consent of the person 
who made it, by the president, a minister, or any member of the National 
Assembly with a request to conduct an investigation thereon; and 
 in any other circumstances in which the Ombudsman on his or her own 
motion considers it necessary to investigate the action on the ground that 
some person has or may have sustained such injustice (Ombudsman Act 
1995:2). 
The Ombudsman Act also spells out certain limitations that the Ombudsman must 
observe. Tonwe (2013:15) confirms that the Ombudsman shall not investigate any 
action or actions taken in respect of: 
 matters certified by the president or a minister to affect relations or dealings 
between the government of Botswana and any other government or any 
international organisation; 
 action taken for the purposes of protecting the security of the state or of 
investigating crime, including action taken with respect to passports for either 
of those purposes; 
 the commencement or conduct of civil or criminal proceedings in any court; 
 action taken in respect of appointments to offices or other employment in the 
service of the government of Botswana or appointments made by or with the 
approval of the president or any minister, and action taken in relation to any 
person as the holder or former holder of such office, employment, or 
appointment; 
 action taken with respect to orders or directions to the Botswana Police Force 
or Botswana Defence Force or member thereof; 
 the grant of honours, awards, or privileges by the president; 
 action taken in matters relating to contractual or other commercial dealings 
with members of the public other than action by a duly authorised authority; 
 action taken in any country outside Botswana by or on behalf of any officer 
representing the government of Botswana or any officer of that government; 
and 
 any action which, by virtue of any provision of the Ombudsman Act or any 
other enactment, may be enquired into by a court of law.  
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Further limitations provided for in the Act include the following: 
 The Ombudsman shall not conduct an investigation into any action in respect 
of which the person aggrieved has or had a right of appeal, reference, or 
review to or before a tribunal constituted by or under any law in force in 
Botswana. 
 The Ombudsman shall not conduct an investigation into any action in respect 
of which the person aggrieved has or had a remedy by way of proceedings in 
any court of law (Ombudsman Act 1997:2). 
Tonwe (2013:15) emphasises that in all Ombudsman and Ombudsman-like 
institutions throughout the world, exclusions are a common feature.  
“The whole area of jurisdictional remit is to ensure that an institution is 
guided so that it does not stray into areas not anticipated and thus 
obviate unwarranted negative consequences. However, some of these 
exclusions may be dysfunctional for a modern institution designed to 
strengthen and consolidate the institutional foundations for good 
governance and checkmating injustice arising from maladministration” 
(Tonwe 2013:15).  
Tonwe (2013:15) further explains that upon close examination of the Ombudsman 
institution in Botswana, it is clear that the powers conferred on this functionary are 
very limited. 
Regarding the reporting and accounting lines for the Ombudsman in Botswana, the 
Ombudsman writes an annual report to the president concerning the discharge of his 
or her functions, which is laid before the National Assembly (Ombudsman Act 
1997:6). Furthermore, the publication, by the Ombudsman or by any of his or her 
staff, of any report or communication shall be absolutely privileged. Tonwe (2013:16) 
contends that the dividing line between Botswana’s legislature and executive is 
blurred, and that the legislature has inadvertently created a redundant institution 
since potentially all matters may be inquired into by the courts.  
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3.9 Summary 
This chapter contextualised the global arena in order to formulate a perspective of 
the Ombudsman institution by examining the mode of operation of this functionary 
across different states. The Ombudsman institution subscribes to the governance 
system followed in respective countries, which is underpinned by the constitutions of 
these countries or other acts, whether they are democracies or not. The 
Ombudsman institution has achieved universal recognition and acclaim owing to the 
value attached to the role of this functionary both in complementing and 
supplementing the oversight role exercised by the legislature in most instances. 
This chapter discussed the roles and functions of the Ombudsman in selected 
countries and the reasons behind the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman 
in these countries. In terms of the institution of the Ombudsman in Scandinavia and 
Europe, selected countries included Sweden (as the first country that instituted this 
office), Finland, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. Thereafter, the 
Ombudsman institution in the UK, Canada, Oregon in the USA, New Zealand, and 
Singapore received attention. In terms of Africa, attention was paid to Ghana, 
Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, and Botswana.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
STATUTORY, REGULATORY, POLICY AND STRUCTURAL  
VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR 
4.1    Introduction 
This chapter serves to provide insight into the statutory, regulatory, and structural 
framework that underpins the foundation on which democratic good governance in 
terms of public oversight is premised. This chapter aims to address the following 
objectives of this study as identified in Section 1.6 of Chapter One:  
 To contextualise the statutory, regulatory, and policy frameworks that 
influence South Africa’s Public Protector; and  
 To determine the multilateral, structural and external variables that oversee 
good governance.  
This chapter discusses the statutory framework that encompasses the Constitution, 
other applicable legislation, policies, and the regulatory guidelines that govern 
oversight functions. In addition to the Constitution, the chapter discusses the most 
comprehensive legislation contained in the statutory framework, namely the Public 
Protector Act (No. 23 of 1994) as amended by the Public Protector Amendment Act 
(No. 113 of 1998).  
Furthermore, the chapter identifies and addresses other pieces of legislation and 
policies that do not necessarily prescribe the mandate of the Public Protector but that 
have an overall impact on good governance in South Africa. Hence, there are other 
regulatory and policy guidelines that aim to enhance good governance, such as the 
King Code of Governance for South Africa of 2009 (King III), as well as the recently 
published King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa of 2016. 
This chapter also addresses other multilateral international organisations that 
promote democratic good governance in the same vein, therefore indirectly 
influencing democratic accountability in South Africa. Brown (2013) contends that 
“functionalism examines structures that make up a society and how each part of the 
structure helps to keep the society stable”.  
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Structural functionalism, “a system of thinking based on the ideas of Emile Durkheim, 
looks at society from a large-scale perspective, and as such emphasises the 
structures that create a society and how the society is able to remain stable” (Brown 
2013). Warner (2015) argues that “the people and the government in a democracy 
have reinforcing roles”. To supplement this argument, it warrants some consideration 
to point out that the Office of the Public Protector exists to consolidate the oversight 
function performed by parliament. It is for this reason that Brown (2013) asserts that 
“in the theory of functionalism, society is made up of a bunch of interconnected 
structures or institutions that meet the needs of society”.    
This chapter explains the unintended consequences normally associated with 
prescriptions made by various multilateral institutions and international movements 
on good governance. It pays attention to country and international-level initiatives 
that impact on good governance without losing sight of the agendas of the major 
donors and international humanitarian funding institutions. In this regard, attention is 
paid to multilateral international institutions involved in promoting good governance, 
such as the UN, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the OECD, the European Commission, 
the IMF, the AfDB, the World Bank, the ADB, the EBRD, and the IADB. 
The statutory, regulatory, structural and functional frameworks in the chapter overlap 
in terms of the respective mandates of the Public Protector, and will be discussed in 
different sections of this chapter and the next chapter. The author did not always 
strictly classify legislative prescriptions under a specific section, for example 
regulatory or structural phenomena, because these issues are also addressed in the 
next chapter.   
4.2    Statutory framework governing the Public Protector 
The Public Protector Act (2014:24) confirms that the Office of the Public Protector 
has a statutory mandate in addition to the constitutional mandate of this office, aimed 
at:  
“strengthening constitutional democracy by investigating and 
redressing improper and prejudicial conduct, maladministration and 
abuse of power in all state affairs; resolving administrative disputes or 
rectifying any act or omission in administrative conduct through 
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mediation, conciliation or negotiation; advising on appropriate remedies 
or employing any other expedient means; reporting and 
recommending; advising and investigating violations of the Executive 
Members’ Ethics Act [82] of 1998; resolving disputes relating to the 
operation of the Promotion of Access to Information Act [2] of 2000 and 
discharging other responsibilities as mandated by the national 
legislation”. 
The national legislation that empowers the Public Protector to discharge his or her 
functions, roles, and responsibilities include the following: 
 Public Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994; 
 Public Protector Act, No. 113 of 1998; 
 Public Protector Amendment Act, No. 22 of 2003; 
 Public Service Laws Amendment Act, No. 113 of 1998; 
 Executive Members’ Ethics Act, No. 82 of 1998; 
 Promotion of Access to Information Act, No. 2 of 2000; 
 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No. 3 of 2000; 
 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, No. 12 of 2004; 
 Protected Disclosures Act, No. 26 of 2000; 
 Electoral Commission Act, No. 51 of 1996; 
 National Archives and Record Service Act, No. 43 of 1996; 
 National Energy Act, No. 40 of 2004; 
 Housing Protection Measures Act, No. 95 of 1998; 
 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, No. 4 of 
2000; 
 Public Finance Management Act, No. 29 of 1999; 
 Lotteries Act, No. 57 of 1997; 
 Special Investigation Units and Special Tribunals Act, No. 74 of 1996; and  
 National Environmental Management Act, No. 108 of 1999 (Public Protector 
South Africa 2014:24). 
A number of laws, regulations, policies, guidelines, and circulars have been issued in 
South Africa to facilitate good governance in the public sector, and as such the list 
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above is not exhaustive but only provided those directly relevant to the role of the 
Public Protector, and only those most relevant to this study were included.  
For the purpose of this thesis, only the legislation and policies that deal with the role, 
mandate, and jurisdiction of the Public Protector are discussed in this thesis.  
In pursuit of accomplishing its mandate, the vision of the Office of the Public 
Protector clearly spells out that this functionary endeavours  
“to be a trusted, effective and accessible Public Protector that rights 
administrative wrongs and consistently acts with integrity to ensure fair, 
accountable and responsive decision making, service and good 
governance in all state affairs and public administration in every sphere 
of government” (Public Protector South Africa 2014:23). 
Thornhill (2011:79) explains that “public administration is subject to the democratic 
ideals of society and in the case of South Africa it has been the premise on which the 
public service has been founded since the inception of the Constitution”. For this 
reason, Thornhill (2011:80) contends that “the Constitution is a prime example of a 
state’s commitment to democratic ideals and to transparent and accountable public 
administration”. The need to buttress public accountability and enhance good 
governance in South Africa has seen a number of laws promulgated over and above 
the Constitution, which is the supreme law of the country. 
Public accountability has become an integral part of well-governed states. Thornhill 
(2011:80) states that “in South Africa the Constitution inter alia states that it is the 
supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the 
obligation imposed by it must be fulfilled”. The foregoing statement presupposes that 
“all laws, codes and prescribed procedures, issued within the stated value 
framework, have to be honoured by political office bearers, appointed officials and 
members of society” (Thornhill 2011:80).   
4.2.1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 
The Constitution has laid the foundation upon which all governance operations must 
be premised. Hence, section 195(1) of the Constitution requires public administration 
to be governed by the following values and principles: 
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 A high standard of professional ethics. 
 Efficient, economic, and effective use of resources. 
 A development-oriented public administration. 
 Service delivery that is impartial, fair, equal, and without bias. 
 The people’s needs must be responded to and the public must be encouraged 
to participate in policy making. 
 Accountable public administration. 
 Transparent public administration. 
 Cultivation of good human resources management and career development 
practices. 
 Public administration that is broadly representative of the South African 
people.  
The Office of the Public Protector in South Africa is an institution created in terms of 
Chapter 9 of the Constitution: State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy 
in South Africa. It is probable that if oversight provided by the legislature was 
adequate, some of the institutions that strengthen constitutional democracy would 
not have existed. As stated in Chapter 9, institutions that support constitutional 
democracy merely supplement the oversight function exercised by the primary 
oversight institution, namely the parliament. The framers of the Constitution could 
have foreseen the fact that since the executive is normally elected from the majority 
party, it would have far-reaching ramifications for accountability in parliament. 
Section 181 of the Constitution highlights the following about state institutions that 
support constitutional democracy in South Africa: 
 “(2) These institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution 
and the law, and they must be impartial and must exercise their powers and 
perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice. 
 (3) Other organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist 
and protect these institutions to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity 
and effectiveness of these institutions.  
 (4) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of these 
institutions. 
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 (5) These institutions are accountable to the National Assembly, and must 
report on their activities and the performance of their functions to the 
Assembly at least once a year”. 
The Constitution, in a broad context, is explicit in terms of the mandate of the Public 
Protector and other state institutions that support constitutional democracy in South 
Africa. Section 182 of the Constitution provides for the following functions of the 
Public Protector: 
“(1) The Public Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation— 
(a)  to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the Public Administration 
in any sphere of government, that is alleged to be improper or to result in 
any impropriety or prejudice; 
(b)  to report on that conduct; and 
(c)  to take appropriate remedial action. 
(2) The Public Protector has the additional powers and functions prescribed by 
national legislation. 
(3) The Public Protector may not investigate court decisions. 
(4) The Public Protector must be accessible to all persons and communities. 
(5) Any report issued by the Public Protector must be open to the public unless 
exceptional circumstances, to be determined in terms of national legislation, 
require that a report be kept confidential”. 
In terms of section 181(3) of the Constitution, all organs of state must assist and 
protect the Public Protector to ensure its independence, impartiality, dignity, and 
effectiveness (Constitution of South Africa 1996). Concurring, a provincial premier is 
constitutionally obliged to protect the dignity of the institution of the Public Protector 
and to assist the Office of the Public Protector to ensure its effectiveness. He or she 
should not act in a manner relating to an investigation of the Public Protector, which 
could be interpreted as contemptuous (Public Protector South Africa 2008a:12). To 
ensure that the Public Protector is not hindered from executing the mandate of his or 
her office, section 181(4) of the Constitution provides that no person or institution of 
state may interfere with the functioning of the institution of the Public Protector, and 
the Public Protector Amendment Act of 1998 makes such interference a culpable 
offence. 
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The Public Protector does not act in the pursuit of self-interest but carries out a 
constitutional mandate. In terms of the supremacy of the Constitution:  
“It is not conducive to the upholding of our constitutional democracy if 
the findings and recommendations of constitutional institutions are 
disregarded by other organs of state, merely on the basis of a 
difference of opinion. Differences of opinion need to be resolved in the 
interest of legal certainty, the protection of the dignity and the 
enhancement of the efficiency of both constitutional and organ of state 
involved” (Public Protector South Africa 2008a:13). 
Pienaar (2000:60) highlights that “according to section 182(1)(a) of the Constitution, 
the Public Protector has powers that are regulated by national legislation, namely, 
the Public Protector Act”. In the same manner, Thornhill (2011:79) explains that “to 
obtain, maintain and promote public accountability the Constitution provides in 
Chapter 9 for State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy; one such 
institution being the Public Protector”.  
Section 36(1) of the Constitution (1996) states that,  
“the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors”.  
The very nature of the Office of the Public Protector means that it is a creation of the 
Constitution. As one of the Chapter 9 institutions, the Public Protector is part of the 
collective mechanisms meant to consolidate democracy in South Africa, together 
with other state institutions that support constitutional democracy. Hence, Brynard 
(1993:183) explains that “the Constitution provides that other state institutions must, 
through legislation and other measures, assist and protect the Office of the Public 
Protector to ensure, inter alia, the effectiveness of the institution”. 
The Public Protector serves as an extended mechanism that supports parliament in 
its oversight function. Section 181(5) of the Constitution states that “Chapter 9 
institutions are accountable to the National Assembly, and must report on their 
activities as well as the performance of their functions to the Assembly at least once 
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a year” (Constitution of South Africa 1996). Correspondingly, Thornhill (2011:82) 
explains that “section 182(5) of the Constitution also contains an important condition, 
tantamount to democratic governance, that is, that the Report of the Public Protector 
must be open to the public unless exceptional circumstances require the report to be 
kept secret”. This is in line with the reason previously stated that the judiciary is also 
a mechanism to exercise oversight over the executive through judicial reviews. 
4.2.2 Public Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994  
The Public Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994 (hereafter referred to as the Public 
Protector Act), as amended by the Public Protector Act, 113 of 1998, and the Public 
Protector Amendment Act, 22 of 2003, is a piece of legislation that comprehensively 
outlines the jurisdiction, powers, roles, duties, and responsibilities of the Public 
Protector. It clearly specifies what the Public Protector’s roles, powers, and functions 
are in a more detailed manner than is provided in the Constitution.  
The overriding purpose of the Public Protector Act (1994:3) is “to provide for matters 
incidental to the Office of the Public Protector as contemplated in the [interim] 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith”. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 
1993, served as the interim constitution before the final Constitution of 1996 was 
adopted. The Public Protector Act therefore serves as a guarantee of the legitimacy 
and credibility of the Public Protector. For this reason, the Public Protector is 
expected to operate with full confidence that the office would be seen to be serving 
the public rather than the politicians and the politically connected. 
As stated in the Public Protector Act, “the Public Protector must be distinguished 
from other institutions which monitor government activities in that the office is part of 
the constitutional mechanisms of parliamentary control” (Brynard 1999:20). 
Pienaar (2000:58) maintains that the Public Protector is the institution among the 
other watchdog institutions with the most general mandate and, as such, the widest 
scope of control over the executive power. Brynard (1999:15) contends that in some 
cases the Public Protector may feel that another body would be the more appropriate 
authority to approach and must then simply keep him or her informed of 
developments. Pienaar (2000:58) asserts that when supplementing and/or 
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complementing one another, state institutions form an effective net for any blunder in 
the exercise of administrative power.  
The Preamble of the Public Protector Act (1994) states that:  
“Whereas sections 181 to 183 of the Constitution of 1996 provide for 
the establishment of the Office of Public Protector and that the Public 
Protector has the power, as regulated by national legislation, to 
investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in 
any sphere of impropriety or prejudice, to report on that conduct and to 
take appropriate remedial action, in order to strengthen and support 
constitutional democracy in the Republic; and whereas sections 193 
and 194 of the Constitution provide for a mechanism for the 
appointment and removal of the Public Protector; and whereas the 
Constitution envisages further legislation to provide for certain ancillary 
matters pertaining to the Office of the Public Protector; be therefore 
enacted by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa”.  
The Preamble was substituted by section 2 of Act 113 of 1998. 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of the Public Protector Act entail the following aspects:  
Section 3: Staff of the Public Protector 
“(1)  The Public Protector shall, subject to his or her directions and control, in the 
performance of his or her functions under this Act and the Constitution, be 
assisted by - 
 (a) the Deputy Public Protector; 
(b) a suitably qualified and experienced person as Chief Administrative 
Officer, appointed by the Public Protector or seconded in terms of 
subsection (12), for the purpose of assisting the Public Protector in the 
performance of all financial, administrative and clerical functions 
pertaining to the Office of the Public Protector; and 
(c) such staff, seconded in terms of subsection (12) or appointed by the 
Public Protector, as may be necessary to enable the Public Protector to 
perform his or her functions” (Public Protector Act 1994). 
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Section 4: Finances and accountability 
“(1)   The Chief Administrative Officer referred to in section 3(1)(b) - 
(a) shall, subject to the Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 
1999) - 
(i)   be charged with the responsibility of accounting for money 
received or paid out for or on account of the Office of the Public 
Protector; 
(ii)   cause the necessary accounting and other related records to be 
kept; and 
(b) may exercise such powers and shall perform such duties as the Public 
Protector may from time to time confer upon or assign to him or her, 
and shall in respect thereof be accountable to the Public Protector. 
(2)   The records referred to in subsection (1) (b) (ii) shall be audited by the 
Auditor-General” (Public Protector Act 1994). 
Section 5: Liability of Public Protector 
“(1)  The Office of the Public Protector shall be a juristic person. 
(2)   The State Liability Act, 1957 (Act 20 of 1957), shall apply reference in that Act 
to ‘the minister of the department concerned’ shall be construed as a 
reference to the Public Protector in his or her official capacity. 
(3)   Neither a member of the Office of the Public Protector nor the Office of the 
Public Protector shall be liable in respect of anything reflected in any report, 
finding, point of view or recommendation made or expressed in good faith and 
submitted to Parliament or made known in terms of this Act or the 
Constitution” (Public Protector Act 1994). 
Section 6 relates to reporting matters to and the additional power of the Public 
Protector. These aspects entail:  
“(1)  Any matter in respect of which the Public Protector has jurisdiction may be 
reported to the Public Protector by any person- 
(a) by means of a written or oral declaration under oath or after having 
made an affirmation, specifying-  
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(i) the nature of the matter in question; 
(ii) the grounds on which he or she feels that an investigation is 
necessary; 
(iii) all other relevant information known to him or her; or  
(b) by such other means as the Public Protector may allow with a view to 
making his or her office accessible to all persons. 
(2)  A member of the Office of the Public Protector shall render the necessary 
assistance, free of charge, to enable any person to comply with subsection 
(1). 
(3)  The Public Protector may refuse to investigate a matter reported to him or her, 
if the person ostensible prejudiced in the matter is- 
(a) An officer or employee in the service of the State or is a person to 
whom the provisions of the Public Service Act, 1994 (Proclamation 103 
of 1994), are applicable has, in connection with such matter, not taken 
all reasonable steps to exhaust the remedies conferred upon him or 
her in terms of the said Public Service Act, 1994; or 
(b) Prejudiced by conduct referred to in subsections (4) and (5) and has 
not taken all reasonable steps to exhaust his or her legal remedies in 
connection with such matter. 
(4)  The Public Protector shall be competent- 
(a) to investigate, on his or her own initiative or on receipt of a complaint, 
any alleged- 
(i) maladministration in connection with the affairs of government at 
any level; 
(ii) abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, 
discourteous or other improper conduct or undue delay by a 
person performing a public function; 
(iii) improper or dishonest act, or omission or offences referred to in 
Part 1 to 4, or section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as it relates to the 
aforementioned offences) of chapter 2 of the Prevention and 
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Combating or Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, with respect to public 
money; 
(iv) improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt or any improper 
advantage, or promise or such enrichment or advantage, by a 
person as a result of an act or omission in the public 
administration or in connection with the affairs of government at 
any level or of a person performing a public function; or  
(v) act or omission by a person in the employ of government at any 
level, or a person performing a public function, which results in 
unlawful or improper prejudice to any other person; 
(b) to endeavour, in his or her sole discretion, to resolve any dispute or 
rectify any act or omission by- 
(i) mediation, conciliation or negotiation; 
(ii) advising, where necessary, any complainant regarding 
appropriate remedies; or 
(iii) any other means that may be expedient in the circumstances; 
(c) at a time prior to, during or after an investigation- 
(i) If he or she is of the opinion that the facts disclose the 
commission of an office by any person, to bring the matter to the 
notice of the relevant authority charged with prosecutions; or 
(ii) If he or she deems it advisable to refer any matter which has a 
bearing on an investigation, to the appropriate public body or 
authority affected by it or to make an appropriate 
recommendation regarding the redress of the prejudice resulting 
therefrom or make any other appropriate recommendation he or 
she deems expedient to the affected public body or authority; 
and  
(d) on his or her own initiative, on receipt of a complaint or on request 
relating to the operation or administration of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, 2000, endeavour, in his or her sole discretion, to 
resolve any dispute by- 
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(i) mediation, conciliation or negotiation; 
(ii) advising, where necessary, any complainant regarding 
appropriate remedies; or  
(iii) any other means that may be expedient in the circumstances. 
(5)  In addition to the powers referred to in subsection (4), the Public Protector 
shall on his or her own initiative or on receipt of a complaint be competent to 
investigate any alleged- 
(a) maladministration in connection with the affairs of any institution in 
which the State is the majority or controlling shareholder or of any 
public entity as defined in section 1 of the Public Finance Management 
Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999);  
(b) abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, 
discourteous or other improper conduct or undue delay by a person 
performing a function connected with his or her employment by an 
institution or entity contemplated in paragraph (a); 
(c) improper or unlawful enrichment or receipt of any improper advantage, 
or promise of such enrichment or advantage, by a person as a result of 
an act or omission in connection with the affairs of an institution or 
entity contemplated in paragraph (a);or 
(d) act or omission by a person in the employ of an institution or entity 
contemplated in paragraph (a), which results in unlawful or improper 
prejudice to any other person. 
(6)  Nothing in subsections (4) and (5) shall be construed as empowering the 
Public Protector to investigate the performance of judicial functions by any 
court of law. 
(7)  The Public Protector shall be competent to investigate, on his or her own 
initiative or on receipt of a complaint, any alleged attempt to do anything 
which he or she may investigate under subsections (4) or (5). 
(8)  The Public Protector or any member of his or her staff shall be competent but 
not compellable to answer questions in any proceedings in or before a court 
of law or anybody or institution established by or under any law, in connection 
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with any information relating to the investigation which in the course of his or 
her investigation has come to his or her knowledge., 
(9)  Except where the Public Protector in special circumstances, within his or her 
discretion, so permits, a complaint or matter referred to the Public Protector 
shall not be entertained unless it is reported to the Public Protector within two 
years from the occurrence of the incident or matter concerned” (Public 
Protector Act 1994). 
Section 7 of the Public Protector Act entails matters related to investigations by the 
Public Protector. These are, inter alia:  
“(1)  (a)  The Public Protector shall have the power, on his or her own initiative or 
on receipt of a complaint or an allegation or on the ground of information that 
has come to his or her knowledge and which points to conduct such as 
referred to in section 6(4) or (5) of this Act, to conduct a preliminary 
investigation for the purpose of determining the merits of the complaint, 
allegation or information and the manner in which the matter concerned 
should be dealt with. 
(b)(i) The format and the procedure to be followed in conducting any 
investigation shall be determined by the Public Protector with due 
regard to the circumstances of each case. 
(ii)    The Public Protector may direct that any category of persons or all 
persons whose presence is not desirable, shall not be present at any 
proceedings pertaining to any investigation or part thereof. 
(2) (a) The Public Protector may, at any time prior to or during an investigation 
request any person- 
(i) at any level of government, subject to any law governing the terms and 
conditions of employment of such person; 
(ii) performing a public function, subject to any law governing the terms 
and conditions of the appointment of such person; or  
(iii) otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Protector” (Public 
Protector Act 1994). 
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Section 7(4)(a) of the Public Protector Act states that for the purpose of an 
investigation under the Act, the Public Protector may direct any person to submit an 
affidavit or affirmed declaration, to appear before him or her to give evidence, or to 
produce documents relevant to the investigation, and may examine such a person. 
Section 7(4)(b) also prescribes that the Public Protector may request an explanation 
from any person who may have information relevant to the investigation.  
In addition, section 6 prescribes that “[t]he Public Protector may require any person 
appearing as a witness before him or her under subsection (4) to give evidence on 
oath or after having made an affirmation” (Public Protector Act 1994), and according 
to section (11),  
“The Public Protector may make rules in respect of any matter referred to in 
this section which has a bearing on an investigation or in respect of any 
matter incidental thereto, provided that such rules must be published in the 
Government Gazette and tabled in the National Assembly” (Public Protector 
Act 1994). 
Section 8 of the Act deals with the publication of findings. These include:  
“(1)   The Public Protector may, subject to the provisions of subsection (3), in the 
manner he or she deems fit, make known to any person any finding, point of 
view or recommendation in respect of a matter investigated by him or her. 
(2) (a) The Public Protector shall report in writing on the activities of his or her office 
to the National Assembly at least once every year: Provided that any report 
shall also be tabled in the National Council of Provinces. 
     (b)  The Public Protector shall, at any time, submit a report to the National 
Assembly on the findings of a particular investigation if- 
(i) he or she deems it necessary; 
(ii) he or she deems it in the public interest; 
(iii) it requires the urgent attention of or an intervention by, the National 
Assembly; 
(iv) he or she is requested to do so by the speaker of the National 
Assembly; or 
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(v) he or she is requested to do so by the chairperson of the National 
Council of Provinces. 
(2A) (a)  Any report issued by the Public Protector shall be open to the public, unless 
the Public Protector is of the opinion that exceptional circumstances require 
that the report be kept confidential. 
        (b)  If the Public Protector is of the opinion that exceptional circumstances 
require that a report be kept confidential, the committee must be furnished 
with the reasons therefor and, if the committee concurs, such report shall be 
dealt with as a confidential document in terms of the rules of Parliament. 
       (c)  For the purposes of this section, ‘exceptional circumstances’ shall exist if the 
publication of the report concerned is likely- 
(i) to endanger the security of the citizens of the Republic; 
(ii) to prejudice any other investigation or pending investigation; 
(iii) disturb the public order or undermine the public peace or security of 
the Republic; 
(iv) to be prejudicial to the interests of the Republic; or 
(v) in the opinion of the Public Protector to have a bearing on the 
effective functioning of his or her office. 
(3)   The findings of an investigation by the Public Protector shall, when he or 
she deems it fit but as soon as possible, be made available to the 
complainant and to any person implicated thereby” (Public Protector Act 
1994). 
Section 11 of the Public Protector Act entails offences and penalties in terms of the 
following:  
“(1)   Any person who contravenes the provisions of sections 3(14), 7(2) and 9 of 
this Act, or interferes with the functioning of the Office of the Public Protector 
as contemplated in section 181 (4) of the Constitution, shall be guilty of an 
offence. 
(2)    Any person who fails to disclose an interest contemplated in section 3(14), 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
(3)   Any person who, without just cause, refuses or fails to comply with a direction 
or request under section 7(4) or refuses to answer any question put to him or 
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her under that section or gives to such question an answer which to his or her 
knowledge is false, or refuses to take the oath or to make an affirmation at the 
request of the Public Protector in terms of section 7(6), shall be guilty of an 
offence.  
(4) Any person convicted of an offence in terms of this Act shall be liable to a fine 
not exceeding R40 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 
months or to both such fine and such imprisonment” (Public Protector Act 
1994). 
In terms of Section 14 of the Public Protector Act, the following former pieces of 
legislation are repealed: 
 The Ombudsman Act, No. 118 of 1979;  
 The Advocate-General Amendment Act, No. 55 of 1983; and  
 The Advocate-General Amendment Act, No. 104 of 1991 (Public Protector Act 
1994). 
Inasmuch as the Public Protector investigates complaints from the public, the Public 
Service Commission investigates complaints by aggrieved public servants (Mothupi 
2002:12). The two institutions therefore work in tandem to maximise efficiency and 
effectiveness in pursuit of good governance in the public sector.  
To put things into perspective, and in the light of the foregoing paragraph, Thornhill 
(2011:81) argues that “it is obvious the South African government has, through the 
Constitution and the two pieces of legislation quoted above, established a framework 
to promote transparency and public accountability”.  
4.3  Other statutory, regulatory and policy guidelines 
Public accountability requires that information must be gathered by investigating 
officials and presented to the applicable authority to enhance the quality of 
investigations, as well as to enable decision making. Thornhill (2011:81) states that 
“administrative and executive decisions and actions or inactions are open to public 
scrutiny” to satisfy the principles of transparency and openness on the part of the 
authorities.  
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Following from the abovementioned paragraph, the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act, No. 2 of 2000, was passed “to give effect to the Constitutional right 
of access to any information held by the state or any information that is held by 
another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights” 
(Thornhill 2011:81). On the same note, “although certain exceptions apply, the Act is 
a mechanism to bring information in the public domain and to promote transparent 
administrative and executive decision and actions” (Thornhill 2011:81) Concurrently, 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, No. 3 of 2000, was also passed by 
parliament “to give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair and the right to written reasons for administrative 
actions contemplated in section 36 of the Constitution” (Thornhill 2011:81). 
Other powers are conferred to the Public Protector other than by the Constitution, 
the Public Protector Act, and legislation listed previously. These powers are as 
follows: 
 Power to investigate alleged executive ethical lapse by all members of the 
cabinet in terms of the Executive Members’ Ethics Act of 1998. 
 Power to investigate offences in parts 1 to 4 of sections 17, 20, and 21 of the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004, read with the 
Public Protector Act. 
 Power to receive protected disclosures from whistle-blowers and protecting 
them under the Protected Disclosures Act of 2000. 
 Power to resolve access to information disputes through measures deemed 
appropriate under the Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000. 
 Power to review the decisions of the National Homebuilders Registration 
Council (Madonsela 2013). 
The requirement that public administration must be accountable is not only an 
obligation emphasised by the Constitution. According to the Institute of Directors in 
Southern Africa (IoDSA 2009:5), the “King III report on corporate governance 
published in 2009 simply implies ‘comply or explain’ as required by legislation 
governing corporations in South Africa”. Thornhill (2011:81) concurs that “this 
requirement is not only applicable to the private sector companies, but to organs of 
state defined in section 239 of the Constitution as well”.  
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The issue of good governance is of paramount importance not only to the public 
sector, but the private sector as well. The King III report is just one of the additional 
mechanisms that serves to close any gaps that may not have been foreseen with the 
promulgation of all other pieces of legislation. The King III report therefore provides, 
guidelines to be pursued in the quest to attain good governance across public and 
private sector institutions. Compliance in following policies and legislation bodes well 
for the successful implementation of institutional programmes.   
IoDSA (2016:35) explains that the legal status of the King IV report, as with its 
predecessors, is that of a set of voluntary principles and leading practices to serve 
as policy guidelines. Corporate governance can be applied as a voluntary code of 
principles and practices, or as a combination of the two. Countries globally usually 
have legislated good governance practices, as well as parallel voluntary codes of 
governance. However, if there is a conflict between legislation such as the Public 
Finance Management Act, No. 1 of 1999, and the King IV code, now or in the future, 
the law prevails (IoDSA 2016:35). 
The King IV report is clear on corporate governance within the spheres of 
government, with particular emphasis placed on municipalities, as an equivalent of 
private organisations although not in the absolute sense. According to IoDSA 
(2016:80), municipalities are autonomous but operate within a system of cooperative 
governance in terms of the Constitution. Cooperative governance requires that the 
various spheres of government (national, provincial, and local) cooperate when 
exercising their powers and performing their functions. The governance of provincial 
governments or municipalities should be viewed in the context of cooperative 
governance without detracting from provincial or municipal autonomy. 
IoDSA (2016:80) highlights that the essence of the King IV code, as represented by 
its governance outcomes and principles, applies to all spheres of government with 
the necessary adaptation in contextual terminology. Accordingly, there are 16 
principles (IoDSA 2016:81-86) that pertain to good governance that must be adhered 
to: 
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 Principle 1: Governing bodies should lead ethically and effectively. Ethical 
and effective leadership is exemplified by integrity, competence, 
responsibility, accountability, fairness, and transparency.  
 Principle 2: The governing body should govern the ethics of the institution in 
a way that supports the establishment of an ethical culture.  
 Principle 3: The governing body should ensure that the institution is seen to 
reflect the values of responsible corporate citizens. Corporate citizenship is an 
alternative expression of the objectives of the institutions, for example as set 
out in section 152(1) of the Constitution. 
 Principle 4: The governing body should appreciate that the institution’s core 
purpose, its risks and opportunities, strategy, business model, performance, 
and sustainable development are all inseparable elements of the value-
creation process. 
 Principle 5: The governing body should ensure that reports issued by the 
institution enable stakeholders to make informed assessments of the 
institution’s performance and its short-, medium-, and long-term prospects. 
 Principle 6: The governing body should serve as the focal point and 
custodian of corporate governance in the institution.  
 Principle 7: The governing body should comprise the appropriate balance of 
knowledge, skills, experience, diversity, and independence for it to discharge 
its governance role and responsibilities objectively and effectively. 
 Principle 8: The governing body should ensure that its arrangements for 
delegation within its own structures promote independent judgement, and 
assists with the balance of power and effective discharge of its duties. 
 Principle 9: The governing body should ensure that the evaluation of its own 
performance supports continued improvement in its performance and 
effectiveness. 
 Principle 10: The governing body should ensure that the appointment of, and 
delegation to, management contributes to the role clarity and the effective 
exercise of authority and responsibilities. 
 Principle 11: The governing body should govern risk in a way that supports 
the institution in setting and achieving its strategic objectives. 
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 Principle 12: The governing body should govern technology and information 
in a way that supports the institutional setting and achieving its strategic 
objectives. 
 Principle 13: The governing body should govern compliance with applicable 
laws and adopted non-binding rules, codes, and standards in a way that 
supports the institution being an ethical and a good corporate citizen. 
 Principle 14: The governing body should ensure that the institution 
remunerates fairly, responsibly, and transparently so as to promote the 
achievement of strategic objectives and positive outcomes in the short-, 
medium-, and long-term. 
 Principle 15: The governing body should ensure that assurance services and 
functions enable an effective control environment, and that these support the 
integrity of information for internal decision making and of the institution’s 
external reports. 
 Principle 16: In the execution of its governance role and responsibilities, the 
governing body should adopt a stakeholder-inclusive approach that balances 
the needs, interests, and expectations of material stakeholders in the best 
interests of the institution over time. 
IoDSA (2016:76) outlines that the King IV principles are the embodiment of the 
aspirations in the journey towards good corporate governance and guide what 
organisations should strive to achieve by the application of governance practices. 
Similarly, the King IV principles should be adapted to meet the challenges of sectoral 
contexts, situations, and legislative requirements. The King IV principles are phrased 
so that they hold true across all organisations (IoDSA 2016:76). 
4.4 Multilateral international institutions involved in promoting good 
governance 
Good governance is closely related to a host of interrelated activities, ideologies, and 
principles. This section examines the efforts and initiatives of the UN, multilateral 
agencies, humanitarian funding institutions, and major donors in contributing to the 
good governance agenda. Some of the interventions by these institutions have led to 
significant improvements in governance in some of the poorly governed countries. 
Some interventions in steering countries towards good governance have, however, 
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contributed to the worsening of situations and more challenges than before. In most 
instances, the initiatives’ consequences were unintended because, as Grindle (2007) 
observed, every effort viewed good governance as “a bundle of many good things”.  
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Seery and Arendar (2014:93) state that  
“rich-country governments and donor agencies – including the World Bank 
Group, the United Nations Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the European 
Union – are also pushing for greater private sector involvement in service 
delivery … This can only lead to greater economic inequality”.  
In the following paragraphs, initiatives by these institutions to steer the international 
community to embrace accountable good governance are outlined, some sharing 
common principles.   
4.4.1 United Nations (UN) 
The UN purports to put the interest of the community of nations first and upholds 
good governance only insofar as it promotes equity, participation, pluralism, 
transparency, accountability, and the Rule of Law. According to the UN, these must 
be carried out in a manner that is effective, efficient, and enduring. “In translating 
these principles into practice, the results are the holding of free, fair and efficient 
elections, a representative legislature that make laws and provides oversight, and an 
independent judiciary to interpret those laws” (UNDP 1997). The UNDP (1997) 
highlights the following essential characteristics of good governance: 
 Participation, which allows all men and women to have a voice in decision 
making, either directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that 
represent their interests. 
 Rule of Law, which points out that legal frameworks should be fair and 
enforced impartially, particularly the laws on human rights. 
 Transparency, which is built on the free flow of information. Accordingly, 
processes, institutions, and information should be directly accessible to those 
concerned, sufficient information should be provided to render them 
understandable, and they should be subject to monitoring. 
 Responsiveness, in terms of which institutions and processes should serve all 
stakeholders. 
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 Consensus orientation, which implies that good governance should mediate 
differing interests in order to reach broad consensus on the best interests of 
the group and, where possible, on policies and procedures. 
 Equity, which advocates that all men and women should have equal 
opportunity to maintain or improve their wellbeing. 
 Effectiveness and efficiency, according to which processes and institutions 
should produce results that meet needs while making the best use of 
resources. 
 Accountability, in terms of which decision makers in government, the private 
sector, and civil society organisations should be accountable to the public, as 
well as to institutional stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on 
the organisation and whether the decision is internal or external to an 
organisation. 
 Strategic vision, which points to the fact that leaders and the public should 
have a broad and long-term perspective of good governance and human 
development, together with a sense of what is needed for such development. 
4.4.2 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 
The IIAG assesses the progress of states with regard to promoting good governance 
under four main conceptual categories: Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and 
Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, and Human Development (Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation 2014:3). The category Safety and Rule of Law “measures the 
extent to which all individuals are protected from both the internal and external 
threats to the peace, and the existence of a robust legal system and transparent, 
effective and accessible institutions, within all branches of the state” (Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 2014:10).  
The category Participation and Human Rights is concerned with the relationship 
between government and citizens. “It measures both the extent to which individuals 
can participate in, and take ownership of, the political process and the state’s 
achievement in guaranteeing the political and social rights of all citizens” (Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 2014:14). 
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In line with the foregoing paragraph, the category Sustainable Economic 
Opportunity,  
“assesses whether the state provides the conditions necessary for the 
pursuit of economic opportunities that contribute to a prosperous and 
equitable society. It measures the delivery of sound economic policies 
and the provision of a sustainable economic environment that is 
conducive to investment and the operation of business” (Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 2014:18).  
Lastly, the category Human Development “evaluates the success of states in 
ensuring the wellbeing of all its citizens. It measures the extent to which the 
government provides citizens with social protection, comprehensive education 
provision and a healthy life” (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014:22). 
4.4.3 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)  
According to the OECD (1998), in its work on public governance, it focuses in 
particular on the principal elements of good governance, namely: 
 Accountability, in terms of which the government is able and willing to show 
the extent to which its actions and decisions are consistent with clearly 
defined and agreed-upon objectives. 
 Transparency, according to which government actions, decisions, and 
decision-making processes are open to an appropriate level of scrutiny by 
other parts of government, civil society, and, in some instances, external 
institutions and governments. 
 Efficiency and effectiveness, highlighting that governments strive to produce 
quality public outputs, including services delivered to citizens, at the best cost, 
and ensures that outputs meet the original intentions of policy makers. 
 Responsiveness, which assumes that governments have the capacity and 
flexibility to respond rapidly to societal changes, takes into account the 
expectations of civil society in identifying the general public interest, and civil 
society being willing to critically re-examine the role of government. 
 Forward vision, implying that governments are able to anticipate future 
problems and issues based on current data and trends and develop policies 
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that take into account future costs and anticipated changes such as 
demography, economic, and environmental costs, amongst others. 
 Rule of Law, which concerns governments’ ability to enforce equally 
transparent laws, regulations, and codes. 
4.4.4  European Commission  
The European Commission focuses on “five principles underpinning good 
governance and the changes proposed in its ‘White Paper’. The principles are 
openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence” (European 
Commission 2001:8). “Each principle is important for establishing more democratic 
governance, they underpin democracy and the Rule of Law in member states but 
they apply to all levels of government; global, European, nationally, regional and 
local” (European Commission 2001:10). 
4.4.5  International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
The IMF (1997) describes its activities as follows: 
“The IMF is primarily concerned with macroeconomic stability, external 
viability, and orderly economic growth in member countries. The contribution 
that the IMF can make to good governance; including the avoidance of corrupt 
practices; through its policy advice and, where relevant, technical assistance, 
arises principally in two spheres: 
 Improving the management of public resources through reforms covering 
public sector institutions, including administrative procedures; and 
 Supporting the development and maintenance of a transparent and stable 
economic and regulatory environment conducive to efficient private sector 
activities”. 
The IMF focuses on those aspects of good governance relating to “transparency of 
government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource management and the 
stability and transparency of economic and regulatory environment for private sector 
activity” (IMF 1997). 
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4.4.6 African Development Bank (AfDB) 
The AfDB (2008) policy document identifies the key elements of good governance as 
accountability, transparency, participation, combating corruption, and the promotion 
of an enabling legal and judicial framework. 
4.4.7 World Bank  
The World Bank pays attention to issues of transparency and accountability, and has 
developed an understanding to the effect that these are the two main aspects that 
enable a government to deliver services to its people efficiently. These two aspects 
are what help “governments to function effectively and achieve economic progress” 
(World Bank 2006).  
4.4.8 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
The ADB (1995) states that,  
“[a]lthough policy aspects are important for development, the Bank’s 
concept of good governance focuses essentially on ingredients for 
effective management. In other words, irrespective of the set of 
economic policies that find favour with government, good governance 
is required to ensure that those policies have their desired effect”.  
The concern is “norms of behaviour that help ensure that governments actually 
deliver to their citizens what they say they will deliver” (ADB 1995). The ADB (1995) 
identified four basic elements of good governance, namely accountability, 
participation, predictability, and transparency, and draws a distinction between 
elements of good governance and specific areas of action such as public sector 
management. 
4.4.9 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
The founding documents of the EBRD highlight several issues commonly associated 
with good governance, such as multiparty democracy, the Rule of Law, respect for 
human rights, and market economics, but the EBRD does not use the term “good 
governance” (EBRD 2010). 
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4.4.10 Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
The IADB (2010) does not use the term “good governance” specifically but highlights 
several issues commonly associated with good governance, such as accountability, 
transparency, democracy, and institutional development.   
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The IADB (2010) also, 
“approved additional measures to include social policy for equity and 
productivity; infrastructure for competitiveness and social welfare; 
institutions for growth and social welfare; competitive regional and 
global international integration; as well as protecting the environment, 
responding to climate change, promoting renewable energy, and 
ensuring food security”.  
4.5 Summary 
While the government or the executive functions as the public administration 
machinery behind the provision of public goods and services, the legislature or 
parliament, together with the Chapter 9 institutions, specifically the Public Protector 
and the Auditor-General, plays a role in promoting transparency and public 
accountability. The other arm of the state, the judiciary or courts, has jurisdiction over 
all legal matters, as well as the interpretation of laws. As a result and a condition, the 
Public Protector has no authority to review the decisions of the courts. 
As noted previously, the South African society is structured in a manner that reflects 
specific statutory and institutional arrangements that perform defined functions. The 
Public Protector assumes a defined role within a statutory and institutional structural 
context that operates within the broader government system. Pavone (2014:1) 
maintains that “in general, structural functionalists posit that if structures and 
institutions are to survive, they must promote social solidarity, or once solidarity is 
achieved, system stability”. The way the South African state is structured and the 
wishes of the framers of the Constitution, with all its institutional frameworks, reflect 
the aspirations of establishing a sound democracy. Kingsburn and Scanzoni 
(1993:196) explain that “the essence of functionalism is actors’ conformity to a set of 
pre-existing standards that promotes the greater good of the larger whole to which 
actors belong”. As such, locating the Public Protector within the broader statutory 
framework of society and the state, it is imperative to acknowledge the important role 
this functionary plays in promoting good governance.  
Pienaar (2000:62) concludes that “consistent with the separation of powers, the 
Public Protector is pertinently barred from investigating the decision of any court of 
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law”. As a matter of principle and in line with the public accountability imperative, the 
“Public Protector should be sensitive to the fact that reports are written not only for 
the benefit of legislators, but also serve the interests of the public and public 
institutions” (Brynard 1999:9).  
This chapter reviewed the regulatory frameworks that serve to promote and enhance 
good governance in South Africa. The Constitution, with its broad outline of the 
mandate of the Chapter 9 institutions, which includes the Office of the Public 
Protector, was discussed first. This was followed by the Public Protector Act, 23 of 
1994, as amended by the Public Protector Act, 113 of 1998, which provided 
comprehensive details on the mandate of the Public Protector with respect to the 
role of strengthening constitutional democracy in South Africa. The other supporting 
acts are the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2 of 2000, and the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 3 of 2000.  
In terms of other regulatory and policy guidelines, the chapter also highlighted the 
pronouncements of the King Code of Governance for South Africa (III and IV), with 
specific reference to the guidelines that public and private sector institutions are 
expected to observe in enhancing and promoting good governance in their 
respective contexts.  
The chapter also addressed other multilateral international organisations that 
promote democratic good governance, therefore indirectly influencing democratic 
accountability in South Africa. Brown (2013) contends that “functionalism examines 
structures that make up a society and how each part of the structure helps to keep 
the society stable”. Structural functionalism is “a system of thinking based on the 
ideas of Emile Durkheim, [which] looks at society from a large-scale perspective, and 
as such emphasises the structures that create a society and how the society is able 
to remain stable” (Brown 2013). Hence, Warner (2015) argues that “the people and 
the government in a democracy have reinforcing roles”. To supplement this 
argument, it warrants some consideration to point out that the Office of the Public 
Protector exists to consolidate the oversight function performed by parliament. It is 
for this reason that Brown (2013) asserts that “in the theory of functionalism, society 
is made up of a bunch of interconnected structures or institutions that meet the 
needs of society”.    
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This chapter paid attention to country- and international-level initiatives that affect 
good governance, as well as the major donors and international humanitarian 
funding institutions. In this regard, attention was paid to the following multilateral 
international institutions involved in promoting good governance: the UN, the Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation, the OECD, the European Commission, the IMF, the AfDB, the 
World Bank, the ADB, the EBRD, and the IADB. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONTEXTUALISING THE SCOPE, ROLE, FUNCTIONS, AND REMEDIAL 
POWER OF SOUTH AFRICA’S PUBLIC PROTECTOR TO PROMOTE GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to address the following objectives as outlined in Section 
1.6 in Chapter One:  
 To determine and contextualise the scope, role, and functions of the Public 
Protector in promoting good governance;  
 To contextualise the mandate of the Public Protector as an independent 
institution that operates in a democratic state system by way of case 
examples; 
 To determine whether the recommendations made by the Public Protector 
have remedial power in terms of their enforcement; and   
 To determine the variables that influence and the credibility of the Office of the 
Public Protector. 
This chapter outlines how the Public Protector executes the mandate of his or her 
office. While the Constitution provides broad guidelines on the powers and functions 
of the Public Protector, other national legislation also provides prescriptions 
regulating these powers, functions, and roles (see Chapter Four). 
The Public Protector exercises his or her mandate as part of the government system 
geared towards supporting and enhancing democratically accountable good 
governance desirable for South Africa’s stability. It is for this reason that the Public 
Protector Act of 1994 empowers the Public Protector with a specific mandate without 
encroaching the domain of other state functionaries. The Public Protector Act also 
spells out the jurisdiction within which the Public Protector must exercise the 
mandate of his or her office. 
This chapter discusses the evolution of the Office of the Public Protector in South 
Africa, the role and activities of the Public Protector, the powers of the Public 
Protector, as well as the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the Public Protector.   
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The chapter also provides selected reports of the Public Protector to be 
contextualised as cases in order to determine how the mandate of the Public 
Protector is complied with in a democratic system of cooperative governance. In this 
regard, the case of the Minister of Transport in 2007, the case of the Deputy Minister 
of Home Affairs in 2009, the case of the Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation in 2016, and the case of the Minister of Basic Education in 2013, are 
presented to highlight examples of oversight in terms of the national sphere of 
government. 
This chapter also highlights investigation reports that implicate members of the 
Provincial Executive Councils (PECs) in the provincial sphere of government. In this 
regard, the case of the Premier of the Free State in 2006 and the case of the 
Premier of Gauteng in 2010 are discussed. Regarding the local sphere of 
government, the chapter highlights the investigation reports that implicate members 
of municipal councils; for example the case of the Kungwini Local Municipality in 
2006 and the case of the Municipal Council of the City of Matlosana in 2007. 
Cooperative governance goes beyond the three spheres of government, hence the 
chapter highlights investigation reports involving public officials and public entities. 
These include the case of the South African Board of Sheriffs (SABS) in 2009, the 
case of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) in 2007, 
and the case of the Gauteng Department of Education in 2011. 
The chapter also analyses the remedial power of the Office of the Public Protector in 
terms of recommendations made with regard to improper practices and the abuse of 
power of selected cases in general and the controversial case of the State of 
Capture report in particular. The State of Capture report created a dilemma in terms 
of, inter alia, the alleged state abuse by the acting president at that stage that raised 
questions in terms of the remedial actions the Public Protector can take to expose 
corruption and state abuse. Questions in terms of the validity of the recommended 
judicial inquiry and nature and scope of the power to appoint a commission of inquiry 
to investigate state abuse came to the fore as an outcome of this report.  
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5.2  Evolution of the Office of the Public Protector 
As noted in Chapter Three, the concept of the Public Protector has its roots in the 
concept of an Ombudsman in other countries. Mothupi (2002:4) explains that “in its 
modern form, the concept of an Ombudsman has its roots in Sweden, where in 1713 
King Charles XII appointed an Ombudsman called the Chancellor of Justice” (see 
Section 3.2 in Chapter Three). This act by the monarch was a milestone in paving 
the way for entrenching an independent accountability institution. “The Chancellor’s 
function was to ensure that the laws of the land were being upheld and the king’s 
officials, public servants and other government officials exercised their duties and 
responsibilities in a proper and efficient manner” (Mothupi 2002:4). It follows that 
accountability measures were in the process of being formally adopted outside of the 
traditional repositories of power. 
As noted previously, subsequent to the monarch’s decree, “the adoption of a 
democratic constitution by the Swedish people in 1803 brought about the new Office 
of the Ombudsman for Justice” (Mothupi 2002:4).  
Brynard (1999:8) contends that “wherever the Ombudsman system is employed, it is 
adapted to the unique circumstances of the country concerned”. Rudolph (1983:95-
96) posits that “the features of the Ombudsman are a product of the country in which 
the Ombudsman is appointed and in which he or she operate, but all Ombudsmen 
share a common objective of serving the public and its administration”.   
Brynard (1999:8) explains that,  
“in South Africa the Office of the then Advocate-General was 
established on the 18th of July 1979 following the Department of 
Information debacle involving the misappropriation of public funds, as 
well as the commitment, made by the then prime minister on assuming 
office on 28 September 1978, to maintaining honest public 
administration and orderly government”.  
Similarly, Belt (2000:4) explains that “the Nationalist government appointed an 
independent high-ranking official, the Advocate-General, to be the watchdog over 
and to deal with misappropriation of public funds in terms of the Advocate-General 
Act 118 of 1979”.  
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According to Mothupi (2002:5), the “Advocate-General’s Office functioned as an 
Ombudsman Office, but shortly after its inception it became clear that there was a 
need for a proper Ombudsman institution in South Africa”. This resulted from the 
realisation that the Advocate-General had no powers to act on own initiative even 
when suspicion prevailed. Brynard (1986:1) postulates that aspirations of the 
Advocate-General Office’s “initiative was criticised as being the result of a need of 
the government to have an institution to investigate matters of a similar nature in the 
future and not necessarily the result of a need of the public”. 
Additionally, Brynard (1999:8) argues that “it was evident that the position of 
Advocate-General was established in the absence of a thorough prior study of, and 
investigation into the needs of the citizens as regards such an institution”. Mothupi 
(2002:5) explains that parliament attempted in 1991 to convert the Advocate-General 
Office to the Office of an Ombudsman, based on the Advocate-General Amendment 
Act, No. 104 of 1991. This was not, however, a constitutional institution and as a 
result of the government not representing the majority of the people in South Africa, 
its credibility was somewhat suspect. Brynard (1999:8), however, contends that the 
creation of a fully fledged Ombudsman in 1991 served to rectify the less-recognised 
Advocate-General. “This office was a true classical Ombudsman, in the international 
sense, with authority to investigate any of maladministration; appointed and 
functioned in terms of the Ombudsman Act 118 of 1979 as amended” (Brynard 
1999:8). This state of affairs was to continue until,  
“the dawn of yet another constitutional dispensation in South Africa on 
27 April 1994, which was the day of both the first fully democratic 
elections in South Africa and the birth of the so-called Interim 
Constitution, with provision made for a Public Protector to replace the 
Ombudsman” (Brynard 1999:9).  
Mothupi (2002:6) maintains that it was in fact “the Multi-Party Negotiating Team, 
prior to the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994 that conceded the need 
to continue with the Office of the Ombudsman”. Disagreements ensued in the 
negotiating chamber, with gender activists participating in the negotiations finding the 
term “Ombudsman” unacceptable because it was perceived in the contemporary 
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political social context to be sexist, nor did the term “Ombud” find favour (Devenish 
1998:6).  
Mothupi (2002:6) states that “the Negotiating Council agreed that although 
‘Ombudsman’ is a gender-neutral loan word from Sweden, the South African 
Ombudsman should be given a more descriptive name, and that is how the 
appellation Public Protector came into being”.  
Brynard (1999:9) states that,  
“the Office of the Public Protector was established under Chapter 8 of 
the then Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
The operational requirements of the office were provided for under the 
Public Protector Act, 23 of 1994, with the first incumbent only assuming 
office on the 1st October 1995”.  
Mothupi (2002:7) maintains that,  
“to prove to and assure the international community that true 
democracy has been attained, South Africans, during the Multi-Party 
negotiations, created measures to curb any loopholes that could be 
used to compromise the democratic principles and values, thus the 
Constitution paved way for the establishment of Chapter 9 institutions, 
including the Public Protector”.  
Pienaar (2000:57) asserts that “institutions which support constitutional democracy in 
South Africa can function individually or in tandem with one another”.  
Chapter 9 institutions were envisioned to contribute towards “ensuring an effective, 
accountable, responsive and open democratic government” (Mothupi 2002:7). 
Brynard (1999:9) points out that “the final Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 108 of 1996, which came into operation in February 1997, also made 
provision for the continued existence of the Public Protector”. Pienaar (2000:5) 
states that, as noted previously, “the Public Protector’s Office, in the wording of 
section 181(1) of the Constitution, is intended to strengthen constitutional 
democracy”. Pienaar (2000:53) also posits that “it is not only in the interest of the 
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individual that government power must be controlled, but also in the interest of the 
government itself”. Caiden, MacDermont and Sandler (1993:5) confirm that,  
“the existence of an independent Ombudsman office denotes a clear 
indication by the rulers that they recognise obligations and duties to the 
ruled, that the ruled should be treated justly, promptly and courteously, 
that they should be granted their due according to the law, and that 
public business should be conducted honestly and efficaciously”. 
The Office of the Public Protector is equally beneficial to the governors and the 
governed alike. In providing insight into the scope of government, Mothupi (2002:2) 
explains that,  
“public administration refers to the machinery of the executive 
government as a whole, while the executive refers to the state 
president and his or her cabinet whose functions include developing 
and implementing national policy and co-ordinating the functions of the 
state departments and administration”.  
Mothupi (2002:2) confirms that “a need exists for the establishment of bodies or 
institutions to oversee public administration and to protect individuals against 
government abuse of power and maladministration” (Mothupi 2002:2).    
Pienaar (2000:54), however, cautions that “it is a misconception to assume that the 
Public Protector exists solely in order to protect citizens and members of the public 
from the misuse of power by the state and government of the day”. Pienaar 
(2000:54) also asserts that “such an oversimplification suggests that the state is the 
only institution that possesses power, or capacity to misuse it, and also that the 
office exhibits a structural bias against the state and its employees”.  
Mothupi (2002:2) confirms that,  
“in order to strengthen and provide meaningful support for the system 
of constitutional democracy and open government, Chapter 9 of the 
1996 Constitution created institutions such as the Commission for 
Gender Equality, Auditor-General, Human Rights Commission, Public 
Protector, Electoral Commission and the Commission for the 
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Promotion of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic 
Communities”.  
According to Pienaar (2000:53),  
“the issue in question is the legitimacy of the government and the 
willingness of the citizen to accept both the powers vested in 
government and the way these are used. Legitimacy, the intangible 
and amorphous commodity known as working capital, is fundamental 
to every democratic government”.  
As a result, Pienaar (2000:53) maintains that “the relevance of the Public Protector in 
this context is to boost public confidence in that he or she is not only a watchdog, but 
also an official whom they can easily relate to”.  
Mothupi (2002:3) confirms that “the Office of the Public Protector is one of the 
institutions designated in the supreme law of the land, the Constitution, to underpin 
democracy”. In the same manner, Mothupi (2002:50) propounds that,  
“the effectiveness of the Office of the Public Protector in public 
administration can only be a success if the Office is sufficiently 
resourced and supported both materially and morally, also due to the 
constitutional obligation on other organs of state to protect the Office”.  
5.3 Contextualising the role and activities of the Public Protector  
As noted previously, the Public Protector Act of 1994 clearly specifies what the 
Public Protector’s roles, powers, and functions are in a more detailed manner than is 
provided for in the Constitution. Although the Public Protector Act does not provide 
clear delineation between roles, powers, and functions, this study will attempt to 
separate these roles, powers, and functions. This study views powers as the formal 
authority conferred on the incumbent Public Protector in terms of legislation. Roles 
are responsibilities that appeal to the Public Protector’s conscience when executing 
the mandate of his or her office. Functions, on the other hand, refer to the actual 
duties that must be carried out by the incumbent Public Protector; the failure of which 
charges of dereliction of duty may be imposed.  
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According to Katz (2017),  
“The president appoints the Public Protector for a non-renewable 
period of seven years. The Public Protector may be removed from 
office by the president only on grounds of misconduct, incapacity or 
incompetence after two-thirds of the National Assembly adopt a 
resolution calling for the person’s removal”. 
The Public Protector has an executive office that administers three major 
programmes: Investigations and Outreach, Executive Management, and Corporate 
Support Services. The Office of the Public Protector currently manages 
approximately 40 000 cases, with a staff of 314. During the 2013/2014 budget, the 
Office of the Public Protector was allocated R199.3 million, with an increase for the 
2014/2015 financial year. During the budget of 2015, the Office of the Public 
Protector was allocated an additional increase of R60 million instead of the R200 
million initially requested by the Justice Portfolio Committee. As a result, the Office of 
the Public Protector was required to make drastic cutbacks (Wikipedia n.d.). 
The 2015/2016 annual report indicates that the Office of the Public Protector 
received 17 374 cases, finalised 12 735, and carried over 4 251 to the next year. The 
remainder of the cases were either referred to other institutions, or dismissed. In the 
previous year, the Office of the Public Protector finalised 20 231 cases out of a total 
caseload of 26 070, while 2 740 complaints were referred to other competent bodies 
such as the Public Service Commission (Public Protector South Africa 2016a). 
The Public Protector must be a South African citizen, who is a fit and proper person 
to hold such an office. In particular, he or she must be a judge of the High Court, or 
an admitted advocate or attorney who has practised law or lectured in law for an 
accumulative period of 10 years, or had been a member of parliament, or possesses 
specialised knowledge of or experience in the administration of justice, public 
administration, or public finance. He or she shall not perform remunerative work 
outside official duties (Katz 2017). 
The Office of the Public Protector is open to all people in South Africa, irrespective of 
whether they are citizens or not. The point for consideration is that the person must 
have suffered an injustice or must have been treated poorly by any official in the 
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employment of a state institution. There must also be reasonable grounds to suggest 
that corruption or maladministration exists in any particular institution of state. Any 
party may lodge a complaint at the Office of the Public Protector, where they will be 
assisted by staff to formalise the complaint before resuming with the process of 
investigating. The Public Protector investigates maladministration and corruption in 
all institutions in all spheres of government (Katz 2017).  
The Public Protector may, however, undertake his or her own initiative in dealing 
with any perceived maladministration or corruption where there is reason to believe 
that such exists. At the start of an investigation, the Public Protector is empowered to 
summon any party who is deemed fit to provide information to enhance the 
investigation. The identity of the persons summoned is not made public for fear that 
people will not cooperate. The evidence gathered is treated in the most confidential 
manner possible to ensure that the investigation is not jeopardised. Upon conclusion 
of the investigations, the Public Protector must report the findings to parliament and 
thereafter devise the necessary remedial action to bring about the desired results. 
The following section reviews the reports of the Public Protector over several years 
and provides an indication of this functionary’s scope of performance.  
5.3.1  The powers of the Public Protector 
The powers of the Public Protector are strong and wide ranging as far as public 
administration is concerned, and extend to the affairs of any institution or entity in 
which the state is the majority or controlling shareholder. There is no power at all in 
relation to private, as opposed to public, entities (Katz 2017). 
The Public Protector Act of 1994, as amended by the Public Protector Amendment 
Act of 1998, as well as the Public Protector Amendment Act of 2003, empowers the 
Public Protector (as previously noted)  
“to investigate, on his or her own initiative or on receipt of a complaint, 
any alleged (i) maladministration in connection with the affairs of 
government at any level; (ii) abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or 
unfair, capricious, discourteous or other improper or dishonest act, or 
omission or offences contained in the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act, 2004, with respect to public money; (iv) improper 
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or unlawful enrichment, receipt of any improper advantage, or promise 
of such enrichment or advantage, by a person as a result of an act or 
omission in the public administration or in connection with the affairs of 
government at any level or of a person performing a public function; or 
(v) act or omission by a person in the employ of government at any 
level, or a person performing a public function, which results in unlawful 
or improper prejudice to any other person” (Katz 2017). 
The Public Protector Act of 1994 also empowers the Public Protector, as previously 
noted, to act as one of the institutions where protected disclosure may be made. 
Mothupi (2002:30) states that a public disclosure is any disclosure made to the 
Public Protector in good faith in respect of which the person concerned believes that 
the relevant improper conduct falls within any description of matters that in the 
ordinary course are dealt with by the Public Protector and the information disclosed 
and any allegation contained in it, are substantially true. Thornhill (2011:82) 
highlights that the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, No. 12 of 
2004, confers on the Public Protector the power to investigate any improper or 
dishonest act or omission that may relate to an infringement of this Act. 
According to Pienaar (2002:57), in a more obscured, less apparent sense, the Public 
Protector, as presently constituted, is a far-reaching constitutional institution that is 
also tasked with promoting and protecting basic rights. Brynard (1999:13) states that 
it is clear that, within the broad boundaries of his or her jurisdiction, the Public 
Protector has considerable discretion to determine the boundaries of his or her 
authority. To this end, Pienaar (2002:56) highlights that the Public Protector has 
powers of subpoena, search and seizure, and of taking evidence under oath. In the 
same way, the Public Protector may direct that certain persons, whose presence is 
not desirable at a particular investigation, may not be present at proceedings of that 
investigation, as stipulated in section 7(1) of the Public Protector Act (Brynard 
1999:14). 
Pienaar (2002:55) states that the Public Protector has greater freedom of movement 
and action, and is afforded simple and quick access to confidential documentation 
held by the state and individuals, and thus has power to refuse to disclose 
information to any person. Correspondingly, for reasons of maintaining the credibility 
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of his or her office, the Public Protector has the responsibility to keep information 
submitted, as well as the identity of complainants or informants, confidential (Brynard 
1999:14). Pienaar (2002:57) contends that through investigation, mediation, 
conciliation, and negotiation, the Public Protector is empowered to bring about the 
revocation of an official decision or even a change in policy. 
Brynard (1999:14) confirms that the Public Protector may request that any person at 
any level of government, who is performing a public function, or who is otherwise 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Protector, to assist in an investigation. As 
noted in Chapter Four, the Public Protector Act in section 7(4)(a) states that for the 
purpose of an investigation, the Public Protector may direct any person to submit an 
affidavit or affirmed declaration, to appear before him or her to give evidence, or to 
produce documents relevant to the investigation, and may examine such person. It 
was also noted that, according to section 7(4)(b) of the Public Protector Act, the 
Public Protector may request an explanation from any person who may have 
information relevant to an investigation.  
Pienaar (2002:56) confirms that the Public Protector is empowered to initiate 
investigations without awaiting receipt of a complaint. In contrast, Brynard (1999:17) 
states that the Public Protector may, at his or her discretion, refuse to conduct an 
investigation when the person is ostensibly prejudiced in the matter by an act or 
omission of a public servant or official and has not taken all reasonable steps to 
exhaust the legal remedies available. Similarly, section 6(3)(a) of the Public 
Protector Act prescribes that the Public Protector may, at his or her discretion, refuse 
to conduct an investigation when the person ostensibly prejudiced in the matter is a 
public servant or official and has not taken all reasonable steps to exhaust the 
remedies available in terms of the Public Service Act. 
5.3.2  Roles and responsibilities of the Public Protector   
Inasmuch as the Office of the Public Protector is a creation of the Constitution, there 
are certain roles that the Public Protector must undertake with respect to the appeal 
on the incumbent’s conscience. In situations where the Public Protector acts with 
partiality, the integrity of the Office of the Public Protector becomes compromised. 
What the framers of South Africa’s Constitution had in mind was the safeguarding of 
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the integrity of this country and its citizens. The Public Protector has a somewhat 
dual role of protecting the public, as well as protecting officials from unwarranted and 
unfair accusations. Brynard (1999:11) asserts that despite the unfortunate 
designation of “Public Protector”, the the Office of the Public Protector should not 
only be seen as a “watchdog for the public” but as an independent and impartial 
upholder of the highest standards of efficient, effective, just, and fair public 
administration. 
Hence, Brynard (1999:18) contends that the Public Protector not only protects 
members of the public, but also endeavours to protect public officials from 
unfounded criticism and false accusations. However, unfortunately, many 
commentators and writers have stressed only one side of the equation, namely the 
protection of the public. Pienaar (2002:56) concurs that the Public Protector acts as 
a “public watchdog”, but can also protect public officials from unfair criticism by a co-
worker or citizen. The mission of the Public Protector is therefore to help make 
government more efficient, ethical, fair, and responsive (Pienaar 2002:56). This is 
the real essence of advocating for good governance that the Public Protector is 
charged with. 
The Public Protector is seen as a beacon of hope where the quest for attaining good 
governance is an ideal most sought after. Brynard (1999:19) highlights that the fact 
that the Public Protector is the focal point for administrative complaints presents him 
or her with a unique opportunity to identify patterns of administrative inconsistency or 
persistent problem areas that indicate whether the cause of the problem is systemic. 
Furthermore, Brynard (1995:514) states that the Public Protector is an advocate for 
neither the complainant nor the public authority concerned but instead he or she 
must ascertain the facts of the case and reach an impartial and independent 
conclusion based on the merits of the case. 
For reasons of maintaining the credibility of the office, the Public Protector has the 
responsibility of keeping information submitted, as well as the identity of 
complainants or informants, confidential (Brynard 1999:14). As noted in Chapter 
Four, the Public Protector Act in section 8(1) gives the Public Protector the mandate 
to make any findings, point of view, or recommendation in respect of a matter 
investigated by him or her known to any person. Brynard (1999:11) postulates that,  
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“one of the most basic principles underlying the impartiality and 
independence of the Office of the Public Protector is equal protection of 
both the citizen and the public officials. This is important because if the 
Public Protector wants to retain the values of easy accessibility, 
promptness of response, independence, impartiality and integrity, it 
should at least attempt to enjoy the trust of both officials and the 
public”.  
Additionally,  
“to highlight the importance of this office as the instance of last resort 
for complaints of improper prejudice by the authorities, the Public 
Protector has appealed to public institutions to assign a high-ranking 
official in every institution to deal with complaints. Such a ‘complaints 
commissioner’ would then act as a screening mechanism by solving 
most of the complaints and only referring to the Public Protector those 
he or she has been unable to solve” (Public Protector South Africa 
1997:4). 
Thornhill (2011:81) argues that accountability is located within the hierarchy of public 
administration, and as such the requirement for public accountability places the 
Public Protector in a position of the custodian of public aspirations and hopes, hence 
public administration must be accountable. However, Brynard (1999:15) argues that 
when the Public Protector decides that a particular investigation should proceed on a 
formal or quasi-judicial basis, special care is taken to ensure that the basic rights of 
those being investigated are respected. At the same time, where fraud is found to be 
rife in a certain department, the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators will be 
dealt with by prosecuting authorities, after referral by the Public Protector (Pienaar 
2002:61). 
Pienaar (2002:56-57) posits that given the underlying principles of accountability, 
openness, freedom, and equality enshrined in the Constitution, it is clear that the 
Public Protector must: 
 Ensure that public sector institutions, in their functions, do not abuse their 
powers; 
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 Guarantee that public servants observe and uphold constitutional principles 
and directives; and 
 Build and sustain, in the public sector, a sense and culture of service, 
responsibility, discipline, and honesty. 
The Public Protector also looks beyond individual errors and the mere settlement of 
a complaint, with a view to seeking changes in procedures, practices, and 
regulations that repeatedly generate errors and injustice. As a result, this allows the 
Public Protector to adopt a systemic approach to defective administration (Public 
Protector South Africa 1997:2). It is for this reason that Brynard (1999:20) believes 
that the mere existence of the Office of the Public Protector may have an indirect 
influence on the administrative performance by exerting psychological fear on 
officials to prevent administrative malfeasance. 
Pienaar (2002:58) states that although the Public Protector exists to uphold the Rule 
of Law and to strengthen constitutional democracy, he or she is at liberty to be 
guided principally by considerations of fairness and natural justice, rather than being 
bound by the strict, narrow letter of the law. The Public Protector also operates as a 
“clearing house” by referring appropriate cases to other institutions that support 
constitutional democracy, and even other legal assistance bodies in the public and 
private sectors and civil society. As noted in Chapter Four, the Public Protector Act in 
section 6(4)(b) prescribes that to endeavour, in his or her sole discretion, to resolve 
any dispute or rectify any act or omission, the Public Protector may act by way of 
mediation, conciliation, or negotiation; advise, where necessary, any complainant 
regarding appropriate remedies; or employ other means that may be expedient in the 
circumstances. 
Brynard (1999:9) contends that the Public Protector has the responsibility to 
publicise the activities of this institution, and more importantly, the existence of the 
office, hence an awareness of the existence of the Public Protector is a functional 
imperative for possible users of the services offered by the institution. Mothupi 
(2002:24) states that the Public Protector is obliged to submit a report on alleged 
breaches of the code to the president or premier depending on the circumstances or 
sphere of government of the particular case. Because of the characteristic 
responsibility of an Ombudsman with regard to an ill-defined area of ethics, the 
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institution is also able to operate as an early warning system, with the responsibility 
to monitor, inter alia, aberrations from the standards of ethical conduct that fall short 
of the narrow definition (Pienaar 2002:60). Lastly, an important element of the public 
Protector’s task of protecting the public interest is to play a role in sensitising the 
public by pointing out or confirming to the public at large what is or is not corrupt or 
unacceptable conduct (Pienaar 2002:61). 
5.3.3 Functions of the Public Protector  
The Public Protector, like any other state official, has functions which he or she is 
obliged to carry out, as prescribed by legislation. Public Protector South Africa 
(1997:2) highlights that it would be wrong to view the Public Protector as being 
concerned only with the remedy of individual complaints. Another important function 
is to encourage the improvement of administrative performance in public institutions. 
According to Pienaar (2002:50), the Public Protector can launch on his or her own 
initiative investigations without having received any complaint, as determined by 
Public Protector Act. In the same vein, the Public Protector has a duty to receive 
complaints made by any person by means of a written or oral declaration, under oath 
or after having made an affirmation or by any other means as the Public Protector 
may allow, with a view to making the office accessible to all persons (Public 
Protector Act 1994). 
Brynard (1999:12) confirms that even in cases where the Public Protector does not 
have jurisdiction, the Public Protector’s policy is to assist the complainant by advising 
him or her on the correct procedure to be followed and places to contact. Similarly, 
Pienaar (2002:60) reveals that, in many instances, what may be investigated by the 
Public Protector under the powers referred to in terms of section 182(1)(a) of the 
Public Protector Act of 1994 would amount to the criminal offence of corruption. 
Additionally, Pienaar (2002:60) asserts that under circumstances where evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing is clear, the Public Protector has discretion to refer the matter to 
the authorities that bear the responsibility of criminal prosecution. Similarly, 
Madonsela (2013) contends that corruption is a matter of collusion between private 
persons and state actors. 
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In terms of corruption, the Public Protector has a wide mandate to investigate corrupt 
conduct or irregularities in the broad sense of any conduct that reflects diversion 
from ideal norms and standards (Pienaar 2002:58). With regard to public money and 
improper or dishonest acts, the actions of an official who accepts a bribe, steals, or 
defrauds for self-enrichment would always amount to criminal conduct, and the crime 
of corruption in some jurisdictions (Pienaar 2002:60). 
Mothupi (2002:24) propounds that the Public Protector is obliged to investigate any 
alleged breach of the Code of Ethics in terms of the Executive Members’ Ethics Act, 
No. 82 of 1998, on receipt of a complaint. The Public Protector can also investigate 
matters that fall into the frequently grey and ill-defined area of ethics, where a law 
may not have been transgressed but where the community’s sense of right and 
wrong is offended (Pienaar 2002:60). The Public Protector Act prescribes that the 
Public Protector must mediate and persuade in order to ameliorate the often 
unforeseen consequences of laws of general application, and does not only 
recommend corrective action in cases of clear breaches of the law. As noted 
previously, the Public Protector can investigate, on his or her own initiative or on 
receipt of a complaint, any alleged: 
 Maladministration in connection with the affairs of government at any level; 
 Abuse or unjustifiable exercise of power or unfair, capricious, discourteous, or 
other improper conduct or undue delay by a person performing a public 
function; 
 Improper or dishonest act, omission, or corruption with respect to public 
money; 
 Improper or unlawful enrichment, or receipt of any improper advantage, by a 
person as a result of an act or omission in the public administration in 
connection with the affairs of government at any level or of a person 
performing a public function; and/or 
 Action or omission by a person in the employ of government at any level, or a 
person performing a public function, which results in unlawful or improper 
prejudice to any other person (section 6(40)(9a) of the Public Protector Act 
1994). 
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Pienaar (2002:61) confirms that an investigation to identify and remedy the systemic 
or environmental causes of fraud lies with the Public Protector if the causes fall 
within public administration. It is indeed the Public Protector’s business to identify 
instances of systemic maladministration and to rectify the situation.  
In terms of the operations of the government system, the Public Protector has a duty 
to report his or her findings to parliament. Brynard (1999:9) asserts that the Public 
Protector shall, on a half-yearly basis, submit reports to parliament on his or her 
findings in respect of investigations of a serious nature, which were conducted during 
the half-year concerned as per section 8(2) of the Public Protector Act. This is the 
inherent nature of horizontal accountability that serves to ensure that no institution 
becomes the law onto itself and that the public is served.  
The Public Protector Act was amended in 1998. Brynard (1999:10) highlights that the 
Public Protector Amendment Act, No. 113 of 1998, provides for a report to the 
National Assembly to be submitted at least once every year, and the report must 
also be tabled in the National Council of Provinces of the respective province under 
investigation. In addition, as noted in Chapter Four, provision is also made in the 
1994 Act for the Public Protector to submit a special report to parliament on the 
findings of a particular investigation if deemed necessary, as prescribed by section 
8(2)(a). The report submitted to the National Assembly is a clear indication that the 
Public Protector is accountable to some higher authority. 
As a matter of principle and in line with the public accountability imperative, the 
“Public Protector should be sensitive to the fact that reports are written not only for 
the benefit of legislators, but also serve the interests of the public and public 
institutions” (Brynard 1999:9). Correspondingly, as noted in Chapter Four, Thornhill 
(2011:82) explains that “section 182(5) of the Constitution also contains an important 
condition, tantamount to democratic governance, that is, that the Report of the Public 
Protector must be open to the public unless exceptional circumstances require the 
Report to be kept secret”. This is in line with the reason previously stated that the 
judiciary is also a mechanism to exercise oversight over the executive through 
judicial reviews. 
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5.4  Reports of the Public Protector that implicate members of cabinet 
South Africa has had four Public Protectors since 1995. Each one served for a 
seven-year term of office. The first Public Protector, Advocate Selby Baqwa 
(appointed by former president Nelson Mandela), served from 1995 to 2002 and 
during that time produced reports in line with investigations conducted. The second 
Public Protector, Lawrence Mushwana (appointed by former president Thabo 
Mbeki), served from 2002 to 2009, wherein he reported related investigations. The 
third Public Protector, Advocate Thulisile Madonsela (appointed by former president 
Jacob Zuma), served from 2009 to 2016 and had a number of high-profile cases to 
investigate and report on, especially pertaining to the president of the country. The 
fourth Public Protector, Busisiwe Mkhwebane, was appointed in October 2016 by 
former president Jacob Zuma.  
The activities relating to the operations of the Public Protector are published in 
reports, mainly in annual reports and investigation reports. Annual reports represent 
a comprehensive scope of the activities and investigations accomplished by the 
Office of the Public Protector within a given financial year. Investigation reports that 
reflect individual cases investigated by the Public Protector at any given moment will 
also be discussed. This is because these activities require the use of funds provided 
through the annual budget of the Public Protector. The focus in the ensuing 
paragraphs is firstly on the investigation reports, followed by the annual reports. 
Investigation reports cited in this section are in no particular order and are grouped 
into reports involving members of the national government, members of the 
provincial government, members of municipal councils, public officials, and finally 
members of the public. 
Members of cabinet or government include all ministers and deputy ministers who 
discharge their official duties as political office bearers in the government without 
exception. They include the deputy president and president of the country, who 
serves in his or her capacity as the head of the government. These political office 
bearers operate at national level and are accountable to parliament for all that they 
do or do not do. 
Thuli Madonsela’s tenure at the helm of the Office of the Public Protector of South 
Africa has significantly raised the profile of this institution. This was mainly due to 
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several high-profile and controversial cases referred to the Office of the Public 
Protector for investigation and adjudication during her tenure. 
The cases that received extensive media coverage included investigations into 
irregular spending and expenditure in government departments. There was also 
extensive coverage of an investigation into the Passenger Rail Agency of South 
Africa (Hunter 2015), as well as the probe into the so-called state capture (Public 
Protector South Africa 2016c). 
The Public Protector has also been instrumental in assisting individuals who grapple 
with unfair treatment from government departments and other public institutions. The 
Public Protector does lesser-known yet equally important work.  
The key function of the Public Protector is to promote good governance and access 
to justice for the poorest people. As noted previously, the Office of the Public 
Protector acts as a defender of people’s rights against the abuses of public office, 
corruption, mismanagement, and negligence. 
In executing this mandate, the Public Protector handles a variety of concerns. In 
2015-2016, these included the following: 
 Intervening in the deadly conflict at Glebelands Hostel in Umlazi, KwaZulu-
Natal (Ndaliso 2016). Although the investigations are ongoing, the Office of 
the Public Protector identified the source of the conflict. It notified the Premier 
of KwaZulu-Natal, thereby averting the further loss of lives. 
 Remedying the improper awarding of a construction tender and addressing 
allegations of irregular payments in a government housing project in 
Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth. The Public Protector’s investigation found that the 
tender had been irregularly awarded. The municipality was instructed to pay 
the outstanding amount, with interest, within 30 days and apologise in writing 
to the complainant (Public Protector South Africa 2016a). 
 Resolving a complaint lodged by a student against the University of Pretoria 
for maladministration and reporting of inconsistent examination marks for a 
special examination written by the complainant. The complaint was 
subsequently resolved following intervention by the Public Protector. The 
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complainant’s scripts were remarked and a letter of apology was issued by the 
university (Public Protector South Africa 2016a). 
 A complaint was lodged against a local municipality for undue delay. The 
municipality was negligent in processing the documentation relating to the 
payment of the deceased’s employee benefits. The Public Protector directed 
the municipality to compensate the deceased’s family for the financial losses 
incurred (Public Protector South Africa 2016a).  
The following sections highlight several other cases that were investigated by the 
Public Protector.  
5.4.1 The case of the Minister of Transport, 2007 
According to Public Protector South Africa (2007a:3), the Office of the Public 
Protector investigated a complaint in connection with a report published by a 
newspaper, Beeld, alleging that shortly after the Minister of Transport, Mr J. Radebe, 
launched the National Road Safety Project at Rayton on 5 December 2006, where 
he urged motorists to drive slowly, the car in which he was transported was observed 
driving in the direction of Pretoria at high speed. The complainant held the view that 
by allowing his driver to exceed the speed limits, Minister Radebe acted improperly.  
Public Protector Lawrence Mushwana stated in 2007 that during his investigation, 
the newspaper was asked to provide more information, but it declined, saying it 
preferred to be an independent observer (Da Costa 2007).  
The Public Protector held, however, that it could reasonably be expected from 
members of the media to cooperate with organs of state investigating allegations of 
misconduct by members of the executive that they know of and/or reported on 
(Public Protector South Africa 2007a:3). The Public Protector explained that it is the 
responsibility of the South African Police Service (SAPS) to transport the minister 
when he is travelling on official business.  
In the same respect,  
“the member of the SAPS driving the car of the minister may only exceed the 
speed limit if the execution of his or her primary responsibility requires him/her 
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to do so. The driver has discretion in this regard and it is not dependent on 
directions of the minister” (Public Protector South Africa 2007a:3).  
Public Protector South Africa (2007a:20) highlights that exceeding the speed limit at 
the instruction of the minister for any other reason would be unlawful. From the 
investigation it could not be found that the minister acted improperly as was alleged 
(Public Protector South Africa 2007a:21).  
5.4.2   The case of the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, 2009 
Public Protector South Africa (2009a:3) reveals that the Public Protector, Thuli 
Madonsela, conducted an investigation on own initiative into allegations that the 
Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Mr M.K.N. Gigaba, misappropriated public funds. It 
was alleged that the deputy minister sent flowers to his wife at the expense of the 
Department of Home Affairs and that the Office of the Deputy Minister paid for flight 
tickets and car rental of several private individuals on several occasions. 
In the process of investigating, it was stated that  
“in terms of section 11(3) of the Public Protector Act of 1994, any person who, 
without just cause, refuses or fails to comply with a request of the Public 
Protector for information relating to a matter being investigated, shall be guilty 
of an offence” (Public Protector South Africa 2009a:3).  
This was after the minister had failed to comply when requested to cooperate. 
According to Public Protector South Africa (2009a:21), the investigation revealed that 
the expenditure incurred by the Office of the Deputy Minister in respect of flowers 
sent to the deputy minister’s wife was “irregular and wasteful. The allegation relating 
to the travelling expenses incurred by the deputy minister were unfounded”. 
5.4.3    Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, 2016 
According to Public Protector South Africa (2016b:3), the Office of the Public 
Protector investigated a complaint by a member of parliament, in terms of section 
4(1) of the Executive Members’ Ethics Act of 1998 against the Minister of 
International Relations and Cooperation, Nkoana-Mashabane, for a breach of the 
Executive Ethics Code. The complainant alleged that the minister received a benefit 
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amounting to approximately R100 000 in respect of payments towards security 
services at her private residence in Polokwane, which she failed to declare in the 
Parliament’s Register of Members’ Interests. The complaint was based on an article 
published in the Mail & Guardian of 25 November 2011 under the heading “Tycoon 
pays for minister’s guards” (Faull, McKune and Brümmer 2011). 
Public Protector South Africa (2016b:6) highlights that, having considered the 
evidence uncovered during the investigation against the relevant regulatory 
framework, Public Protector Thuli Madonsela elected to make no findings in 
connection with the allegations against Minister Nkoana-Mashabane as the 
parliament’s Joint Committee on Ethics and Members’ Interests had already 
investigated the matter and found that there was no evidence that the minister 
personally and directly received the benefit. The committee found and accepted, 
however, that the benefit related to the minister’s property and she therefore 
benefitted indirectly.  
5.4.4  The case of the Minister of Basic Education, 2013 
Public Protector South Africa (2013a:3) states that Learning Without Books was the 
Public Protector’s report issued in terms of section 182(1) of the Constitution and 
section 8(1) of the Public Protector Act of 1998. The Office of the Public Protector 
conducted an investigation into a complaint lodged on 7 August 2012 by a member 
of the Eastern Cape Provincial Legislature and the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
Education Spokesperson, concerning the Eastern Cape school textbook shortages. 
The complaint was communicated to the Minister of Basic Education to the effect 
that a resolution be found to the school textbook shortage but to no avail. 
According to Public Protector South Africa (2013a:54), the National Department of 
Basic Education and the Eastern Cape Department of Education violated the 
provisions of section 29 of the Constitution by failing to provide basic education in 
the form of school textbooks to everyone in the language of their choice, as 
mandated by sections 195(1), (b), (d), and (f) of the Constitution, by failing to provide 
textbooks efficiently, effectively, and equitably, and therefore being accountable in 
terms of section 237 of the Constitution by failing to perform its obligations diligently 
and without delay. The violation of the said constitutional provisions constituted 
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maladministration in terms of section 6(4)(a)(i) of the Public Protector Act. Public 
Protector South Africa (2013a:56) explains that Thuli Madonsela directed that the 
Minister of Basic Education should hold the Director-General accountable for actions 
and omissions that resulted in the failure of prevention or solving the national school 
textbook crisis. 
5.5 Investigation reports that implicate members of the Provincial Executive 
Councils (PECs) 
Members of the PECs include all Members of the Executive Councils (MECs) in the 
provinces. MECs are normally headed by premiers in all provinces. The premier and 
MECs are political office bearers who discharge their official duties at the provincial 
level of government. These provincial office bearers are accountable to the provincial 
legislatures for all that they do or do not do.      
5.5.1  The case of the Premier of the Free State, 2006 
Public Protector South Africa (2008a:3) highlights that the Office of the Public 
Protector conducted an investigation on own initiative into the allegations of non-
compliance by the Premier of the Free State province with the provisions of the Free 
State Youth Commission Act of 1996 (the Youth Commission Report), which was 
submitted to the Free State Provincial Legislature on 20 June 2006. From the 
investigation referred to in the Youth Commission Report, it was found, inter alia, that 
the decisions of the premier to appoint a “Caretaker Commission” and new members 
of the Free State Youth Commission were invalid and therefore improper. 
Thuli Madonsela pointed out the principles regulating cooperative governance and 
cited sections 41(3) and (4) of the Constitution, which prescribe that,  
“[a]n organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dispute must 
make every reasonable effort to settle the disputes by means of 
mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, and must 
exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the 
dispute. If a court is not satisfied that the requirements of section (3) 
have been met, it may refer a dispute back to the organ of state 
involved” (Public Protector South Africa 2008a:3).  
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Public Protector South Africa (2008a:14) emphasises that the Public Protector is not 
obliged to resolve the dispute with the premier, referred to in the Youth Commission 
Report in terms of the provisions of the Constitution relating to cooperative 
government. In terms of the provisions of section 182(1) of the Constitution and 
section 6(4)(c)(ii) of the Public Protector Act, the provincial legislature is competent 
to deal with this matter. 
5.5.2    The case of the Premier of Gauteng, 2010 
Public Protector South Africa (2011a:3) reveals that the Office of the Public Protector 
conducted an investigation into the alleged breach of section 2 of the Executive 
Members’ Ethics Act of 1998, and, by implication, the corresponding provisions of 
the Executive Ethics Code, by the Premier of Gauteng, Ms N.P. Mokonyane. The 
Public Protector received a complaint from a member of the provincial legislature for 
the DA, Gauteng, on 23 April 2010. The complainant alleged that the denial by the 
premier of her office’s involvement in the awarding, without a tender, of a R30 million 
project to beautify the R24 Albertina Sisulu Highway between OR Tambo 
International Airport and Johannesburg possibly constituted unethical behaviour. 
The following findings were made by Thuli Madonsela’s investigation: 
 No tangible evidence was found that indicated that the role of the premier and 
her office went beyond the receipt and referral of the proposal to the 
Department of Roads and Transport, and therefore influenced the adjudication 
or award of the contract or tender. 
 The premier did not act in breach of the provisions of sections 2(1)(a) to (d), 
and 2(3)(a), (c), and (d) of the Code, and is consequently not found guilty of 
any unethical behaviour (Public Protector South Africa 2011a:29). 
5.5.3   The case of maladministration in the Mpumalanga Department of 
Public Works, Roads and Transport, 2013 
According to Public Protector South Africa (2013b:3), the Office of the Public 
Protector investigated a complaint lodged by Advocate Alberts (the complainant) in 
which he alleged maladministration by the Mpumalanga Department of Public 
Works, Roads and Transport in the awarding of tenders for shop leases in Pilgrim’s 
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Rest. Pilgrim’s Rest is a national heritage site and a tourist attraction, hence the 
government, through the Mpumalanga Department of Public Works, Roads and 
Transport, is its custodian. Businesses that rent premises are selected through a 
tender process that considers the functionality of each bidding business and price. 
The allegation of unlawfulness and impropriety with regard to the awarding of the 
tender for the leasing of business premises at Pilgrim’s Rest was substantiated, 
since the process was characterised by gross irregularities and maladministration 
(Public Protector South Africa 2013a:61). Furthermore, businesses that legitimately 
qualified to be awarded the tenders and many of which were running sustainable 
businesses beneficial to the community were prejudiced by or suffered an injustice 
due to the department’s maladministration with regard to the awarding of the new 
leasing tenders (Public Protector South Africa 2013a:62). Thuli Madonsela provided 
the remedial action to be taken in terms of section 182(1)(c) of the Constitution and 
section 6(4)(c)(ii) of the Public Protector Act (Public Protector South Africa 
2013a:63). 
5.6  Investigation reports that implicate members of municipal councils 
Members of municipal councils include all elected councillors who are responsible for 
governing a municipality. The activities of the municipal council are coordinated by 
the mayor, who is assisted by the mayoral committee, which is comprised of 
councillors. The mayor is an equivalent of the president at local level of government, 
while the mayoral committee is like cabinet. As in the case of the national and 
provincial governments, councillors are political office bearers at the local level of 
government. The mayor and mayoral committee are accountable to the municipal 
council for all that they do or do not do.  
5.6.1  The case of the Kungwini Local Municipality, 2006 
Public Protector South Africa (2008b:8) states that the Public Protector submitted a 
report to the National Assembly relating to an investigation into an allegation of the 
misappropriation of public funds by the Kungwini Local Municipality in the Gauteng 
province. The complaint was lodged by a member of parliament with the Public 
Protector, Lawrence Mushwana, in connection with a request from the municipality 
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for financial assistance (a donation) for the launch of the African National Congress 
(ANC) Parliamentary Constituency Office (PCO), which was officially launched on 20 
May 2006 at the Rethabiseng Community Hall (Public Protector South Africa 
2008b:8-9). From the evidence considered during the investigation, the Public 
Protector held that: 
 PCOs are established by political parties with the assistance of funds 
allocated to them by parliament. 
 The location, structure, functions, and operations of a PCO are determined 
only by the political party involved. 
 Political parties are accountable to the Electoral Commission and to 
parliament for the expenditure of the funds allocated to them to enable them 
to perform their political functions effectively. 
 A PCO is a political party structure. Even though it might be performing a 
public function to a certain extent, it does not do so in terms of any legislation, 
but in terms of the decisions, policies, and prescripts of the political party by 
whom it was established. 
 PCOs are therefore not organs of state or part of any sphere of government. 
The fact that parliament provides financial assistance for the establishment of 
PCOs does not change their character and status from that of being political 
structures. 
 Moreover, the mere fact that members of a community can approach a PCO 
for assistance relating to service delivery issues does not change its status 
from being a structure established by a political party and not by parliament. 
 A PCO cannot therefore be regarded as an extension of parliament. 
 The provisions of section 41 of the Constitution and Chapter 5 of the 
Municipal Finance Management Act, No. 56 of 2003, relating to cooperative 
governance, consequently do not apply to PCOs. 
 There is therefore no obligation on any sphere of government or any organ of 
state, except the National Assembly, to assist political parties in the 
establishment and maintenance of PCOs. 
 The establishment and launching of a PCO is not a matter that falls within the 
objectives of local government. The fact that some of the objectives of a PCO, 
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in terms of the monitoring of public service delivery, might overlap with that of 
a municipality does not change the position. 
 Neither the Constitution nor the Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 
permits a municipality to donate public funds to political parties for any 
purpose. Such expenditure therefore cannot be covered under any vote in the 
budget of a municipality. 
 Unforeseen and unavoidable expenditure, as contemplated by section 29 of 
the Municipal Finance Management Act, relates to expenditure in connection 
with the constitutional objectives of the municipality. It cannot justify financial 
assistance provided to a particular political party in the form of a donation for 
the establishment of a political structure. Such a donation would therefore 
constitute irregular expenditure. 
 It would also amount to fruitless and wasteful expenditure as it was made in 
vain and could have been avoided if the municipal manager properly applied 
his or her mind to the matter. 
 A decision to donate public funds to a political party, apart from being 
unlawful, creates a perception of bias and political favouritism on the part of 
the municipality. It also disadvantages other political parties that have to work 
with the allocations allocated to them by parliament. 
 The mayor and a municipal manager, who are responsible for irregular, 
unauthorised, and fruitless and wasteful expenditure, have to be held liable for 
the expense. Disciplinary steps should also be taken against them (Public 
Protector South Africa 2008b:33-36). 
Public Protector South Africa (2008b:36-37) reveals that the Public Protector made 
the following findings from the investigation: 
 The request to the executive mayor of the Kungwini Local Municipality in the 
Gauteng province for the donation of public funds for the launching of a PCO 
was improper. 
 The donation by the municipality on 22 May 2006 of R25 856.00 to the ANC 
PCO was improper and unlawful. It resulted in irregular, fruitless, and wasteful 
expenditure, and could be regarded as financial misconduct by the accounting 
officer as contemplated by section 171(1)(c) of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act.  
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5.6.2  The case of the Municipal Council of the City of Matlosana, 2007 
Public Protector South Africa (2007b:7) highlights that the Public Protector 
conducted an investigation into alleged impropriety by the City of Matlosana in 
respect of the appointment of a municipal manager. Lawrence Mushwana was the 
Public Protector in 2007. The allegation was based on the fact that a candidate for 
the post of municipal manager had been suspended at the Moqhaka Local 
Municipality and that charges of misconduct had been formulated against him at the 
time of his application for the said position at the City of Matlosana. It was not the 
aim of the investigation to determine whether the findings of the investigation at the 
Moqhaka Local Municipality and the ensuing charges brought against the candidate 
were justified. 
According to Public Protector South Africa (2007b:9), section 151 of the Constitution 
provides that the executive and legislative authority of a municipality is vested in its 
municipal council. A municipality has the right to govern, on its own initiative, the 
local government affairs of its community, subject to national and provincial 
legislation. The national government or a provincial government may not 
compromise or impede a municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or 
perform its functions. Furthermore, in terms of section 160 of the Constitution, a 
municipal council makes decisions concerning the exercise of all the powers and the 
performance of all the functions of the municipality and may employ personnel who 
are necessary for the effective performance of its functions. 
Public Protector South Africa (2007b:26) confirms that the following observations 
and findings were made from the investigation: 
 Municipalities are autonomous in exercising their executive and legislative 
authority. The decisions and actions of a municipality therefore have no 
bearing or impact on the exercising of its public powers by another 
municipality. 
 The decision of the Municipal Council of the City of Matlosana to appoint the 
candidate as its municipal manager complied with the relevant legislative 
prescripts and requirements and with the standards for the exercising of public 
power set by the Constitutional Court. 
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 The allegation that the appointment of the candidate as municipal manager by 
the Municipal Council of the City of Matlosana was improper, was unfounded. 
5.7    Investigation reports that involve public officials and public entities 
This section includes reports that implicate and involve citizens against public 
entities other than governments at the three levels of the state. This is in line with 
section 6(4)(a) of the Public Protector Act, which outlines that the Public Protector is 
competent to investigate, on his or her own initiative or on receipt of a complaint, any 
alleged maladministration in connection with the affairs of any institution in which the 
state is the majority or controlling shareholder or of any public entity as defined in 
section 1 of the Reporting by Public Entities Act of 1992. Included are matters in 
which citizens seek recourse against public officials employed in these entities or 
where public officials endeavour to clear themselves against any sanction unfairly 
meted out.   
5.7.1 The case of the South African Board of Sheriffs (SABS), 2009 
Public Protector South Africa (2011a:3) states that the Office of the Public Protector 
conducted an investigation regarding the alleged refusal by the SABS in Cape Town 
to institute disciplinary action against the Sheriff for Wynberg North. The complaint 
falls within the mandate of the Public Protector (Public Protector South Africa 
2011a:8).  
According to Public Protector South Africa (2011a:5-6), 
“The complainant, on behalf of a client, approached the Public 
Protector on 14 August 2009 with a complaint pertaining to the refusal 
of the SABS to institute a disciplinary action against the Sheriff for 
Wynberg North. The complainant mentioned that his client was the 
plaintiff in a civil matter (interpleader proceedings) in which the 
Magistrate ruled on 24 November 2000 that the sheriff had been 
negligent in his failure to set down the interpleader proceedings 
timeously as a result of which movable assets were released from 
attachment”.  
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In this particular case, Thuli Madonsela was Public Protector in 2009.  
Public Protector South Africa (2011a:6) explains that subsequent proceedings on a 
civil basis against the Sheriff have been instituted by the client. Judgement was 
obtained against the Sheriff and a warrant of execution was issued. Following the 
investigation, the Public Protector presented the following findings: 
 The complainant’s allegation that SABS had failed to institute a disciplinary 
enquiry against the Sheriff for Wynberg North was substantiated. 
 On its admission, SABS had lost the initial complaint and claim despite its 
statutory duty of recordkeeping as stipulated in section 44 of the Sheriffs Act 
of 1986. This action is found to have been improper and constitutes 
maladministration. The complainant’s client was prejudiced by the 
maladministration. 
 The amount of time it took for SABS to decide on the complainant’s request 
for a disciplinary enquiry was unnecessarily long and accordingly constituted 
maladministration. The complainant and/or the complainant’s client were 
prejudiced by the maladministration (Public Protector South Africa 2011a:14). 
5.7.2  The case of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA), 2007 
Public Protector South Africa (2009b:5) notes that the Office of the Public Protector 
conducted an investigation into allegations of failure by the CCMA to issue an 
arbitration award or ruling in terms of the Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995. The 
CCMA is an independent institution established in terms of section 112 of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995, thus subjecting it to investigation by the Public Protector. The 
complainant lodged a complaint with the Office of Public Protector in July 2007, 
alleging that he had lodged a complaint of unfair dismissal with the CCMA against 
his former employer. The complainant had patiently waited for the CCMA to inform 
him of its award or ruling on his complaint for a period of more than a year, after 
which he visited its office on numerous occasions (Public Protector South Africa 
2009b:6). The complainant believed that the CCMA Commissioner had breached the 
relevant laws of the Republic of South Africa and had violated his right to be 
informed of the outcome of his complaint (Public Protector South Africa 2009b:7). 
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Lawrence Mushwana was the Public Protector in 2007. Public Protector South Africa 
(2009b:13-14) highlights that the following key findings were made: 
 The Commissioner did not issue the arbitration award or ruling on the 
arbitration hearing into the complaint of unfair dismissal lodged by the 
complainant against his former employer. 
 The omission on the part of the Commissioner to issue an award or ruling 
constituted a gross breach of the provisions of section 195 of the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995. 
 The omission by the Commissioner unfairly and improperly deprived the 
complainant of his right to be informed of the outcome of his complaint against 
his former employer and therefore caused him to suffer improper prejudice. 
Following the investigation and after considering all the evidence, the Public 
Protector held that in terms of section 182(1)(b) of the Constitution and section 
6(4)(c)(ii) of the Public Protector Act, it is recommended that the governing body of 
the CCMA and the director of the CCMA take necessary steps to ensure that: 
 An award or ruling in the arbitration held on 6 June 2005 into the complaint of 
unfair dismissal lodged by the complainant against his former employer is 
issued within a period of one month from the date of the report; 
 The award or ruling mentioned above is served upon both the complainant 
and his former employer within 14 days from the date of its issue; and 
 The original award or ruling is filed with the Registrar of the Labour Court as 
required in terms of the Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
5.7.3  The case of the Gauteng Department of Education, 2011 
According to Public Protector South Africa (2013a:6), Fair Pay is a report the Public 
Protector issued in terms of section 182(1)(b) of the Constitution and section 8(1) of 
the Public Protector Act. The report relates to an investigation into a complaint of 
alleged unfair dismissal and the subsequent deduction of a departmental debt from 
the complainant’s benefits by the Gauteng Department of Education. On 6 July 2011, 
the complainant lodged a complaint with the Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, in 
which he alleged that he was dismissed by the Gauteng Department of Education 
and issued with a dismissal letter prior to the receipt of the presiding officer’s 
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recommendations in a disciplinary hearing that was held on this matter. The 
complainant also alleged that the Gauteng Department of Education dismissed him 
without following proper termination of employment procedures. 
Public Protector South Africa (2013a:7) points out that the complainant further 
alleged that as a result of the abovementioned termination of employment, the 
Gauteng Department of Education forwarded incorrect information to the 
Government Employees Pension Fund, now known as the Government Pension 
Administration Agency (GPAA), relating to the actual date of dismissal. In addition, 
the complainant alleged that as a result of the Gauteng Department of Education’s 
error, the GPAA deducted an amount of R7 317.81 from his pension benefit as a 
departmental debt, owed to the Gauteng Department of Education, without his 
consent. Public Protector South Africa (2013a:8) confirms that the Gauteng 
Department of Education is an organ of state and its conduct amounts to conduct in 
state affairs, and, as a result, this matter falls within the ambit of the Public 
Protector’s mandate. 
Public Protector South Africa (2013a:23) presents the following findings by the Public 
Protector: 
 The GPAA’s conduct of deducting money from the complainant’s pension 
benefit without complying with the provisions of paragraph 3.3.1 of the 
Procedure Manual for Interaction between Pensions Administration and 
Government Employers in terms of section 21(3) of the Government 
Employees Pension Law of 1996 was improper. The conduct of the Gauteng 
Department of Education accordingly constituted maladministration. 
 The abovementioned act of maladministration prejudiced the complainant in 
that he was not paid interest to which he was entitled in respect of the amount 
of R7 317.81 that was wrongfully deducted from his pension benefit and 
refunded after 36 months. The complainant has suffered improper prejudice 
due to the undue delay by the Gauteng Department of Education to pay 
interest on the sum of R7 317.81. 
In concluding the investigation, the Public Protector ruled that: 
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 The head of department should ensure that the Gauteng Department of 
Education pays the complainant interest in the amount of R5 000, as 
elaborated in the settlement agreement signed between the complainant and 
the Gauteng Department of Education on 30 May 2013. 
 The head of department should ensure that the complainant is provided with a 
letter of apology for the prejudice he suffered as a result of the conduct of the 
department in this matter. 
5.8  Remedial power of the Office of the Public Protector 
While the Ombudsman,  
“does not have the power to make decisions which are binding on the 
administration, it makes recommendations that are complied with on a 
voluntary basis and through the mercy of other governmental 
structures. If they choose to ignore them, the whole purpose for which 
it is established would have little effect” (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:11).  
This was the case in the country,  
“when there were divided views on whether the findings and remedial 
actions of the Public Protector were binding … The debate was brought 
to court and it was left to the judiciary to clarify the authority of the 
remedial actions of the Public Protector” (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:11). 
A case in terms of this issue is the failure by the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC) to implement the Public Protector’s remedial action issued in 
Report No. 23 of 2013/2014 (dealing with the investigation into allegation of 
maladministration, abuse of power, and the irregular appointment of Mr Hlaudi 
Motsoeneng by the SABC). After investigation, the Public Protector directed in her 
report that the SABC board should take disciplinary action against Mr Mostsoeneng 
for his dishonesty relating to the misrepresentation of his qualifications, abuse of 
power, and improper conduct in appointments and salary increases and for his role 
in the action of the Public Protector, the SABC board appointed Mr Mostsoeneng 
permanently to the position of chief operations officer, in which he had been acting. 
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This prompted the DA to apply for the setting aside of the appointment (Democratic 
Alliance vs South African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 551 (WCC).  
The Public Protector then filed an affidavit in which she requested the court to 
assess whether her report on the matter was legally valid, binding, and enforceable, 
and to refrain from pronouncing on the correctness of her findings or the remedial 
action contained in the report. Rejecting the Public Protector’s contention that the 
findings and the remedial action of the Public Protector were binding and 
enforceable unless properly and successfully reviewed, the court held that because 
the Public Protector is modelled on the institution of the Ombudsman, her findings 
and remedial actions were not binding or enforceable (Democratic Alliance vs South 
African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 551 paras. 49-63). 
Dissatisfied with the High Court’s decision that disciplinary proceedings be brought 
against Mr Motsoeneng, the SABC appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal is limited to its finding in relation to the 
extent of the remedial action of the Public Protector. Distancing itself from the finding 
of the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Democratic Alliance v South 
African Broadcasting Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 551 made a crucial finding. The 
court took the view that in holding that the Public Protector’s findings were not 
binding and enforceable, the court a quo was comparing the powers of the Public 
Protector to that of the court. If found that it was unsound and inaccurate to do that 
because “the phrase ‘binding and enforceable’ is terminologically inapt and in this 
context, conduces to confusion” (Democratic Alliance vs South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Limited 2015 1 SA 551 para. 45). 
Relying on the decision in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd vs City of Cape Town to the 
effect that and administrative decision stands until set aside on review, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that the principle also finds application to the findings of the 
Public Protector (Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd vs City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 
(SCA) para. 26). According to the court, because of the unique position that the 
Public Protector occupies in the Constitution, that principle must apply “with at least 
equal or perhaps even greater force to the decisions finally arrived at by that 
institution” (Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd vs City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) 
para. 26).  
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This signifies that without a review application,  
“to set aside the remedial action of the Public Protector, the official or 
the organ of state against whom the remedial action is issued is 
obliged to implement these findings and remedial measures. In other 
words, the Public Protector’s findings must not be overlooked and 
should he implemented until reviewed and set aside” (Tchawouo 
Mbiada 2017:12).  
The Constitutional Court recently reiterated this position in Economic Freedom 
Fighters vs Speaker of the National Assembly, as well as Democratic Alliance vs 
Speaker of the National Assembly cases. In the judgment, the Constitutional Court 
concurred with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s view that the Public Protector’s 
remedial action had a binding effect (Economic Freedom Fighters vs Speaker of the 
National Assembly and Others; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National 
Assembly and Others 2016 (3) ZACC 11; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the 
National Assembly 2016 5 BCLR 618 (CC) para. 73). To this effect, the 
Constitutional Court held that when remedial action is binding, compliance is not 
optional and that remedial action taken against those under investigation cannot be 
ignored without any legal consequences (Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of 
the National Assembly; Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly 
2016 5 BCLR 618 (CC) para. 73). 
It is therefore not open to anyone to ignore the Public Protector’s remedial action 
based on holding a different view or to choose which part(s) of the remedial action to 
implement (Democratic Alliance vs Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 5 BCLR 
618 (CC) paras. 73-75). Doing so should be contrary to the Rule of Law, and 
requires that law-abiding people obey decisions made by those with legal authority to 
make such laws or to approach a court for the setting aside of such decisions 
(Democratic Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 5 BCLR 618 (CC) 
para. 75). This is why the Constitutional Court, contrary to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, was vehemently critical of the use of parallel investigations and processes in 
order to assess the veracity of the findings and recommendations of the Public 
Protector (Democratic Alliance vs Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 5 BCLR 
618 (CC) para. 47). It stated in no uncertain terms that the National Assembly was 
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wrong in passing a resolution that nullified the Public Protector’s remedial actions 
(Democratic Alliance vs Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 5 BCLR 618 (CC) 
para. 98). According to the court, there is nothing wrong with seeking to ascertain the 
veracity of the findings of the Public Protector, but the court made it clear that the 
National Assembly actually flouted its obligations by passing a resolution that 
nullified the Public Protector’s findings and replacing them with its own findings, 
because the Public Protector’s remedial actions are binding until set aside through a 
proper judicial process (Democratic Alliance vs Speaker of the National Assembly 
2016 5 BCLR 618 (CC) para. 99). 
5.9  The case of the president of South Africa: The State of Capture report, 
2016 
Former Public Protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela, investigated alleged improper 
and unethical conduct by former president Jacob Zuma and other state functionaries 
relating to alleged improper relationships and the involvement of the Gupta family in 
the removal and appointment of ministers and directors of state-owned enterprises, 
that resulted in improper and possibly corrupt awarding of state contracts and 
benefits to the Gupta family’s businesses. Members of cabinet, a former cabinet 
minister, and other persons testified that the Gupta family offered bribes and/or posts 
in exchange for certain benefits. The former president and/or his family members 
were either present or facilitated the meetings. 
This section puts the State of Capture report’s remedial action into perspective and 
discusses the issues surrounding the validity of the recommended judicial inquiry. 
Heated discussions have broken out over the issue whether the remedial action that 
the former Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, prescribed in her State of Capture 
report was constitutionally valid. The remedial action of the Public Protector in the 
State of Capture report that instructs the president to appoint a commission of inquiry 
into his own improper behaviour and potential breaches of the legislation governing 
corruption and malfeasance poses interesting questions of law. The Public Protector 
also imposed several limitations on the power of the president to appoint a 
commission of inquiry, among others that the commission should be headed by a 
judge solely selected by the chief justice.  
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In essence, the remedial action entailed three aspects. Firstly, the Public Protector 
instructed the president,  
“to appoint, within 30 days, a commission of inquiry headed by a judge 
solely selected by the chief justice, who shall provide one name to the 
president … The commission should be adequately funded by the 
Treasury and complete its report within 180 days and present the 
president with findings and recommendations” (Wolf 2016b).  
Furthermore, a  
“commission of inquiry should be given powers of evidence collection 
that are no less than that of the Public Protector ... Once the report is 
presented to the president, he should submit a copy to parliament 
within 14 days of its release and inform parliament about his intentions 
regarding the implementation of the recommendations” (Wolf 2016b).  
The second aspect of the remedial action entailed that parliament should review, 
“within 180 days, the Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998 to provide better 
guidance regarding integrity, including avoidance and management of conflict of 
interest” (Wolf 2016b). Finally, her successor “should bring matters that were 
identified as matters that should be prosecuted to the attention of the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions” (Public Protector South Africa 2016c:353-354 in 
Wolf 2016). 
According to Wolf (2016b),  
“[t]he remedial action that parliament should review the Executive 
Members’ Ethics Act does not seem to cause any concern … The 
recommendation that possible breaches of the Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act of 2004 and the Public Finance 
Management Amendment Act 29 of 1999 should be investigated by the 
NPA [National Prosecuting Authority] cannot be faulted – at least in 
theory”.  
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Whether any prosecutions are likely to be undertaken is another matter currently 
under investigation by the Zondo Commission of Inquiry, which is discussed later in 
the text.  
It appears that as a general rule, no state organ may instruct the president to appoint 
a commission of inquiry. That would amount to an abdication of power if he should 
follow the instructions because he should exercise the power personally. Although 
section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution does not expressly specify any limits to this 
power, it does not imply that the Constitutional Court could not make a ruling to this 
effect where the president is subject to a conflict of interest. In this instance, 
according to Wolf (2016b), “the public interest to have an impartial commission of 
inquiry might outweigh the president’s power to appoint a commissioner of his choice 
and to determine the terms of reference”. 
There are other issues that need to be considered as well, for example whether the 
“power to appoint commissions of inquiry is restricted to matters of policy or includes 
matters of public concern, e.g. an inquiry into the abuse of executive power or 
executive malfeasance” (Wolf 2016b). According to Wolf (2016b), “[j]udicial 
precedent is inconclusive on this but it appears that the inquiry envisaged by the 
Public Protector would fall in the broader category of commissions of inquiry into a 
matter of public concern”. In the Heath case (South African Association of Personal 
Injury Lawyers vs Heath 2001(1) SA 883 (CC)), the Constitutional Court indicated 
that in appropriate circumstances the president may appoint a judicial officer to 
preside over a commission without infringing upon the separation of powers, but 
noted that it will “depend on the subject matter of the inquiry” whether such judicial 
involvement will transgress the separation of powers.  
Although the proper role of judges in relation to commissions of inquiry was not at 
issue, the Constitutional Court indicated that “in appropriate circumstances” the 
president may appoint a judicial officer to preside over a commission without 
infringing upon the separation of powers, but that will “depend on the subject matter 
of the inquiry” (South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001(1) 
SA 883 (CC) para. 34):  
“The performance of such functions ordinarily calls for the qualities and 
skills required for the performance of judicial functions – independence, 
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the weighing up of information, the forming of an opinion based on 
information, and the giving of a decision on the basis of a consideration 
of relevant information”. 
The court warned, however, that the appointment of a judicial officer would be 
inappropriate where the judicial officer would be required to perform functions that 
were far removed from the judicial function. To permit a judicial officer to perform 
functions far removed from the judicial function of adjudication would blur the 
separation of powers that must be maintained between the judiciary and other 
branches of state power (South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers vs 
Heath 2001(1) SA 883 (CC) para. 35).  
As previously indicated, there can be no objection to the remedial action of Advocate 
Madonsela that potential criminal offences that were uncovered by the report should 
be investigated and prosecuted by the NPA. In effect, the Hawks are too 
dysfunctional and too badly led to do the work that Advocate Madonsela would like 
to have seen done by the judicial commission of inquiry that she had in mind in her 
report. The main problem is that the executive interferes in the sphere of 
competence of the NPA and regards it as part of the executive branch. In the 
Westminster system, the prosecution service is only functionally but not structurally 
independent from the executive. In the constitutional state model, however, the 
prosecutors are both structurally and functionally independent from the executive 
and should operate as a second state organ in the third branch of state power (Wolf 
2016b). This is also the way Chapter 8 of the Constitution conceives of the 
administration of justice, but it has not been implemented like that in practice. As a 
result, the NPA has been politicised and is increasingly used to settle political scores 
or to shield certain politicians and their friends from prosecution. Currently, there is 
no clear demarcation between the prosecuting powers of the NPA and the executive 
powers of the police in the sphere of public safety. When it comes to criminal 
investigations, it is the domain of the prosecutors to lead such investigations, and the 
police only assist them (Wolf 2015; Wolf 2016a). In constitutional states it is also 
typical that the NPA has its own forensic teams. The dissolution of the Scorpions will 
go down in history as one of most fatal blunders.  
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What exactly happened in the last days of the former Public Protector’s tenure is not 
clear. It appears that the State of Capture report was initially intended to be realised 
as a preliminary report, but then former president Zuma threatened to interdict the 
release of the report since he allegedly “had not had enough time to respond to the 
allegations” (DA News 2016). He claimed that he “had only been told he was 
implicated on October 2” (Rabkin 2016). It seems as if this was obviously not true. “It 
has been meticulously documented that Zuma was offered an opportunity to make 
representations several times since March 2016 but used delaying tactics not to give 
evidence before the Public Protector” (eNCA 2016).    
It appears that the interdict was a last effort to stop the truth from being made public 
(News24 2016). It was reported that “the Public Protector was weighing her legal 
options on what to do” (Gallens 2016). The difficulty was that she had a specific 
timeframe to report and the incoming Public Protector, Advocate Busisiwe 
Mkhwebane, made public announcements why she thought that the state capture 
probe could “not be a priority once she was in office” (TMG Digital 2016). This put 
Madonsela in a very difficult position. Faced by these circumstances, Madonsela 
took the decision to declare the report as final and signed it off. In her report, she 
said she decided to direct that a judicial commission be set up to probe Zuma’s 
relationship with the Guptas because the investigation had been hamstrung by 
insufficient funds (Wolf 2016b). At the outset of the investigation, the Public Protector 
wrote to the government requesting resources for a special investigation similar to a 
commission of inquiry overseen by the Public Protector. The money was made 
available only in September and the R1.5 million allocated to her was completely 
insufficient (Public Protector South Africa 2016c:353). It appears that the legal 
advisors of the Public Protector thought that if she only presented findings, it would 
be difficult to take the report on review. Lawson Naidoo, the Executive Director of the 
Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution, expressed a similar 
view. In his opinion, “only the remedial action could be reviewed, but the remedial 
action is essentially a commission of inquiry … What had been produced is prima 
facie evidence of wrongdoing and to review on that basis would be difficult” (Marrian 
2016). 
The interdict was subsequently withdrawn during the hearing and the Pretoria High 
Court ordered the release of the report. Afterwards, Madonsela reportedly said that 
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she “regretted having listened to lawyers who represented the broader legal 
community and urged her to tread softly with this report mainly to avoid a successful 
court review of the report” (Vollgraaff, Cohen, Mbatha and Sguazzin 2016). Even if 
some commentators are of the opinion that the report was rushed and incomplete, “it 
is quite formidable how much prima facie evidence was collected in such a short 
span of time” (Wolf 2016b).   
5.9.1   The validity of the recommended judicial inquiry 
The constitutionality of the remedial action that the president should appoint a 
judicial commission of inquiry into his own wrongdoing is more complicated. The 
rationale behind the instruction that the president should not be allowed to select a 
judge of his choice is the obvious conflict of interest between the power of the head 
of state (Zuma) to appoint a commission of inquiry into alleged improper or corrupt 
behaviour of the head of government (also Zuma), who, on the basis of prima facie 
evidence presented to the Public Protector, appeared to have abdicated his 
constitutional powers to members of the Gupta family in exchange for financial 
benefits for his family (Wolf 2016b).  
Zuma declared that he accepted the remedial action, but insisted that “it is his sole 
prerogative to determine who should conduct the inquiry and to specify the terms of 
reference” (Nicholson 2016a). The gist of Zuma’s argument was that the Public 
Protector was usurping his powers and that the remedial action infringed upon the 
constitutional separation of powers. However, according to Wolf (2016b), as “the 
Public Protector [2016c:353] pointed out in her State of Capture report, the president 
noted in the matter of EFF v Speaker of Parliament that ‘I could not have carried out 
the evaluation myself lest I be accused of being judge and jury in my own case’”.  
Several aspects of the power to appoint commissions of inquiry in the context of the 
remedial action are in need of clarification. Firstly is “whether the Public Protector’s 
instruction that the president should appoint a commission of inquiry with certain 
limitations to exercise the power personally due to a conflict of interests is 
permissible” (Wolf 2016b). Secondly, “whether the Public Protector could give 
instructions with regard to the terms of reference of such a commission of inquiry” 
(Wolf 2016b). Thirdly,  
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“whether the Public Protector could implicitly instruct that the 
Commissions Act 8 of 1947 should find application in order to secure 
that the powers of evidence collection of the commission of inquiry are 
no less than that of the Public Protector” (Wolf 2016b).  
Fourthly,  
“what kind of commissions of inquiry could be appointed that would fall 
within the constitutional scope of presidential powers; and finally, 
whether the appointment of judicial commissions of inquiry into 
executive malfeasance or abuse of power infringes upon the 
constitutional separation of powers” (Wolf 2016b). 
5.9.3  The nature and scope of the power to appoint commissions of inquiry 
To start with, the argument that the remedial action infringes upon the constitutional 
separation of powers misses the point insofar as the separation of powers refers to 
the functions of the three branches of state power (trias politica); for example, the 
legislature, the executive, and the administration of justice. According to Wolf 
(2016b),  
“[t]he power to appoint a commission of inquiry under section 84(2)(f) 
of the Constitution is not an executive power but a power of the head of 
state … The office of head of state is not part of the separation of 
powers … Accordingly there cannot be an infringement upon the 
separation of powers”.  
Whether one can speak of a usurpation of the president’s powers by the Public 
Protector, when the remedial action instructs the president to appoint a commission 
of inquiry and requires that a non-partisan person, in this case the chief justice, 
should name the judge who should conduct the inquiry, is not easy to answer.  
The ludicrous situation is that the head of state (former president Zuma) was 
required to appoint a commission of inquiry into alleged wrongdoing of the head of 
government (also Zuma) on the basis of prima facie evidence that he has abdicated 
his executive powers to the Gupta family with regard to cabinet appointments and 
that he acted in a manner that is inconsistent with the Executive Members’ Ethics Act 
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(Wolf 2016b). As head of state, Zuma claimed that “he may not abdicate his powers 
under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution to appoint a commission of inquiry in a 
personal capacity” (Wolf 2016b). Yet the same scrupulous exercise of power did not 
seem to apply with regard to the exercise of his executive powers under sections 91 
and 96 of the Constitution. He was also not willing to concede a conflict of interest.  
Wolf (2016b) states that, 
“[w]hat is certain is that in the somewhat halcyon days of constitutional 
drafting, no one foresaw that the president of democratic South Africa 
could be so conflicted that the nation is forced to ponder this dilemma 
… There can be no doubt, however, that he may not be the arbiter in 
his own matter … If the remedial action is challenged, a court will have 
to determine whether the power of the head of state to appoint 
commissions of inquiry may be limited under these circumstances by 
requiring that another state official should select the presiding 
commissioner in order to uphold the Rule of Law, accountability and 
transparency as foundational values of the Constitution”.  
There are potentially two officials who could exercise this power on the president’s 
behalf should a limitation of power be permissible: the deputy president and the chief 
justice. The deputy president can only take over functions of the president in an 
acting capacity within the limited scope specified by section 90 of the Constitution, 
i.e. when the president is absent from the country or otherwise unable to fulfil the 
duties of president, or during a vacancy (Wolf 2016b). From an objective legal 
perspective, the president is clearly not able to fulfil the responsibility to appoint a 
commission of inquiry into his own abdication of executive power due to conflict of 
interest (Wolf 2016b).   
What might pose a difficulty is that parliament has previously rejected a motion to 
remove Zuma from office in terms of section 89 of the Constitution on the basis of his 
breaches of the law and the Constitution in the Nkandla scandal. The majority in 
parliament “found that none of the section 89(1)(a)-(c) grounds, including an inability 
to perform the functions of office, warrants his removal from office” (Merten 2016). 
Subsequent to the release of the State of Capture report, “a motion of no confidence 
in the president was rejected by parliament” (Nicholson 2016b). When questioned 
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about the involvement of the Gupta family in state affairs and taking decisions on his 
behalf or him facilitating improper favours for the Guptas in parliament, Zuma evaded 
answering the questions (Munusamy 2016).   
Thus, objectively speaking, the president was unable to fulfil his functions as they 
related to the appointment of a commission of inquiry into his own malfeasance 
because of conflict of interests, but he continued to cling to power and thus blocked 
a section 90 option. Another reason that speaks against “the deputy president 
appointing the commission and selecting a commissioner in this specific case was 
the obvious conflict of interest of the cabinet” (Wolf 2016b). At least two ministers of 
the cabinet (Mosebenzi Zwane and Des van Rooyen) were also implicated by prima 
facie evidence presented to the Public Protector. Worse still, the whistle-blowers 
included a deputy cabinet minister and a former cabinet minister (Mcebisi Jonas and 
Barbara Hogan).  
Due to the high regard for the impartiality of the judiciary, it is understandable that 
the Public Protector determined that the “commission should be headed by a judge 
solely selected by the chief justice who shall provide one name to the president” 
(Public Protector South Africa 2016c:353). The chief justice seemed to be the 
obvious choice since he presided over the election of the president.  
Legal experts have mostly taken a guarded approach to the constitutional validity of 
the remedial action of the Public Protector and whether the power to appoint a 
commission of inquiry could be limited (Wolf 2016b). It is questionable whether the 
Public Prosecutor could instruct the president to appoint a commission of inquiry. It is 
one of the three instances mentioned by the Constitutional Court that would “amount 
to an abdication of the president’s power to another person or state organ” (Wolf 
2016b). Whether it would also constitute an abdication of power “when he selects a 
judge on the advice of the chief justice whom he consulted in the matter due to his 
personal conflict of interest, is open to question” (Wolf 2016b). 
The only instance that could have served as a precedent to clarify whether under 
such exceptional circumstances the president as head of state could be forced to 
appoint a commission of inquiry into executive malfeasance where he himself was 
implicated, was the case brought by Terry Crawford-Browne (Wolf 2016b). He 
unsuccessfully petitioned two sitting presidents – Motlanthe in December 2008 and 
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Zuma in June 2009 – to appoint a judicial commission of inquiry into the arms deal 
(Faull 2011; Quintal 2008).  
After the petitions were declined, Crawford-Browne, 
“launched an action in the Western Cape High Court by way of public 
interest proceedings, arguing that the president was responsible to 
exercise his powers under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution and to 
discharge that obligation in a manner which accords with the tenets of 
legality and rationality” (Wolf 2016b).  
Wolf (2016b) states that,  
“[h]e wanted a direction that the president appoint the commission of 
inquiry, that the president’s decision not to do so be set aside, and that 
the matter be referred back to him for determination … Zuma’s counsel 
filed a number of dilatory exceptions to this”.  
The final exception filed on behalf of the president “was that only the Constitutional 
Court has the jurisdiction to decide the matter” (O’Grady 2011). 
After that exception was filed, Crawford-Browne filed an application to the 
Constitutional Court, applying for direct access to the Constitutional Court in terms of 
section 167(4)(e) of the Constitution to grant the same relief he claimed in the action 
by way of a declaratory mandamus aimed at securing the appointment of an 
independent judicial inquiry into the arms deal (Wolf 2016b).  
In February 2011, the Constitutional Court set down the matter for a hearing on 5 
May 2011 and set deadlines to file written argument on the following issues 
(Directions 7 February 2011 Case CCT 103/10): 
“a) In what circumstances is this Court empowered to scrutinise the exercise by 
the president of his power to appoint a commission of inquiry in terms of 
section 84(2)(e) of the Constitution?  
b)  Does the Constitution oblige the president to exercise his power to appoint a 
commission of inquiry whenever there are indications of corruption, 
malfeasance and misfeasance in relation to public procurement?  
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c)  If not, in what circumstances do indications of corruption, malfeasance and 
misfeasance in relation to public procurement oblige the president to appoint a 
commission of inquiry?  
d)  More particularly, in the circumstances alleged by the applicant, and assuming 
that all the allegations of fact he advances are true, does it follow that the 
president is constitutionally obliged to exercise his power to appoint a 
commission of inquiry?  
e)  If the answer to (d) is yes, what steps should the court take to resolve the 
disputes of fact?  
f)  If the answer to (d) is no, is the court able to dispose of the application without 
resolving the disputes of fact?” (Directions 7 February 2011 Case CCT 
103/10). 
The case was eventually postponed to 20 September 2011 (O’Grady 2011). 
Unfortunately, before the case could be heard by the Constitutional Court, the 
president capitulated, after which Crawford-Browne and Zuma reached a last-minute 
out-of-court settlement (Hoffman 2016). Zuma proceeded to appoint the Seriti 
Commission of Inquiry (Powell 2011; Mail & Guardian 2011; Mail & Guardian 2009).  
It is interesting to note what motivated Zuma, who was conclusively implicated in the 
arms deal scandal in Shaik’s corruption trial, to abandon the case at the last minute.  
According to Wolf (2016a),  
“[r]eportedly members of the ANC’s National Executive Committee 
(NEC) said that Zuma took the decision to appoint the commission of 
inquiry because he did not want a situation where the courts would be 
seen to be running the affairs of the government on his behalf”.  
Zuma spent a great deal of time complaining about the attitude of the Constitutional 
Court judges and said that the ANC and his government were under attack from 
some reactionaries who go to court on everything. To appoint a commission of 
inquiry was an attempt to stay ahead of the court, according to an NEC member, 
who pointed out that if the matter was left to the court, the type of commission and its 
terms of reference would be stricter and more binding on many party leaders and the 
party itself. Many ANC leaders would have been expected to testify if the court ruled 
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that a commission of inquiry should be appointed and they might have ended up in 
jail if it was found that the organisation was a beneficiary of the arms deal bribes 
(Mail & Guardian 2011; Letsoalo and Mataboge 2011). 
De Vos expresses the opinion that the Constitutional Court could almost certainly not 
have ordered the president to appoint such a commission of inquiry (De Vos in Wolf 
2016a). De Vos points out that the power to appoint a commission of inquiry had a 
strong political dimension and, as the Constitutional Court made clear in the 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) case, the 
exercise of these powers would very seldom be reviewable by a court (De Vos in 
Wolf 2016a). Where these powers are exercised (or not exercised), a court would 
only intervene if the decision by the president was irrational. One would have to 
show that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, which, in the opinion 
of De Vos (2008a), would have been difficult, “given the many different policy options 
open to the president to fulfil his constitutional duty to uphold and defend the 
founding values of openness and accountability” specified by section 1 of the 
Constitution. What De Vos (2008a) overlooked was that Crawford-Browne launched 
the case after the executive interfered in the arms deal corruption trial and the 
Hawks subsequently closed the case (O’Grady 2011). Crawford-Browne’s papers 
showed that it was irrational to decline to appoint a commission of inquiry, which is 
why Zuma capitulated. 
The issues raised by the chief justice in the Crawford-Browne vs The President of 
South Africa Case CCT 103/10 case are exactly the same issues that are at stake 
with regard to the constitutionality of the Public Protector’s remedial action in the 
State of Capture report. Wolf (2016a) stated:  
“Since we do not have the benefit of a Constitutional Court ruling on 
the issue, it is difficult to say whether the court would have created an 
exception to the rule that the president should exercise the 
responsibility to appoint commissions of inquiry in a personal capacity 
where he is the subject of a conflict of interest”.  
It may well be that the court would have ruled that a limitation of power is reasonable 
and in the public interest under these circumstances. The complexity of the issues at 
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stake is reflected by the views of various legal experts on the validity of the remedial 
action. 
Former Deputy Chief Judge Dikgang Moseneke (Kubheka 2016) and Professor 
Karthy Govendor (Mlambo 2016) expressed the view that “a conflict of interest would 
probably bar Zuma from appointing a commission of inquiry into his own wrongdoing 
because it would be inappropriate to select a judge of his choice on the basis of the 
rule nemo iudex in sua causa” (Wolf 2016a). 
De Vos (in Wolf 2016a) observes that the remedial action required by the Public 
Protector indeed fetters the discretion of the president to appoint a commission of 
inquiry.  
If the remedial action is contested, the question a court will have to answer is 
whether the,  
“special circumstances of this case render this fettering of the 
president’s constitutional powers constitutionally valid or not. Is it 
permissible – in these extraordinary circumstances in which the 
president is being implicated in breaches of the Executive Members’ 
Ethics Act and in possible corruption – for the Public Protector to 
restrict the constitutional powers of the president?” (Wolf 2016a).  
There are excellent reasons why the president should not have the discretion to 
appoint a judge of his choice to head a commission of inquiry to investigate matters 
delineated by the president. The president is conflicted as he is implicated in 
wrongdoing, which would have to be investigated by the commission of inquiry. It is 
inevitable that if his discretion is not fettered, he would appoint a judge he perceives 
to be sympathetic to him. This conflict of interest would almost certainly invalidate 
the entire commission (De Vos 2016).  
Phephelaphi Dube, the director of the Centre for Constitutional Rights, also makes a 
case in support of reasonable limitations of the presidential prerogative to appoint a 
commission of inquiry when it is in the public interest. In appointing a commission of 
inquiry, by necessary implication it is important that the commission should have 
absolute credibility and therefore absolutely no partiality (in Wolf 2016a). Thus, the 
public interest should outweigh the president’s prerogative to determine who should 
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conduct the inquiry. Given the Constitutional Court’s views on the Public Protector’s 
powers in the Economic Freedom Fighters vs Speaker of the National Assembly 
case, the president would probably have to show why it is, given the State of 
Capture report, not rational to appoint a commission of inquiry (Wolf 2016a). She 
adds that it appears as though, given the timeframes and sheer volume of 
investigations to be conducted, there would have been insufficient time to make 
binding remedial actions which would have withstood the scrutiny of the courts (Wolf 
2016a). As such, the State of Capture report does not make specific findings but 
rather recommends the appointment of a commission of inquiry. The commission of 
inquiry would then be a judicial fact-finding mission of a very high level of 
competency, based on the State of Capture report’s prima facie assessments. Given 
the circumstances in which the State of Capture report was compiled, there is a need 
for a commission of inquiry to bring to finality the investigations conducted by the 
erstwhile Public Protector. As the Public Protector herself noted, the Executive 
Members’ Ethics Act obliged her to investigate any alleged breach of the Executive 
Ethics Code and thereafter, within 30 days, submit a report to either the president or 
the premier, depending on the nature of the complaint. It is well known that the then 
Public Protector’s term of office ended on 14 October and she was bound by the 
timeframe (Dube 2016).  
The State of Capture report determines that the judge leading the commission 
should be able to appoint his or her own staff and investigate all the issues using the 
record of this investigation and the report as a starting point. Furthermore, the 
commission must complete its task and present the report with findings and 
recommendations to the president within 180 days (Public Protector South Africa 
2016c:354). These are indeed very detailed instructions with regard to the terms of 
reference. It is open to question whether the Public Protector can issue such 
instructions, but the terms of reference of a commission is so closely linked to the 
power to appoint a commission of inquiry that the two cannot really be separated. If a 
limitation of the power under section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution is justifiable, which 
might extend to the terms of reference, which is part of the power, the terms of 
reference are issued independent of the Commissions Act. 
It appears that the Public Protector intended “that the commission of inquiry should 
be given powers of evidence in terms of the Commissions Act. She required that the 
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powers of evidence are no less than that of the Public Protector” (Public Protector 
South Africa 2016c:354). Section 3 of the Commissions Act, No. 8 of 1947, 
determines that for the purpose of ascertaining any matter relating to the subject of 
investigations, a commissioner shall have the powers of a High Court to summon 
witnesses, to lead evidence under oath, and to require the production of documents 
to the inquiry.  
These powers are similar to the powers conferred upon the Public Protector in terms 
of section 7 of the Public Protector Act. There would be little sense to conduct such 
an inquiry without powers of evidence. 
In South Africa, the appointment of commissions of inquiry is regulated in terms of 
legislation in 1947. The Commissions Act, which is still in force, determines that a 
commission may be appointed “for the purpose of investigating a matter of public 
concern”. Wolf (2016a) states that the  
“topics that could be investigated were therefore no longer restricted to 
matters of public policy for purposes of advising the government on 
concept legislation and were soon extended beyond that. Apart from 
that, the Act conferred powers to subpoena witnesses and take 
evidence under oath similar to that of the Supreme Court 
commissioners”. 
In later constitutions, the prerogatives were explicitly listed and formed part of the 
powers of the head of state. According to Wolf (2016a), 
“[t]he convention that the prerogatives should be exercised on advice 
of another state organ was retained, but in how far this was still 
possible to speak of the head of state acting on the advice of the head 
of government with regard to the executive prerogative powers since 
the fusion of the two offices in 1984, is open to question”. 
This construct was retained by both the 1993 and 1996 constitutions. The 
Constitutional Court resolved the issue in that it ruled in the Sarfu case (President of 
the Republic of South Africa vs South African Rugby Football Union (Sarfu) 2001 (1) 
SA 1 (CC) para. 145) that the former prerogative powers are now “original” powers of 
the head of state conferred upon him by the Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
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further held that the appointment of commissions of inquiry in terms of the 
Constitution was a “separate legal act distinct from that which vests the powers 
contained in the Commissions Act in a commission of inquiry” (Wolf 2016a). The 
source of the power to appoint commissions of inquiry is the Constitution. Whereas 
the Commissions Act limits the power of the president with regard to the kind of 
commission of enquiry he can appoint under the Act to matters of “public concern”, 
section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution does not explicitly specify limitations to the kind of 
commissions that can be appointed. Yet, the exercise of this power is nevertheless 
constrained by the Constitution in a variety of ways (President of the Republic of 
South Africa vs South African Rugby Football Union (Sarfu) 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
paras. 155-156). 
Since the remedial action of the Public Protector arguably intended that the 
Commissions Act should find application, one should take note of what the 
Constitutional Court regarded as “public concern”. The Constitutional Court 
interpreted the term “public concern” as containing “two specifications: first, the word 
‘concern’ implies ‘worry and anxiety’ or a ‘matter of interest or importance’ – both 
interpretations are relevant; and second, the word ‘public’ implies that private 
concerns are excluded” (President of the Republic of South Africa vs South African 
Rugby Football Union (Sarfu) 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para. 174). It must further be “a 
concern of members of the public and which is ‘widely shared’ by ‘a significant 
segment or portion of the public’” (President of the Republic of South Africa vs South 
African Rugby Football Union (Sarfu) 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para. 175). In other words, 
the purpose of the “public concern” requirement “is to exclude inquiries into purely 
private matters, on the one hand, and, on the other, to protect the interests of the 
public by enabling effective investigation of matters that are of public concern” 
(President of the Republic of South Africa vs South African Rugby Football Union 
(Sarfu) 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para. 171).  
The Constitutional Court stated that  
“coercive powers of subpoena are generally reserved for courts. It is 
therefore quite appropriate that where the president is given the power 
to extend them to a commission investigating a matter, he may do so 
only where, viewed objectively, the matter to be investigated by the 
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commission is one of public concern. It is an objective check, 
justiciable by the courts … The legally relevant question is not whether 
the president thought that the subject matter of the inquiry was a matter 
of public concern, but whether it was objectively so at the time the 
decision was taken” (President of the Republic of South Africa vs South 
African Rugby Football Union (Sarfu) 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) para. 175). 
Wolf (2016a) argue that  
“[t]his is a rather wide interpretation of the scope of application of the 
Commissions Act and it does not clarify whether the president may 
only appoint commissions of inquiry into matters of public policy or also 
into executive malfeasance or an abuse of power by the executive”.   
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It would seem that the court restricted it to the former instances since the court 
described the power as a discretionary power “related to policy”:  
“In the case of the appointment of commissions of inquiry, it is well-
established that the functions of a commission of inquiry are to 
determine facts and to advise the president through the making of 
recommendations … The president is bound neither to accept the 
commission’s factual findings nor is he or she bound to follow its 
recommendations … A commission of inquiry is an adjunct to the policy 
formation responsibility of the president … It is a mechanism whereby 
he or she can obtain information and advice. When the president 
appointed the commission of inquiry into rugby he was not 
implementing legislation; he was exercising an original constitutional 
power vested in him alone” (President of the Republic of South Africa 
vs South African Rugby Football Union (Sarfu) 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
paras. 146-147). 
One could therefore argue that the scrutiny of executive abuse of power or 
malfeasance does not fall within the scope of topics that may be investigated by a 
commission of inquiry appointed by the president under section 84(2)(f) of the 
Constitution because it is a matter of accountability and not a matter of policy. Yet,  
“it does not make sense to confer such intrusive powers on a panel of 
experts that should investigate policy issues with a view to draft 
legislation. In practice, both kinds of commissions of inquiry had been 
appointed for decades – both before and after the adoption of the 1996 
Constitution” (Wolf 2016a). 
The topic of the investigation of a judicial commission of inquiry in terms of the Public 
Protector’s remedial action would clearly fall within the wider context of a public 
concern. Professor Govender, for example,  
“observed that Deputy Finance Minister Jonas raised ‘extremely 
serious’ allegations that he had been offered the position of Finance 
Minister and a R600 000 bribe at the Gupta’s Saxonworld home, but 
nothing was done about that by the president … The evidence of Vytjie 
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Mentor and Barbara Hogan implicated him in an equally serious way” 
(Wolf 2016a).  
Another dilemma of a judicial commission of inquiry into executive abuse of power or 
malfeasance is that it duplicates functions specifically accorded to the Public 
Protector by section 182 of the Constitution. The Constitution expressly created a 
permanent body to investigate such impropriety, and that body is the Office of the 
Public Protector. If judicial commissions of inquiry should investigate similar matters, 
that could amount to a usurpation of the powers of the Public Protector. It is 
therefore ironic that the Public Protector, who has far more extensive powers to 
make legally binding findings and order remedial action, should recommend that a 
judicial commission of inquiry should complete the State of Capture investigation 
(Wolf 2016a). 
Finally, the North Gauteng High Court in Pretoria found in December 2017 that 
Madonsela’s recommended remedial actions proposed in the State of Capture report 
after her investigation into state capture were “wise, necessary, rational and 
appropriate” (Tandwa 2017).  
In a landmark and scathing judgement, the full Bench of the Court, led by Judge 
President Dunstan Mambo, dismissed former president Zuma’s application against 
Madonsela’s report:  
“The court found that Zuma must institute a commission of inquiry into 
state capture within 30 days, which would be headed by a judge 
appointed by the Chief Justice Mogoeng Mogoeng, as per the binding 
remedial actions put forward by the Public Protector” (Tandwa 2017).  
In addition, the commission of inquiry was “to be given powers of evidence collection 
that are not less than that of the Public Protector … The commission was ordered to 
complete its task, and present a report with findings and recommendations within 
180 days” (Tandwa 2017). It was also found that “none of the grounds of review [in 
the Zuma application] has any merit … The remedial action [of the Public Protector] 
is lawful and appropriate” (Tandwa 2017). This issue is dealt with by sections 90 and 
96 of the Constitution, stating that if the president “is unable to fulfil [his] duties due 
to the risk of a conflict between [the president’s] official responsibilities and private 
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interests”, the appointment of commissions of inquiry is plainly and expressly in the 
realm of the executive (section 84 of the Constitution). 
The Commission of Inquiry into State Capture is officially a reality. The chief justice 
appointed Deputy Chief Justice Raymond Zondo to head the commission. Zondo 
was appointed with a team of six commissioners and additional investigators and 
they have already begun their work of probing allegations of state capture. 
Therefore, it is clear that the Public Protector has remedial power even if it is the 
president of the country and his family who are implicated in the investigation. The 
limitations imposed by the Public Protector with regard to the commission of inquiry 
appear to be the best solution under the circumstances.  
5.10 Summary 
In terms of the underpinning variables that were discussed in the previous chapters, 
this chapter specifically reviewed several past cases that the Public Protector 
investigated in general and the outcomes of the Public Protector’s State of Capture 
report in terms of its remedial power to enforce the report’s recommendations in 
particular. The Public Protector exercises his or her mandate as part of the 
government system, geared towards supporting and enhancing democratically 
accountable good governance desirable for South Africa’s stability. It is for this 
reason that the Public Protector Act empowers the Public Protector with a specific 
mandate, without encroaching the domain of other state functionaries. The Public 
Protector Act also spells out the jurisdiction within which the Public Protector must 
exercise the mandate of his or her office. 
The annual reports compiled by the Office of the Public Protector represent a 
comprehensive account of all the work undertaken by the Public Protector in a given 
financial year. Public Protector South Africa (2014:9) outlines that the annual reports 
are submitted in terms of section 181(5) of the Constitution: “The reports seek to 
provide an account of how the Office of the Public Protector fared in implementing its 
constitutional mandate and specific commitments of the year under review while 
capturing key promises for the year ahead”. The Office of the Public Protector 
depends on the National Assembly, representatives of organs of state, and the 
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people of South Africa for support and facilitating the fulfilment of its constitutional 
mandate. 
With annual reports, the Public Protector is afforded the opportunity to outline what 
has been achieved for the year, as well as to provide a clear indication of the scope 
of work covered given the budget allocations provided to the Office of the Public 
Protector. Annual reports also serve to highlight the backlog that the Public Protector 
encounters in discharging the mandate of the office. The annual reports presented 
by the Office of the Public Protector represent some form of vertical accountability, 
which is the mere essence of good governance and democratic accountability. 
This chapter discussed the evolution of the Office of the Public Protector in South 
Africa, the activities of the Public Protector, the powers of the Public Protector, as 
well as the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the Public Protector. The chapter 
also contextualised the role of the Public Protector. The fact that the Public Protector 
is expected to act impartially is reason enough to hope for a massive contribution on 
the part of this functionary with regard to pursuing good governance. This 
functionary, together with other horizontal accountability institutions, has an 
important role to play in steering South Africa on the right course; the result of which 
will have a lasting impact on the citizens’ lives. The Public Protector is credited with 
being the embodiment of just and fair public sector administration. 
The chapter also provided selected reports of the Public Protector contextualised as 
cases in order to determine how the mandate of the Public Protector is complied with 
in a democratic system of cooperative governance. In this regard, the cases of the 
Minister of Transport in 2007, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs in 2009, the 
Minister of International Relations and Cooperation in 2016, and the Minister of Basic 
Education in 2013 were presented as examples of oversight in terms of the national 
sphere of government. 
The chapter also highlighted investigation reports that implicate members of the 
PECs in the provincial sphere of government. In this regard, the cases of the Premier 
of the Free State in 2006 and the Premier of Gauteng in 2010 were highlighted. In 
the local sphere of government, the chapter highlighted investigation reports that 
implicate members of municipal councils; for example, the cases of the Kungwini 
Local Municipality in 2006 and the Municipal Council of the City of Matlosana in 
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2007. Cooperative governance goes beyond the three spheres of government, 
hence the chapter highlighted investigation reports that involve public officials and 
public entities. These included the cases of the SABS in 2009, the CCMA in 2007, 
and the Gauteng Department of Education in 2011. 
Finally, the chapter analysed the controversial case of the State of Capture report, 
which created a dilemma in terms of, inter alia, the alleged state abuse by the acting 
president at that stage that raised questions in terms of the remedial actions that the 
Public Protector can take to expose corruption and state abuse. Questions in terms 
of the validity of the recommended judicial inquiry and the nature and scope of the 
power to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate state abuse came to the fore 
as an outcome of this report.  
The Public Protector represents the ideal of a well-governed country where service 
delivery is the norm and growth and development are achievable. The hopes and 
aspirations of the South African public in promoting the general wellbeing of the 
people rest with the Public Protector and other horizontal accountability institutions. 
Good governance requires strong institutions that are central to a functioning 
democracy, and for this reason, the Public Protector shoulders massive 
responsibility. The Public Protector is the last line of defence against ruthless and 
unscrupulous politicians and public officials. This functionary has the obligation to 
change the environment within which public sector institutions serve the nation. 
Prosperous states need the right institutions to strengthen their democracies and 
accountability.  
The powers, roles, responsibilities, and functions of the Public Protector are provided 
for in the Constitution and in other pieces of legislation. From the prescripts and 
statutory framework, it is clear that the Public Protector does not operate arbitrarily 
and without due regard for the law. The Public Protector, like all other public 
functionaries, accounts to some higher authority, like parliament. The Public 
Protector operates within a statutory framework and is not expected to go beyond 
prescribed boundaries or function ultra vires. In the same vein, the Public Protector 
considers the merits and demerits of each case being investigated, and reaches an 
outcome that is seen as fair and just. The statutory framework also sets limits to the 
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jurisdiction of the Public Protector by prescribing areas where the Office of the Public 
Protector may not venture to investigate.   
The chapter also analysed the remedial power of the Office of the Public Protector in 
terms of recommendations made with regard to improper practices and the abuse of 
power of selected cases in general and the controversial case of the State of 
Capture report in particular. It emerged that, unlike Ombudsmen in other 
jurisdictions, the Office of the Public Protector is established on a solid foundation 
that guarantees its independence so as to enable it to carry out its functions 
impartially. In so doing, the Public Protector may hold the government accountable 
on various activities that are investigated and his or her recommendations must be 
adhered to.  
In terms of the remedial action provided in the State of Capture report, the president 
was required to appoint the Zondo Commission of Inquiry despite his attempts to set 
aside the remedial actions recommended by the then Public Protector, Thuli 
Madonsela. The Public Protector therefore has remedial power, and it is not for the 
president to decide what form of remedial action would be more appropriate under 
the circumstances of this particular investigation into executive malfeasance and 
malpractice.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
SYNTHESIS, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1    Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide a synthesis of the key arguments and findings derived 
from the literature review and the legislative prescripts that serve to govern South 
Africa. Furthermore, the purpose of this chapter is to consolidate the data and 
assumptions presented in the text across all chapters of this thesis. 
Although the study contains facets of descriptive and exploratory approaches, it was 
predominantly explanatory in nature. The primary research question that was posed 
in the introductory chapter in Section 1.2 was: What is the role and challenges of the 
Public Protector as an independent Chapter 9 institution, and do the remedial actions 
of the Public Protector contribute to the implementation of good governance in the 
South African constitutional democracy? 
This primary research question is intricately related to the research problem that this 
study seeks to unravel. In an effort to investigate and examine the research problem 
in terms of the above primary research question, 11 research objectives were 
analysed throughout the chapters of this thesis, and these are synthesised and 
concluded on in the sections that follow. 
6.2 The research objectives of the study   
The following objectives formed the basis for meaningful interpretation and analysis 
of the text that made up the chapters of this study: 
 Objective One, discussed in Chapter Two, aimed to provide the conceptual, 
contextual, and theoretical variables that influence democratic good 
governance in the public sector. 
 Objective Two, discussed in Chapter Two, aimed to discuss the origins of the 
theoretical variables that underpin good governance in South Africa and how 
these paradigms are used to advance the practical application of good 
governance. 
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 Objective Three, discussed in Chapter Two, aimed to provide an exploration 
of the conceptual knowledge of the main paradigms that influence the 
theoretical and philosophical public administration frameworks that govern 
public sector activities. 
 Objective Four, discussed in Chapter Three, aimed to highlight how a public 
oversight functionary is constituted internationally and to determine the 
operations of the Office of the Ombudsman as a “watchdog” institution in 
selected countries. 
 Objective Five, discussed in Chapter Four, aimed to contextualise the 
statutory, regulatory, and policy frameworks that influence South Africa’s 
Public Protector.  
 Objective Six, discussed in Chapter Four, aimed to determine the multilateral, 
structural, and external variables that oversee good governance.  
 Objective Seven, discussed in Chapter Five, aimed to determine and 
contextualise the scope, role, and functions of the Public Protector in 
promoting good governance. 
 Objective Eight, discussed in Chapter Five, aimed to contextualise the 
mandate of the Public Protector as an independent institution that operates in 
a democratic state system by way of case examples. 
 Objective Nine, discussed in Chapter Five, aimed to determine whether the 
recommendations made by the Public Protector have remedial power in terms 
of their enforcement.   
 Objective Ten, discussed in this chapter of the thesis, aims to determine the 
variables that influence the credibility of the Office of the Public Protector. 
 Objective Eleven, discussed in this chapter of the thesis, aims to determine 
whether the Public Protector’s remedial actions are enforceable in terms of 
the prescriptions that were made in the State of Capture report.  
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6.3  Synthesis of the chapters of the study 
The following section provides a synthesis of the chapters of the study.  
6.3.1 Chapter One: Research rationale and scientific orientation of the 
study 
Chapter One contextualised the background of the role of the Public Protector as 
one of the Chapter 9 institutions (State Institutions Supporting Constitutional 
Democracy), in order to strengthen the academic discourse for the continued support 
of the Office of the Public Protector as an independent institution to conduct its 
constitutional mandate of advancing good governance. The chapter introduced the 
research by way of providing the background, research rationale, and problem 
statement to provide context for the research problem. It formulated the primary 
research question, secondary research questions, and research objectives. It 
provided the scientific and methodological paradigm in terms of the qualitative 
approach that was followed in this research.  
The chapter explained the research design and contextualised the methodological 
research paradigm, and included an explanation of the types of research, the 
purpose of research, a deductive versus an inductive approach, the relationship 
between theory and knowledge, and the unit of analysis. The chapter discussed the 
adopted unobtrusive research method (conceptual, content, comparative, and 
documentary analyses). The chapter also highlighted the relevant aspects of 
compiling a literature review and explained the validity and reliability of the research. 
The chapter highlighted the data-collection sources in terms of the sources that were 
used to obtain information for the research. The terms frequently utilised in the study 
were defined and the rationale behind the ethical considerations was highlighted. 
Finally, the chapter provided a brief outline to demarcate the chapters in the thesis.  
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6.3.2 Chapter Two: Conceptual, contextual, and theoretical variables that 
influence democratic good governance in the public sector 
Chapter Two aimed to clarify the following secondary questions posed in Section 1.3 
of this study: 
 Which concepts are most appropriate and adequate to address good 
governance challenges in South Africa? 
 What does the concept “democracy” entail? 
 What do the concepts “governance” and “good governance” entail? 
 What do the measures of good governance entail? 
 What is the nature and essence of the variables and concepts that influence 
good governance? 
 What do the concepts “legitimacy” and “credibility” entail? 
 What does the concept “development” entail? 
 What does accountability and transparency entail? 
 What does decentralisation entail? 
 What does centralisation entail? 
 What does leadership entail?   
 How did P(p)ublic A(a)dministration develop? 
 What does the Public Management paradigm entail? 
 What does the NPM paradigm entail? 
 What does Post-NPM entail? 
 What does NPG entail? 
 What does Network Theory entail? 
This chapter provided an outline of the conceptual framework that served as the 
connecting thread in all the chapters of the thesis. This chapter drew most of its data 
from the literature to advance the argument that good governance is an ideal worth 
pursuing by all states – with some exceptions.  
Firstly, the chapter examined the concept of democracy and paid attention to the 
following principles of democracy: political equality, popular consultation, and 
majority rule. Democracy is hailed as a system best suited for countries that aspire to 
entrench the principles of equality, justice, and fairness in governing for the good 
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cause of all their citizens. The concepts of governance and good governance and 
the measures of good governance were also discussed. The chapter paid attention 
to the connection between the concepts “governance” and “good governance”. Of 
particular importance is that good governance is an ideal that could be turned into 
reality, with the government being the willing party in the pursuit of a better life for all. 
The chapter also discussed other concepts and phenomena that are closely linked to 
democratic governance and good governance as all have a bearing on good 
governance. Notably, attention was paid to legitimacy and credibility, development, 
accountability and transparency, decentralisation, and centralisation and leadership. 
Legitimacy and credibility determine how much support the government receives 
from the people it claims to govern. Development is crucial for measuring the 
success and prosperity of a nation state. Accountability and transparency are 
instrumental in ensuring that power is restrained and that authoritarian leadership is 
not allowed to flourish. Decentralisation is important to allow power to be devolved to 
all levels of government. Leadership is meant to provide fertile ground for credible 
persons to be at the helm of a country’s governance. 
This chapter outlined several concepts and approaches developed over time to 
provide insight into the dynamic nature of public administration and management. 
The chapter explored the P(p)ublic A(a)dministration paradigm and its impact on 
developments in the field of good governance. Theories are useful in providing a 
basis for analysing past and current developments in order to chart the future course 
of events. Theories are useful in explaining why things happen the way they do, and 
thus help in anticipating actions to take address the problem at hand. These 
theoretical frameworks provide the basis on which decisions in the public sector are 
made, especially taking into consideration the dynamic nature of events that shape 
the lives of citizens across the global community. In this regard, explanatory 
frameworks interpret events and developments that led to the current good 
governance paradigm. In this regard, the chapter discussed the Public Management 
paradigm, the NPM paradigm, Post-NPM, NPG, and Network Theory. These 
theories shaped the domain of Public Administration and the environment within 
which good governance flourishes.  
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The desire to establish systems to help governments to perform better have existed 
from time immemorial. Former American president Woodrow Wilson is credited with 
being the first leader to formalise public administration, with the main purpose being 
to ensure that government programmes are delivered effectively and efficiently. 
These well-established academic paradigms were presented as a necessity for 
paving the way for good governance to prevail. The chapter provided an explanation 
of how public administration evolved and finally developed and transformed into 
governance, and currently good governance.   
6.3.3 Chapter Three: International perspectives of public oversight 
institutions: The role and functions of an Ombudsman  
Chapter Three aimed to clarify the following secondary research questions posed in 
Section 1.3 of Chapter One: 
 What does the concept “Ombudsman” entail? 
 What do the international perspectives of public oversight institutions entail? 
 How is the modus operandi of the Public Protector constituted internationally 
(Ombudsman) to promote good governance? 
 What do the role and functions of an Ombudsman entail globally? 
 How did the Ombudsman develop in Scandinavia, Europe, the UK, Canada, 
the USA, New Zealand, Singapore, and Africa? 
This chapter served to provide an overview of how Ombudsmen in other countries 
influence the ideal of attaining good governance and maintaining public 
administration that is fair, just, efficient, and effective. The sample of countries 
chosen for the purpose of this study was by no means exhaustive, but was intended 
to highlight the context in which the Office of the Ombudsman operates in each 
country.  
The chapter discussed the roles and functions of the Ombudsman in selected 
countries and the reasons behind the establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman 
in these countries. These discussions were presented, firstly, in terms of the 
institution of the Ombudsman in Scandinavia and Europe. Selected countries in this 
regard included Sweden (as the first country who instituted this office), Finland, 
Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. Secondly, the Ombudsman institution in the 
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UK, Canada, Oregon in the USA, New Zealand, and Singapore received attention. 
Thirdly, in Africa, attention was given to Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, and 
Botswana.    
The chapter presented a comparative overview of how the institution of the 
Ombudsman (Public Protector) operates in these countries. When the institution of 
the Ombudsman was first established, the question was: Who guards the guardians 
of the people, and how can those at the helm of power be held accountable? The 
origin of the concept of an Ombudsman was traced, as well as how this institution 
evolved over the years and what this functionary has achieved in practice. The 
Ombudsman uses different titles from country to country and the application of the 
concept appears common. It must be emphasised that in some countries, the 
Ombudsman’s existence is a sheer formality because the powers of this functionary 
have been usurped by the government.   
Tchawouo Mbiada (2017:3) stated that 
“[d]espite the choice of the title ‘Public Protector’ in the Constitution, this 
institution falls into the general category of the Ombudsman … It follows, 
therefore, that the evolution the of the role of the Ombudsman is of relevance 
to that of the Public Protector from which it is derived … The origin and 
evolution of the role of the Public Protector should be located within that of the 
Ombudsman”.  
It took more than a century from the inception of the Office of the Ombudsman in the 
Swedish Constitution of 1809 to expand beyond Sweden. The institution spread 
throughout Scandinavia in the early to mid-20th century. Finland became the second 
Scandinavian country to establish an Ombudsman, which was empowered to 
investigate complaints of official misconduct and military and prison complaints. The 
third country to set up the Office of the Ombudsman was Norway, which appointed a 
military Ombudsman in 1952, followed by a general Ombudsman in 1962. Denmark 
followed suit in 1955. The establishment of the Office of the Ombudsman started to 
proliferate in the 1960s, with the extensive spread of government bureaucracy in 
many nations. The model of the Ombudsman in Denmark and Norway, which does 
not have the powers to investigate the judiciary, was copied by other countries. New 
Zealand established an Ombudsman based on the Danish format in 1962, followed 
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by a wave of creation of new offices in other countries around the world (Tchawouo 
Mbiada 2017:4). 
As it stands,  
“the establishment of the Ombudsman in many developing Commonwealth 
countries has been instrumental in the establishment of the institution 
internationally, beyond Scandinavia. Since its inception, the role of the 
Ombudsman has been to monitor and regulate the administrative activities of 
the executive branch of government” (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:4).  
The Ombudsman is a complaint-handling mechanism tasked with improving the 
accountability of governments. The Ombudsman serves as a vertical and horizontal 
accountability mechanism by receiving complaints from the people against the 
government, thereby serving as a check on government activities. The Ombudsman 
is therefore an instrument of democratic accountability between individuals and the 
administration of the state. Despite its origin, the Ombudsman has evolved so that it 
now incorporates a number of activities, such as the following: the Human Rights 
Ombudsman assumes the protection of human rights (the South African Human 
Rights Commission falls under this category) (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:4); the 
Classical Ombudsman deals with maladministration in the public sector; and the 
other Ombudsmen deal with a range of services (such as anti-corruption, leadership 
code enforcement, and/or environmental protection functions) (Tchawouo Mbiada 
2017:4). Notably, the focus of this thesis is on the Office of the Public Protector, 
which falls within the Office of the Classical Ombudsman.  
The Ombudsman institutions in Sweden and Finland have exclusive powers to 
investigate all aspects of state administration without exception, while some 
countries – such as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Singapore, the UK, Canada, 
the USA (specifically the state of Oregon), New Zealand, Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, 
Nigeria, and Botswana – have to contend with a number of limitations that are within 
reason. However, the importance of the Ombudsman institution cannot be 
overemphasised, particularly given the worldwide acceptance of this functionary as 
an oversight institution. The success of the Ombudsman institution differs from state 
to state and the contribution of this institution to enhancing good governance is 
laudable.  
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South Africa’s Public Protector compares favourably, and unfavourably, with 
counterparts globally, and there are many lessons to be drawn from the operations 
of this functionary in other countries. The mandate of the Ombudsman / Public 
Protector differs from country to country in the same way as different titles are used. 
In Sweden and Finland, the Ombudsman has extensive powers to the extent of 
being able to review the decisions of judges, although in Finland the powers are 
shared with the Chancellor of Justice. In Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and the 
UK, the Ombudsman’s powers are subject to some limitations but the Ombudsman 
still manages to defend the citizens against the arbitrary powers of the executive and 
its bureaucracy. 
In Canada and the USA, the Ombudsman is only operational at the state and 
provincial levels of government, and this functionary does not exist in all states and 
provinces. Of particular importance is that the Ombudsman is not circumvented from 
exercising the mandate of the office. The Ombudsman in New Zealand enjoys a 
greater degree of autonomy in the exercise of the powers of the office but is 
subjected to some limitations pertaining to issues of judicial review. The 
Ombudsman in Singapore has contributed immensely to good governance together 
with other strong accountability institutions present in that country. In Africa, the dire 
need to entrench the idea of an effective Ombudsman has presented many 
challenges, especially the fact that institutions established to remedy the situation of 
maladministration have not enjoyed much success. 
However, South Africa’s Public Protector has an opportunity to adopt some of the 
best practices from countries abroad and to remedy maladministration accordingly. 
This must, however, be done within the constitutional mandate set by the supreme 
law of the country, the Constitution. The success of the Public Protector is 
dependent on the support that the legislature must provide, especially because the 
Office of the Public Protector reports to parliament, as well as sufficient resources to 
fund all its activities. The most important lesson from some of the developed 
countries in particular is that tackling maladministration and corruption requires a 
collective effort on the part of all organs of state, without exception. Where the Public 
Protector has limitations, other competent authorities must perform their respective 
duties without fear, favour, or prejudice, and in line with the spirit of the Constitution. 
The result, after all, is that the benefits derived from good governance and an 
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effectively governed state will accrue to all South Africans. Party politics have no 
room in the aspiration for the pursuit of good governance; hence politicians must 
continually be monitored in their day-to-day operations.    
Notwithstanding the above, the role of the Ombudsman is to uphold government 
accountability. However, one of the concerns regarding the capacity of the 
Ombudsman to discharge its mandate is the issue of its independence. To this end, 
it is argued that the independence and impartiality of the Ombudsman are 
prerequisites for its effectiveness. In order to discharge its functions, the 
Ombudsman must be independent, impartial, fair, and confidential. However, the 
issue of the Ombudsman’s independence in the South African context does not 
arise. This is because the Constitution secures the independence of the Public 
Protector through its establishment and appointment, removal from the office, and 
allocation of budgets and powers (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:4). 
6.3.4 Chapter Four: Statutory, regulatory, policy, and structural variables 
that influence the role of the Public Protector 
Chapter Four aimed to address the following secondary research questions posed in 
Section 1.3 of Chapter One: 
 What does the statutory framework that governs the Public Protector entail? 
 What are the regulatory and policy variables that influence South Africa’s 
Public Protector? 
 What are the external structural variables that influence South Africa’s Public 
Protector? 
 Which multilateral international institutions are involved in promoting oversight 
of good governance?  
The chapter focused on the statutory, regulatory, policy, and structural variables as 
defined in South Africa’s local context. In addition to the Constitution, the chapter 
discussed the most comprehensive legislation contained in the statutory framework, 
namely the Public Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994, as amended by the Public Protector 
Amendment Act, No. 113 of 1998, and the Public Protector Amendment Act, No. 22 
of 2003.  
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Furthermore, the chapter identified and addressed other pieces of legislation and 
policies that do not necessarily prescribe the mandate of the Public Protector but 
have an overall impact on good governance in South Africa. Hence, there are other 
regulatory and policy guidelines that aim to enhance good governance, such as the 
King Code of Governance for South Africa of 2009 (King III) and the recently 
published King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa of 2016. 
This is a consideration of the unique nature of countries, of which South Africa is no 
exception. The variables in the local context are contextual, hence there is insistence 
on compliance with the Constitution and legislation and policies deemed desirable to 
help the country tread on the right course. The Public Protector is empowered, firstly 
by the Constitution, and secondly by other national legislation. 
The Public Protector receives its mandate from the Public Protector Act of 1994. The 
preamble of the Public Protector Act states, in part, that  
“the Office of the Public Protector … investigate matters … to protect 
the public against matters such as maladministration in connection with 
the affairs of government, improper conduct by a person performing a 
public function, improper acts with respect to public money, improper or 
unlawful enrichment of a person performing a public function and an 
act or opinion by a person performing a public function resulting in 
improper prejudice to another person”.  
The Public Protector Act also gives the Public Protector the authority to investigate 
and take appropriate remedial actions on his or her findings related to the above 
offences. The Public Protector therefore has the mandate to order other state 
institutions to take appropriate remedial action against any impropriety or prejudice 
made by the government, including the president of the country. Court decisions, 
however, may not be investigated by the Office of the Public Protector. The Public 
Protector has the power to investigate complaints from the South African public or on 
his or her own initiative at any level of government, including national, provincial, and 
local government, and any public office bearer, any parastatal, and any statutory 
council.    
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The Public Protector was established in terms of section 181(a) of the Constitution. 
The supreme law of the country that governs the conduct and organisation of the 
nation therefore created the Public Protector. The Public Protector’s independence 
derives from the fact that the Constitution created this office. This is why the 
Constitution in unambiguous terms provides that the Office of the Public Protector is 
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and it must be 
impartial and must exercise its powers and perform its functions without fear, favour, 
or prejudice. Since a motion to amend the constitutional provision establishing the 
Public Protector requires an unlikely supporting vote of at least two-thirds in the 
National Assembly and a supporting vote of at least six members of the National 
Council of Provinces, it is unlikely that the independence of the Public Protector will 
be restricted. In any event, the more difficult it is to change the legal foundation of 
the Office of the Public Protector, the more likely it is that the tenure of the office will 
be secured. Security of tenure creates stability and increases public confidence in 
whoever occupies the Office of the Public Protector. Besides the independence of 
the Public Protector arising from constitutional guarantees, such independence also 
arises from the manner of the appointment. 
The latter part of the chapter focused on the international community and multilateral 
institutions that are involved in promoting, enhancing, and sustaining good 
governance across the world. These international players use a host of incentives 
and interrelated measures, ideologies, and principles to assist countries in attaining 
good governance. Some also use sanctions if need be to enforce compliance on the 
part of the receiving countries. These multilateral institutions include regional and 
global players whose mandate is to provide support to fledgling democracies and 
those that are attempting to observe good governance principles in their endeavour 
to govern their countries well. 
The chapter explained the unintended consequences normally associated with 
prescriptions made by various multilateral institutions and international movements 
on good governance. It paid attention to country- and international-level initiatives 
that influence good governance, without losing sight of the agendas of the major 
donors and international humanitarian funding institutions. In this regard, attention 
was paid to multilateral international institutions involved in promoting good 
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governance such as the UN, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the OECD, the European 
Commission, the IMF, the AfDB, the World Bank, the ADB, the EBRD, and the IADB. 
6.3.5  Chapter Five: Contextualising the scope, role, functions, and remedial 
power of South Africa’s Public Protector to promote good governance 
and democratic accountability 
Chapter Five aimed to provide answers to the following questions posed in Section 
1.3 of Chapter One: 
 How did the Office of the Public Protector develop in South Africa? 
 What is the mandate of the Public Protector as an independent institution that 
operates in a democratic state system? 
 What do the role and activities of the Public Protector entail? 
 What are the powers of the Public Protector? 
 What do the responsibilities of the Public Protector entail?  
 What are the functions of the Public Protector?  
 How can selective reports of the Public Protector be contextualised to provide 
a representative example in general of state abuse? 
 How did the case of the State of Capture report create a dilemma in terms of 
the validity of the recommended judicial inquiry? 
 How did the case of the State of Capture report contextualise the nature and 
scope of the power to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate state 
abuse? 
 Are the Public Protector’s remedial actions enforceable in terms of the 
prescriptions that were made in the State of Capture report?  
Chapter Five contextualised many variables that influence South Africa’s Public 
Protector’s mandate in terms of the above secondary research questions, in 
particular the acts of mediation, conciliation, negotiation, and advising on appropriate 
remedies or employing any other expedient means and remedial actions to right 
wrongs. It is clear that the Public Protector does not possess arbitrary powers but 
rather prescribed powers.    
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During the multiparty negotiations that led to the country’s first democratic election in 
1994, it was decided that South Africa needed a Public Protector to establish and 
maintain efficient and proper public administration and to promote democratic good 
governance and accountability. The Office of the Public Protector was established in 
terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution, which makes it one of the state organs that 
also support democracy. It is independent from government and political alliance and 
no person or organ of state may interfere with its functioning. The Public Protector 
serves a non-renewable term of seven years; at the end of seven years, a new 
Public Protector must be appointed. 
The annual reports compiled by the Office of the Public Protector represent a 
comprehensive account of all the work undertaken by the Public Protector in a given 
financial year. Public Protector South Africa (2014:9) outlines that the annual reports 
are submitted in terms of section 181(5) of the Constitution. “The reports seek to 
provide an account of how the Office of the Public Protector fared in implementing its 
constitutional mandate and specific commitments of the year under review while 
capturing key promises for the year ahead” (Public Protector South Africa 2014:9). 
The Office of the Public Protector depends on the National Assembly, 
representatives of organs of state, and the people of South Africa for support in the 
fulfilment of its constitutional mandate. 
With annual reports, the Public Protector is afforded the opportunity to outline what 
has been achieved for the year, as well as a clear indication of the scope of work 
covered given the budget allocations provided to the Office of the Public Protector. 
Annual reports also serve to highlight the backlog that the Public Protector 
encounters in discharging the mandate of the office. In all fairness, annual reports 
presented by the Office of the Public Protector represent some form of vertical 
accountability, and the essence of good governance and democratic accountability. 
This chapter discussed the evolution of the Office of the Public Protector in South 
Africa, the role and activities of the Public Protector, the powers of the Public 
Protector, as well as the roles, responsibilities, and functions of Public Protector. The 
chapter contextualised the role of the Public Protector. The fact that the Public 
Protector is expected to act impartially is reason enough to hope for a massive 
contribution on the part of this functionary with regard to pursuing good governance. 
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This functionary, together with other horizontal accountability institutions, has an 
important role to play in steering South Africa on the right course, the result of which 
will have a lasting impact on the citizens’ lives. The Public Protector is credited with 
being the embodiment of a just and fair public sector administration. 
The Public Protector has powers derived from the Constitution and national 
legislation, as outlined in this chapter. The chapter specified that the Public Protector 
carries out a constitutional and statutory mandate for which he or she accounts to 
parliament. As noted in Chapter Four, the key legislation prescribing the powers, 
roles, and responsibilities, as well as functions of the Public Protector is the Public 
Protector Act, No. 23 of 1994. All organs of state are expected to support the Public 
Protector in carrying out the mandate of the Office of the Public Protector. The Office 
of the Public Protector has wide-ranging powers, with jurisdiction over all organs of 
state, any institution in which the state is the majority or controlling shareholder, and 
any public entity as defined in section 1 of the Public Finance Management Act of 
1999. The Public Protector has the power to investigate any sphere of government, 
as well as organs of state or any institution where the state is a major controlling 
shareholder, or any public entity for misconduct such as maladministration, abuse of 
power, unfair conduct and unlawful enrichment, and any breach of ethics code that 
applies to the executive branch of government. 
The Public Protector is appointed by the president of the country on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly, in terms of Chapter 9 of the Constitution. 
The Public Protector must be a South African citizen, who is suitably qualified and 
experienced, and has a reputation for honesty and integrity. The proceedings are run 
by a committee of parliament that reflects the proportional representation of all 
political parties represented in the National Assembly. 
Approximately six months before the appointment is to be made, parliament issues a 
notice calling for applications for the post of Public Protector. The nominated 
candidates are shortlisted and public interviews of the applicants begin. The full 
National Assembly then votes on a recommended candidate, who must obtain the 
support of a 60% majority, which allows the president to make the appointment. 
This mandate makes the Office of the Public Protector a crucial corruption-fighting 
body in the public sector as it aims to ensure that the government fulfils its mandate 
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without fear, favour, or prejudice. The Office of the Public Protector has also been 
praised as an accessible and effective alternative to the courts. 
Furthermore, the Constitution, national legislation, and policies require that public 
functionaries must comply, and in terms of failure to act on remedial actions, they 
must be sanctioned. The Constitution is also vocal in communicating the message 
that Chapter 9 institutions must exercise their mandates without fear, favour, or 
prejudice. It is in light of this promulgation that the Public Protector can investigate 
everyone in the country, including the president of the Republic of South Africa. 
Where the Public Protector has reason to believe that serious violations and crimes 
were committed, he or she may refer the matter to the relevant prosecuting authority. 
This is an endeavour to promote cooperation among organs of state. 
The Public Protector can receive complaints from any person with regard to 
suspected incidents of maladministration. Likewise, the Public Protector can initiate 
his or her own investigations to uncover any wrongdoings or acts of corruption. The 
Public Protector is therefore a custodian of the Constitution and a promoter of good 
governance practices. The Constitution further pronounces that all organs of state 
must assist Chapter 9 institutions in their mission to strengthen constitutional 
democracy, and by implication they must also support the Public Protector in 
whatever way possible. 
The Public Protector does not exercise arbitrary powers as this will result in this 
functionary being too powerful to the extent of abusing power. Although the Office of 
the Public Protector is an independent institution subject only to the Constitution, the 
Public Protector is accountable to parliament for all the activities carried out by his or 
her office. The Public Protector is prevented from investigating outcomes of court 
decisions or any case before the courts. This is meant to prevent organs of state 
from encroaching one another’s area of competence and to ensure that duplication is 
avoided at all cost. The necessity to strive towards attaining good governance is not 
a matter of competition among organs of state but rather a collective effort meant to 
achieve a prosperous nation for all. The government is one entity that functions as a 
system with interdependent subsystems. 
The overall objective of a government is to promote and achieve a common cause 
for all its citizens to prosper and to enjoy the fruit of good governance. In conducting 
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investigations, the Public Protector is guided by principles of fairness, equity, and 
justice; hence everyone is allowed to be given a fair hearing, as advocated by the 
principle of audi alteram partem. 
The chapter also provided selected reports of the Public Protector as contextualised 
as cases in order to determine how the mandate of the Public Protector was 
complied with in a democratic system of cooperative governance. In this regard the 
cases of the Minister of Transport in 2007, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs in 
2009, the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation in 2016, and the 
Minister of Basic Education in 2013 were presented to highlight examples of 
oversight in terms of the national sphere of government. 
The chapter also highlighted investigation reports implicating members of the PECs 
in the provincial sphere of government. In this regard, the cases of the Premier of the 
Free State in 2006 and the Premier of Gauteng in 2010 were discussed. In the local 
sphere of government, the chapter highlighted the investigation reports implicating 
members of municipal councils; for example the case of the Kungwini Local 
Municipality in 2006 and the Municipal Council of the City of Matlosana in 2007. 
Cooperative governance goes beyond the three spheres of government, hence the 
chapter highlighted investigation reports involving public officials and public entities. 
These included the cases of the SABS in 2009, the CCMA in 2007, and the Gauteng 
Department of Education in 2011. 
The chapter discussed controversial cases where the issue regarding the question 
whether Public Protector has remedial power was addressed. It was clear that the 
courts can enforce the remedial actions proposed by the Public Protector. However, 
the State of Capture report created a unique dilemma in terms of, inter alia, the 
alleged state abuse by the acting president that raised questions in terms of the 
remedial actions the Public Protector can take to expose corruption and state abuse. 
Questions in terms of the validity of the recommended judicial inquiry, as well as the 
nature and scope of the power to appoint a commission of inquiry to investigate state 
abuse, came to the fore as an outcome of this report.  
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6.4 Findings of the study  
The Office of the Public Protector is held in high esteem since it can summon 
anyone to appear before the Public Protector. As noted previously: 
 the Public Protector can recommend remedial action to right wrongs 
committed;  
 where crimes of a serious nature have been committed, the Public Protector 
can refer the matter to the National Assembly for action;  
 the Public Protector submits annual reports to parliament on activities carried 
out in a financial year as part of vertical accountability; and  
 the Public Protector’s reports are open to the public unless parliament decides 
otherwise, in light of protecting the safety and integrity of the Republic of 
South Africa.  
In triangulating various datasets from the literature, the Constitution, national 
legislation and policies, as well as court findings and principles of multilateral 
institutions, the findings revealed that there is universal support for the Public 
Protector or an Ombudsman-like institution. This is in respect of the necessity to hold 
state organs to account. The qualitative findings also suggested that unrestrained 
power poses problems and does not augur well for good governance. The idea of 
the institution of the Office of the Public Protector has received universal acclaim, 
hence South Africa has followed suit. The Public Protector is rooted in the 
Ombudsman institution taken from global practices and the creation of the 
Constitution, and therefore has constitutional and statutory mandates. 
The narrative on good governance is supported by numerous theories, and a 
number of concepts have been developed to support good governance as an ideal 
worth pursuing. An important point is that good governance is not the preserve of 
democratic countries. The need to hold all public functionaries to account is central 
to a well-functioning government and the concomitant good governance that is so 
universally aspired to. Good governance is essential for the wellbeing of a country as 
it determines whether the country will be rich or poor. Together with other institutions 
established to strengthen constitutional democracy, the Public Protector is 
instrumental in unravelling maladministration and corruption that continue unabated. 
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The framers of the Constitution envisioned the need to exercise oversight over the 
politically powerful and well connected. Hence the Public Protector is empowered to 
summon anyone whose testimony would assist in whatever investigation the Public 
Protector conducts. Without this power, the Office of the Public Protector would be 
undermined to the extent of losing its credibility and effectiveness. Failure to heed 
the Public Protector’s summons to appear before him or her is regarded as a 
criminal offence and carries a sanction. The Public Protector is expected to operate 
impartially, without any prejudice towards any party or individual. The Constitution 
and related legislation prescribe that the Public Protector should be beyond party 
politics and not be subject to political party supremacy.  
Concerning the Public Protector, its predecessors were the Advocate-General and 
the Office of the Ombudsman. Both the Advocate-General and the Office of the 
Ombudsman had the power under the Ombudsman Act to investigate reports of 
maladministration, but not to take remedial action directly. Their remedial powers 
were expressly limited to only referring findings to other institutions for remedial 
action. 
Notwithstanding the above, the role of the Ombudsman is to uphold government 
accountability. However, one of the concerns regarding the capacity of the 
Ombudsman in discharging its mandate is the issue of its independence. To this 
end, it is argued that the independence and impartiality of the Ombudsman are 
prerequisites for its effectiveness. In order to discharge its functions, the 
Ombudsman must be independent, impartial, fair, and confidential. However, the 
issue of the Ombudsman’s independence in the South African context does not 
arise. This is because the Constitution secures the independence of the Public 
Protector through its establishment and appointment, removal from the office, and 
allocation of budgets and powers. 
As noted in Chapter Four, the president appoints the Public Protector on the 
recommendation of the National Assembly, which makes a recommendation from 
persons nominated by a committee proportionally composed of members of all 
parties represented in the National Assembly (see section 193 of the Constitution). 
The nomination must be approved by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of 
at least 60% of the members of the National Assembly to ensure that the candidate 
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is a person who has wide respect among the different political parties represented in 
the legislature. 
It is argued, however, that the appointment process is flawed because of the 
composition of the ad hoc selection committee and the interview process. In respect 
of the composition of the panel, Bazana (in Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:8) argues that a 
committee comprised of politicians representing their various parties and obviously 
their interests compromises the professional ethics of recruitment and selection. 
Regarding the interview process, Bazana (in Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:8) argues that 
“a mere interview is inadequate to identify behavioral characteristics like integrity, 
honesty and reliability, which are crucial to the integrity of the office”. Bazana (in 
Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:8) further argues that “the use of a more competency-based 
assessment relates directly to the job instead of assessing broader behavioral 
characteristics and scrutinizing past events that are not related to the job”. Bazana 
(in Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:8) also states that “parliament should use scientific 
recruitment methods by engaging recruitment professionals to manage the 
recruitment process”. 
According to Tchawouo Mbiada (2017:8), 
“[r]egardless of this concern, the existing selection and recruitment 
process has been in place since the inception of democracy in South 
Africa. The former Public Protectors have upheld the independence of 
the institution … The outgoing Public Protector Advocate Thuli 
Madonsela’s integrity and courage during her term of office bear 
testimony to the fact that notwithstanding the concerns raised about the 
appointment process, maintaining the independence of the Public 
Protector is a matter that depends chiefly on the characteristics of each 
appointee. It is therefore incumbent on the appointed Public Protector 
to prove that he or she is capable of maintaining the independence of 
the office”. 
The independence of the Public Protector is also secured through constitutional 
provisions regarding his or her removal from office and sufficient budget allocation. 
Concerning the removal from office, in terms of section 194 of the Constitution,  
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“the Public Protector may be removed from office only on account of 
misconduct, incapacity or incompetence, after a finding to that effect by 
a committee of the National Assembly and the adoption by the National 
Assembly of a resolution calling for its removal from office”.  
This “resolution of the National Assembly concerning the removal of the Public 
Protector from office must be adopted with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of 
the members of the National Assembly” (Section 194(2)(a) of the Constitution of 
South Africa 1996). Once the resolution is adopted, the president must remove the 
Public Protector from office (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:9). “The lengthy process and 
the high threshold set for the removal of the Public Protector consolidates its 
independence” (see Democratic Alliance vs South African Broadcasting Corporation 
Limited 2015 1 SA 551 para. 30). The Public Protector cannot be removed for 
political reasons or because the results of investigations implicate those in power 
(Gottehrer and Hostina 2000:405). 
What is also important in terms of the independence of the Public Protector, is the 
allocation of the budget. It is common knowledge that financial autonomy plays a 
significant role in the efficiency of any institution, in that without adequate resources 
it will be unable to carry out its activities (Gottehrer and Hostina 2000:403). The 
Public Protector remains “predominantly dependent on the legislature for the 
allocation of funds. It is argued in this respect that an inadequately funded office will 
not be able to perform the duties required by law and will thus lack independence” 
(Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:9). The Public Protector spends the funds allocated to his 
or her office and accounts directly to the legislature, as per section 181(5) of the 
Constitution. This means that it has no control to decide on the allocation of its 
budget as parliament determines and allocates its budget (Tchawouo Mbiada 
2017:10). 
The tendency is for parliament to reduce the budget in order to fund what are 
perceived as being more urgent needs, such as the funding that was required to fund 
the studies of students after the protests during the #FeesMustFall campaigns. 
When this happens, the Public Protector struggles to get more funding for important 
investigations. For example, the Public Protector, while interacting with Nelson 
Mandela University students, expressed concern over her office’s lack of sufficient 
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funding. Similarly, while presenting her annual report to the Portfolio Committee on 
Justice and Correctional Services, she reiterated her call for more funding 
proportional to the workload (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:10). One can infer that with a 
reduced budget, the Public Protector will not be able to carry out all his or her 
investigations, thus reducing his or her effectiveness. The provision of inadequate 
resources  
“does not help in establishing and maintaining the Office of the Public 
Protector as an effective, independent and impartial institution … 
Under financial constraints it may unduly defer to political organs in the 
quest to obtain additional funds and thereby compromise its integrity 
and independence” (Tchawouo Mbiada 2017:10). 
Concerning the powers and functions of the Public Protector, it was argued that 
another way in which the Office of the Public Protector manifests its independence is 
through its powers to freely investigate complaints and make findings and 
recommendations without interference (Gottehrer and Hostina 2000:786). In South 
Africa, however, the functions of the Public Protector are found to go beyond those 
of the Ombudsman in other jurisdictions. In the Mail & Guardian case, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that the Public Protector is not a passive adjudicator between 
citizens and the state, relying on evidence that is placed before it before acting, but 
that its mandate is an investigatory one that requires pro-action in appropriate 
circumstances (The Public Protector v Mail & Guardian Ltd 2011 4 SA (SCA) para. 
9). This signifies that the Office of the Public Protector is given extensive powers to 
carry out its functions. It is pro-active in discharging its investigative functions such 
as entering premises, requesting written submissions, and interviewing parties to a 
dispute. These powers and functions were extensively discussed in Chapter Five.  
The Public Protector represents the ideal of a well-governed country where service 
delivery is the norm and growth and development are achievable. The hopes and 
aspirations of the South African public in promoting the general wellbeing of the 
people rest with the Public Protector and other horizontal accountability institutions. 
Good governance requires strong institutions that are central to a functioning 
democracy, and for this reason, the Public Protector shoulders massive 
responsibility. The Public Protector is the last line of defence against ruthless and 
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unscrupulous politicians and public officials. This functionary has the obligation to 
change the environment within which public sector institutions serve the nation. 
Prosperous states must have the right institutions in place to strengthen their 
democracies and accountability.  
The powers, roles, responsibilities and functions of the Public Protector are provided 
for in the Constitution and other pieces of legislation. From the prescripts and 
statutory frameworks, it is clear that the Public Protector does not operate arbitrarily 
and without due regard for the law. The Public Protector, like all other public 
functionaries, account to some higher authority, such as parliament. The Public 
Protector operates within a statutory framework and is not expected to go beyond 
prescribed boundaries or function ultra vires. In the same vein, the Public Protector 
considers the merits and demerits of each case being investigated, and reaches an 
outcome that is seen as fair and just. The statutory framework also sets limits to the 
jurisdiction of the Public Protector by prescribing areas where the Office of the Public 
Protector may not venture to investigate.   
The chapter also analysed the remedial power of the Office of the Public Protector in 
terms of recommendations made with regard to improper practices and the abuse of 
power of selected cases in general and the controversial case of the State of 
Capture report in particular. It emerged that unlike Ombudsmen in other jurisdictions, 
the Office of the Public Protector is established on a solid foundation that guarantees 
its independence so as to enable it to carry out its functions impartially. In so doing, 
the Public Protector may hold government accountable on various activities that are 
investigated and his or her recommendations must be adhered to.  
In terms of the remedial action presented in the State of Capture report, the 
president was required to appoint the Zondo Commission of Inquiry, despite his 
attempts to set aside the remedial actions recommended by then Public Protector 
Thuli Madonsela. Therefore the Public Protector has remedial power and it is not for 
the president to decide what form of remedial action would be more appropriate 
under the circumstances of this particular investigation into executive malfeasance 
and malpractice. It is clear that there has been almost full compliance with the Public 
Protector’s remedial actions in cases where those recommendations were contested 
in the courts. By holding the government accountable through the remedial actions of 
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the Public Protector, it is ensured that his or her role is consonant with the purpose 
of political accountability, which is to hold government and other organs of state 
accountable for their actions and omissions.   
From the findings of this study, an inference is made regarding how the Public 
Protector fits in the government system of South Africa. This proposed structure is 
depicted in Figure 6.1 in terms of a systems approach flowchart that has greater 
magnitude in an effort to align government towards pursuing good governance. 
Figure 6.1: Position of the Public Protector in the government system 
 
 
Source: Author’s own construction 
 
Figure 6.1 indicates that the Public Protector and parliament receive inputs from 
citizens in the form of complaints and contributions to draft policy documents. These 
are then acted upon by the Public Protector and parliament. The result is 
recommendations from the Public Protector and legislation from parliament. The 
outputs in the form of Public Protector recommendations (remedial action) and 
pieces of legislation passed by parliament must be implemented by the government. 
Government implementation is expected to enhance service delivery and promote 
clean governance, and to provide everyone with prospects of a better life. 
Prospects of a better life for all citizens 
Deliveries of public services free from corruption, and based on clean governance 
Cabinet 
Public Protector, other Chapter 9 institutions, and parliament 
Inputs from citizens and public submissions 
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6.5  Final conclusions 
This research endeavoured to address the primary guiding research question by 
systematically aligning all the chapters of the thesis in a comprehensive manner. The 
research design and methodology therefore served to integrate the key arguments 
and narratives, and thus enabled the thesis to be developed and written 
conclusively.  
The thesis discussed good governance as an ideal worth pursuing as seen in the 
universal acclaim of this “treasure”. One institution best placed to enhance good 
governance is the Office of the Public Protector. Contrastingly, a weak and 
ineffective Public Protector would not be in a position to steer the country towards 
achieving good governance for the ultimate benefit of all citizens. 
Although the Constitution is vocal on the imperative of all organs of state and 
politicians to support the Office of the Public Protector in its mandate, this is not 
always the case. The most vicious attacks on the Public Protector in South Africa 
have come from politicians, in particular from prominent members of cabinet. It is 
therefore, disturbing that those charged with guarding South Africa’s constitutional 
democracy are the ones who are guilty of promoting subtle and overt anarchy. Public 
defiance of the Public Protector by politicians has been demonstrated openly in 
public spaces on numerous occasions.   
A credible Public Protector with strong principles is critical for the pursuit of achieving 
the dream of a country governed on the basis of good governance. Various theories 
assert that good governance requires that all subsystems should be made to work 
towards building a strong, unified and functional system. After all, the forces who 
strongly oppose good governance are ignorant of the essence of cooperative 
governance and are driven by selfishness and greed, as well as the desire to 
continually perpetuate wanton corruption and suffering on the part of impoverished 
citizens. Such characters have no respect for the people, the Constitution, and the 
institutions established to safeguard South Africa’s constitutional democracy. Lastly, 
the framers of the Constitution did not foresee a situation where the president of the 
country would actually be at the centre of accusations concerning violations of the 
Constitution. 
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The ideal of governing on the basis of good governance is worth pursuing since it 
produces overwhelming beneficial results for a country. However, attaining good 
governance requires concerted and well-coordinated efforts on the part of all 
stakeholders. 
The pursuit of good governance as an ideal is a massive responsibility, which may 
not be left solely to one institution to account for without the support of other parties. 
Every party with vested interests in a well-governed country has the responsibility to 
make a sound contribution in this regard. This requires that all institutions and 
citizens must work in unison, not only in attaining good governance but also in 
sustaining it. Institutions and practices established to ensure good governance must 
be maintained and continually monitored to ascertain that there are no deviations or 
unintended consequences that would derail the planned course of action. Figure 6.2 
presents an integrated picture of the context of the operations of the Public Protector 
to achieve good governance. 
Figure 6.2: Integrated perspective of the context of the Public Protector to  
achieve good governance 
 
Source: Author’s own construction 
 
Figure 6.2 depicts an environment of cooperation between accountability institutions, 
with the Public Protector best positioned to deal with maladministration and 
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corruption by drawing from the inputs by citizens. The Public Protector is expected to 
be apolitical, therefore placing this functionary in a better position to serve the public 
diligently. Inputs made by the citizens are based on the expectation that some 
recourse will be provided where there is reason to believe that maladministration 
and/or corruption exists.  
Given the resources available to the Public Protector, the inputs from the citizens are 
processed with a view to finding the best possible outcomes. Some resources 
include managerial capacity, competent investigators and other personnel, systems, 
policies, and procedural guidelines, among others. When the processing of inputs 
are concluded, the outputs to the environment take the form of reports, 
recommendations, remedial action, and corrective measures. Where there is reason 
to believe that a crime has been committed, the Public Protector refers the case to a 
competent authority to initiate prosecution. 
Failure to promote good governance will impact negatively on the lives of citizens 
and this will be clearly articulated in the feedback that emanates from the impact 
made by the outputs to the environment. Good governance is attainable in an 
environment characterised by cooperation and a strong sense of unity, as well as a 
good understanding of employing a systems approach.  
6.6   Recommendations   
In order to strengthen the role of the Public Protector in promoting good governance 
in a constitutional democracy and to enhance the accounting powers of the Public 
Protector, as well as the enforcement of the remedial actions of the Public Protector, 
the following recommendations are made:  
 In the event that the government does not comply with the Public Protector’s 
remedial actions and does not set them aside for review, it is suggested that 
the remedial actions be made an order of the court to have the force of law to 
be applied. 
 That any aggrieved party or the Public Protector may apply to the court for 
remedial actions to be made an order of the court since the decisions of the 
court are binding. 
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 That the legislation governing the Public Protector be amended to 
accommodate the above proposals. 
 That the Office of the Public Protector be empowered with resources not only 
as an alternative dispute resolution institution that operates parallel to the 
courts but as an institution that complements the role of the judiciary in the 
enforcement of the fight against corruption, unlawful enrichment, prejudice, 
and impropriety in the affairs of the state. 
 To provide more enforcement powers for the Public Protector to protect the 
public against discrimination and abuse because it is more cost effective for 
poor people and it will ease the backlog in the courts where litigants many 
have to wait for a long time for their matters to be adjudicated. 
 To improve the accessibility of the Office of the Public Protector to vulnerable 
people who have limited access to justice and cannot afford lengthy and 
expensive court cases. 
 To offer outreach programmes targeted at giving access to poor and 
vulnerable people to lodge complaints.  
 To increase the funding for the Office of the Public Protector in light of the 
increased demand to combat state corruption and to safeguard the values of a 
constitutional democracy. 
6.7  Recommendations for future research 
Future studies could focus on issues this study did not attempt to research, for 
example: What guarantees could be made to ensure that party politics are prevented 
from hindering good governance in terms of the oversight of Chapter 9 institutions? 
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